Putin’s war in Ukraine is an inflection point

Trying to fathom the likely consequences of the world-historical event that is Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war of choice in Ukraine, I am reminded of former British Prime Minister Harold MacMillan. When asked what was the greatest challenge to his foreign policy, MacMillan replied, “Events, Dear boy, events.”

There are few certainties about the world after Putin’s invasion of Ukraine. If we are lucky, we will avoid nuclear war. But his barbaric assaults on Kharkiv and Kyiv may mark a turning point in the war.

There is no going back to the status quo. It is no accident that the White House put its overdue National Security Strategy on hold. For all the urgent priority attached to the Indo-Pacific, it is difficult to see how the U.S. will not be preoccupied with European security for some time to come — including increased U.S. forces in Europe.

The remarkable transformations Putin’s Ukraine war has induced in a matter of days is exactly the opposite of what Putin intended: He’s given new purpose, vigor and unity to NATO; few would be surprised if Finland and Sweden now join. He’s rejuvenating the flailing world order, galvanizing U.S. allies to respond with unprecedented sanctions that could lead to Putin’s undoing. Worldwide anti-war demonstrations – including in 58 Russian cities – against the war and globally in support of Ukraine underscore that Russia is becoming a pariah state.

Putin wanted to get NATO away from his borders. Now it will likely be in a stronger force along his borders with the Baltic states (Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia) and Poland. The economic disruption may plunge the U.S. and Europe into recession and devastate the Russian economy, perhaps placing Putin in jeopardy.

Most dramatically, there has been a tectonic 180-degree shift in Germany. Just a week ago, German Chancellor Olaf Scholz was silent during a U.S. visit when President Biden spoke of cancelling the Nordstream 2 gas pipeline with Russia. Berlin was jeered when it sent only helmets to Ukraine. Fast forward: Last week Scholz emphatically cancelled the pipeline, Germany is sending military equipment to Ukraine and Scholz announced that he’ll increase defense spending to over 2 percent — from 53 billion euros to $100 billion. Scholz also backed U.S. efforts to freeze Russian Central Bank assets, many held in euros.

Europe’s security architecture will almost certainly be reconfigured. It may just be expanding the Cold War frontiers to include a robust NATO military in the Baltic states and Poland. But two millennia ago, Chinese strategist Sun Tzu advised to “Build your opponent a golden bridge to retreat across.” It is a dangerous situation as Putin appears unhinged (as his bizarre Feb. 21 speech demonstrated). It was a distorted paranoid fantasy version of history laced with conspiracy theories claiming threats from Ukrainian Nazis (its president, Volodymyr Zelensky, is Jewish) and nuclear weapons.

Putin appears isolated, talking only to a very small circle of advisers. He has made at least two major strategic miscalculations. First, he thought the U.S. was weak, in disarray, and that Europe was divided, unable to muster a strong response. Second, he severely underestimated Ukrainian resistance, which is raising the cost to Moscow in blood and treasure. He may have been emboldened by a series of low-cost wins with anemic Western response — crushing Chechen rebels in 2000, defeating Georgia in 2008, occupying and annexing Crimea in 2014 and intervening in Syria in 2015.

Perhaps the biggest risk is that Putin, with his finger on the nuclear trigger, cannot admit or accept defeat. Here, Sun Tzu’s advice should be heeded. If Putin’s gambit fails, the U.S. needs to be, as Winston Churchill advised after World War II, magnanimous in victory and offer a non-humiliating off-ramp.

There is no easy, satisfying solution. It may be premature to consider outcomes. It is difficult to imagine a stable, durable European security structure with Putin; it may have to await his successor. That said, given the risk for wider and/or nuclear war, a resolution with the Russian government we have might include a host of arms control and confidence-building measures that were on the table before diplomacy collapsed, expanded to include removing Russian forces in the Donbas, Belarus and Ukraine border and weapons systems near Ukraine NATO borders if Putin wants to avoid U.S./NATO troops on his borders.

And then there is the fate of Ukraine. After Putin’s Crimea grab, Henry Kissinger wrote that, “if Ukraine is to survive and thrive, it must not be either side’s outpost against the other — it should function as a bridge between them.” That may sound cynical and hard to swallow. But Kissinger meant that Ukraine should not be a Russian satellite or a source of Russian security concerns.

In initial Moscow-Kyiv talks, neutrality has been on the table. One scenario might be: leavened by Russian reparations, perhaps a neutral, self-defended Ukraine. But rather than just the EU plan, there is no reason why Ukraine could not also associate with Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union. Eastern Ukraine is integrated into the Russian economy and trade is not necessarily a zero-sum game.

Putin’s war reminds us that the enemy gets a vote. We may get lucky, and Putin may be gone in the coming months, or we may have festering tensions in a volatile Eurasia.      

It’s worth noting obvious Chinese discomfort with Putin’s invasion. Beijing’s obsession with sovereignty and vocal “non-interference” principles has twisted China into all sorts of verbal contortions trying to reconcile the irreconcilable.

It’s no accident that the Russian invasion began one day after the Olympics. Evidence suggests Beijing didn’t know a full invasion was planned, and that Xi got played by Putin to some extent. Watching the robust response of a rejuvenated West may give Beijing’s pause in regards to its strategy toward Taiwan.

Events, dear boy, events. Putin’s Ukraine war marks an inflection point. It will ripple across a shaky and fragmenting world order for much of this decade. U.S. priorities in the Indo-Pacific may take a hit as we are faced with constrained resources. Rejuvenated trans-Atlantic cooperation may thrive. The unintended and unanticipated consequences will reshape and/or wreak havoc on a fragile civilization for much of this decade.           

Robert A. Manning is a senior fellow of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and its New American Engagement Initiative at the Atlantic Council. He was a senior counselor to the undersecretary of state for global affairs from 2001 to 2004, a member of the U.S. Department of State policy planning staff from 2004 to 2008 and on the National Intelligence Council strategic futures group from 2008 to 2012. Follow him on Twitter @Rmanning4.