Double-down on the Indo-Pacific in the midst of a Ukraine crisis 

The Biden administration’s “relentless diplomacy” has generated no notable successes. It failed in Afghanistan with its botched 2021 withdrawal, and it is nearing failure in Iran over a reconstituted nuclear-arms agreement. Its results are yet to be seen in Ukraine — but Russia’s continued military buildup along Ukraine’s border provides no cause for optimism.

There is, however, an upshot of the Biden administration’s misplaced faith in diplomacy in place of force. It has precluded a major force surge in Europe, one that could leave the U.S.’s Indo-Pacific interests in jeopardy. 

Given the prospect of simultaneity, the U.S. must consider increasing its Indo-Pacific forces to prevent China from capitalizing on apparent U.S. weakness. Indeed, it is this apparent weakness, and the attendant question of simultaneity, that gives Ukraine its relevance for American statesmen.

Ukraine is a de facto buffer between NATO and Russia. Although its population tilts West, economically and dispositionally, it remains beyond NATO’s security protection — as it should. The Baltics already are an extended NATO commitment; adding Ukraine would further expand NATO’s borders and add to its ranks a semi-kleptocratic “partial democracy.” 

A successful Russian invasion that tore away “Novorossiya” — a bureaucratic term of Imperial Russian extraction that today’s Kremlin has resurrected, referring to the region from Donbas to Transnistria and north to Dnipropetrovsk — would allow Russia to pressure Romania and Bulgaria, jeopardizing NATO’s southern flank. But a successful Russian invasion is unlikely, given Ukraine’s size, the population’s immense hostility to Russian rule and the sheer number of soldiers required to conquer urban centers. A more limited Russian assault that linked Donbas and Crimea via Mariupol and the Azov Sea’s coastline has a greater likelihood of success and would pose issues for NATO in the Black Sea. Even this, however, will trigger a Ukrainian insurgency.

The U.S. and NATO therefore have an interest in Ukrainian survival, despite their prudent unwillingness to provide a binding military commitment to Kyiv.

Despite the risks, Russia may choose to force the issue.

The Ukraine crisis is the second instance of anti-American pressure in five months. Just as South Vietnam’s conquest by the North prompted Soviet activity in Latin America, Africa and the Middle East, Afghanistan’s fall to the Taliban has emboldened America’s enemies. Victorious or defeated, Russia’s assault will call into question American credibility, given U.S. ties to Ukraine and the rhetorical capital the Obama, Biden and, to a lesser extent, Trump administrations invested in its survival.

On the other side of Eurasia, China eyes Taiwan greedily, hoping to absorb the island-republic, pillage its semiconductor industry and use this rupture in the First Island Chain to push forces out into the Philippine Sea. A Russian assault on Ukraine may prompt — coordinated or otherwise — a simultaneous Chinese attack on Taiwan. Such a coordinated strategy is likely, given the clear confluence of Russian and Chinese interests.

The recently announced Russo-Sino-Iranian military exercises are yet another example of planned cooperation between America’s adversaries. Particularly for China and Russia, each furthers the other’s objectives. Russian pressure diverts American attention and resources from the Indo-Pacific, while Chinese victory would accelerate Russia’s ability to disrupt or crack NATO.

Russia has an Indo-Pacific presence — not as robust as its Soviet predecessors, but relevant nonetheless. Russian submarines, deployed from their Pacific Fleet bases, would, at a minimum, split Japanese and American attention and, at best, if they reach the Taiwan Strait, shift the tactical balance in a Sino-Russian coalition’s favor.

Chinese propaganda outlets have refrained from open support for Russian actions, instead striking a neutral tone. This likely stems from China’s desire to maintain political flexibility in Eastern Europe — Ukraine, after all, could be a valuable participant in China’s Belt and Road initiative. But Chinese tact should not be mistaken for resistance to Russia. If Russia invades, we may expect China to prepare the informational space for action against Taiwan, citing the same narratives the Kremlin has deployed to justify “historical claims” to a sovereign Ukraine.

More broadly, American inaction will encourage our Indo-Pacific allies to rethink their positions.

Taiwanese leaders understand the obvious parallels between the two countries: While Taiwan is far more strategically relevant than Ukraine, both are outside of the U.S. formal alliance structure and, therefore, beyond an explicit American defense perimeter; other Asian countries considering greater links with the U.S., most notably Vietnam, will look at America’s response. And Asian allies, including partners like Japan and Australia, may look askance at American defense commitments, given the trend of the past five months.

America can preempt this erosion of its credibility — and shore up its immediate deterrence posture — in the Indo-Pacific by the rapid deployment of naval and air assets to the region. Four steps are critical.

First, the U.S. should surge attack submarines farther west. Naval Base Guam hosts four Los Angeles-class submarines; ten are home-ported at Pearl Harbor along with five Virginia-class nuclear subs (SSNs), and five in San Diego. Although the Navy uses its Seawolf-class submarines for special missions, the three Seawolf subs are based in Bremerton and Bangor, Wash. Thus, U.S. Indo-Pacific Command has up to 27 attack submarines at its disposal. The berths in Guam likely can accommodate a significant number of SSNs at any given time. A higher operational tempo will stress the Navy’s two-ship submarine tender force, but the Navy likely could sustain this tempo for six to eight weeks — that is, the window of vulnerability that a Ukraine war would create.

Second, the U.S. should deploy at least one of its two West Coast-based Ohio-class guided-missile subs to the Taiwan Strait. (The USS Nevada was sighted in Guam on Jan. 15.) A ballistic-missile sub is a public signal of American resolve. However, it is not a legitimate deterrent against conventional action. China understands that its ballistic missile arsenal is nowhere near large enough to mount a decapitation strike against the U.S.; a guided-missile sub, by contrast, provides immediate conventional combat power. An Arleigh Burke-class destroyer’s 96 missile cells carry a mix of air defense, anti-surface and land-attack missiles. A guided-missile destroyer operating within Chinese missile range would prioritize air defenses, reducing its strike capabilities to between 16 and 32 missiles, depending upon the precise loadout. But an Ohio-class sub carries 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles in 22 launch tubes and can rely on its stealth to avoid detection until launch. A 100-plus missile salvo would disrupt any Chinese landing attempt in Taiwan. The U.S. must demonstrate that a guided-missile sub is in theatre, ideally by surfacing one in or near the Taiwan Strait.

Third, the U.S. should surge strategic bombers to Guam. It has done so in the past, most recently during the 2017-2018 North Korea crisis. B-1, B-2 and B-52 bombers are ideal platforms to carry the U.S.’s longer-range missiles like the AGM-158C. Conducting continuous bomber patrols that approach the Taiwan Strait — particularly if nuclear and conventional loadouts remain unannounced — will ensure additional cruise missile coverage in the event of a Chinese attack.

Fourth, the U.S. should increase Guam’s air defenses. In a war, Guam will be one of China’s primary targets, given its centrality to U.S. Western Pacific logistics. The U.S. military has dragged its feet on deploying missile defenses on Guam for nearly a decade; this is the moment to forward-deploy a Patriot PAC-3 system along with the THAAD anti-ballistic missile system already in Guam.

In the next year, the U.S. must reconsider its entire Eurasian military posture, ideally reorienting it to counter China, which multiple administrations have endorsed but none has executed. Before this point — and before the Ukraine crisis is resolved — a window of vulnerability remains. An immediate surge of air and naval forces into the Western Pacific will reduce this vulnerability, while reassuring U.S. allies and affiliates that, in the event of invasion, they will not share Ukraine’s fate. 

Seth Cropsey is founder and president of Yorktown Institute, a Washington-based think tank focused on America’s global leadership, alliances and related issues, including a concentration on such topics as sea power, force structure and strategy, and strategic history. He served as a naval officer and as a deputy Undersecretary of the Navy.

Harry Halem, who holds a master’s degree in political philosophy from the London School of Economics, contributed.