Missile defense: ‘If it ain’t broke, don’t fix it’

Missile defense is back in the news for a variety of reasons, some good, some worrisome. 

Here is the good news. 

First, the Missile Defense Agency (MDA) just successfully shot down for the first time an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM)-class warhead, using a Navy Aegis ship-based Standard Missile 3. This test was required by Congress as the first step in seriously looking at augmenting our nation’s national missile defense, consisting now of 44 interceptors deployed in Alaska and California, that also have been successful in tests in seven of the last eight intercepts.

Second, the New START Treaty probably will be extended and, although significantly flawed, the positive side is that during a five-year extension we hopefully will not mistakenly restrict missile defenses as part of any nuclear arms deal, which Russia routinely insists upon when asked what the next steps are in arms control.

And third, the current missile defense ground-based interceptor (GBI) is being improved and better sustained, even as Congress is providing — so far — parallel robust funding for a new advanced interceptor, referred to as next-generation interceptor (NGI), to be deployed by the end of this decade. It’s capable of dealing with future ballistic missile threats such as multiple warheads.

There is, however, some bad news.

Missile threats to the United States homeland and the western Pacific and Middle East are getting worse, particularly with respect from Russia, China, Iran and North Korea.

Russia is developing new “exotic” long-range missiles not necessarily constrained by arms control. China has tested more ballistic missiles in the past year than the rest of the world combined, as it is simultaneously on schedule to double its nuclear arsenal within the decade. North Korea is building its own missile arsenal and has an emerging submarine-based ballistic missile that threatens the United States and its allies. As for Iran, the Islamic Republic has the largest missile force in the entire Middle East, remains deadest on securing nuclear weapons, and is the world’s primary sponsor and armory of terrorist groups worldwide, including a growing Hezbollah threat in this hemisphere.

To meet these threats, Congress and the administration must decide who is going to be the long-term manager and integrator of the nation’s “next steps” in U.S. and allied missile defense protection.

The Missile Defense Agency currently integrates the entire missile defense system across the various flight regimes and the Government Accountability Office (GAO) is proposing that it take over the job of lead system integrator of the Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD) program. The assumption is that an MDA-run program would be less expensive and more flexible in moving from research and development to acquisition.

However, the jury is out on that, and what evidence exists points in the opposite direction. An industry-led systems integration job has worked for the Apollo Moon landing, the Space Shuttle, and the International Space Station. The B-1 bomber and Peacekeeper ICBM were, at one point, candidates for a government-run acquisition, but in the final analysis, Rockwell and Boeing did the job well.

The B-1 has proven itself in combat for three decades, while the Peacekeeper ICBM had 21 consecutive successful test flights plus a deployment in 1986 — exactly when the Ballistic Missile Office had projected in 1974.

For the GMD system, Boeing has been the system integrator since 1998. Boeing has led the effort for significant capability expansions that provide a proven defense, which has overcome initial difficulties.

Today, the system has more than 180 assets that stretch across 15 time zones. The system is currently fielded and has been on “ready alert,” defending the U.S. 24/7/365 for more than 16 years, with regular maintenance, upgrades and flight-test support performed by a Boeing-led team across the United States.

Additional activities approved by a bipartisan majority in Congress continue to be conducted that will provide future capability and capacity expansions, including a fourth missile field under construction in Alaska that will provide capacity for 20 interceptors.  

The integration work for GMD consists of five major activities: operations and sustainment support to Warfighter 24/7 mission execution; ground system modernization, including communications upgrades, and silo-based mission electronics; program development and upgrades, primarily software capability upgrades; field expansion (as stated above); and flight tests and ground tests, to demonstrate new capabilities and provide confidence in the system

A single integration contract allows personnel to be moved where needed to work specific problems and return the technical or programmatic experts to their normal operational jobs with rapid execution. The benefit can be accomplished without having to cross individual contract boundaries and/or requesting support from contractors with responsibility for other parts of the overall system.  

This is especially important to one of the most complex weapons systems ever built — the GMD — where the single contractor needs to assure technical, schedule, operational and cost performance. Failure is not an option, and in an environment where weather reaches 50 degrees below zero.

When the government maintains multiple, large prime contractors, a single contractor prime typically is used. The Space Shuttle, Space Station and the B-1 bomber have had large prime hardware contractors across the system and tried but failed to initially integrate the complex systems with a government agency or service as the lead. In the programs noted, industry including Boeing was established as the prime integrator and a hardware provider.  

The country learned the expensive and difficult lesson in the Future Combat System development that it is not healthy for a prime contractor or for the government to hold a unilateral authority at the weapon system level. Similar to the Space Shuttle, Space Station and B-1 programs, where the experiences resulted in appropriate checks and balances between government and industry, the GMD program successfully continues.

The old adage applies — “If it isn’t broke, don’t fix it.” Because we face major missile threats from nuclear-armed adversaries, the United States has some complex geostrategic decisions, especially the extent to which we build defenses beyond the limited missile threats, which was the initial requirement of the 1999 National Missile Defense Act.

Peter Huessy is president and founder of GeoStrategic Analysis, a national security consulting firm in Potomac, Md. For 22 years, he was senior defense consultant at the National Defense University Foundation. For the past six years, he has been a guest lecturer on nuclear deterrence and missile defense policy at the U.S. Naval Academy.