How Western nuclear inaction could embolden the Kremlin

The Kremlin might be emboldened by the weak pushback from the U.S. and NATO against its heightened nuclear saber-rattling, increasing nuclear dangers. NATO allies might explore more effective ways to reduce these risks.

In February 2023 when Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, President Vladimir Putin put Russian nuclear forces on higher alert. In recent months, Moscow has unleashed a torrent of nuclear scare rhetoric. 

In February, Putin warned that posting NATO troops to Ukraine could risk nuclear conflict. Former President Dmitry Medvedev sneered that attempts to restore Russia’s 1991 border with Ukraine would lead to a “global war.”

On state television, Russian propagandists amplify the bluster. Last month, commentator Dmitry Kiselyov said U.S. “decision-making centers and launch sites on land and sea are in our crosshairs. France will be disarmed in an instant. The British Isles will simply go underwater.”

Russia has also bolstered its military nuclear posture in Europe. In the 2000s, Moscow began covertly deploying a new cruise missile, the 9M729. It violated the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, causing the U.S. to withdraw. This spring, Russia moved tactical nuclear weapons into Belarus. On May 6, Putin touted a military exercise in southern Russia involving tactical nuclear weapons.

Over the past two years, NATO allies have sometimes been hesitant to send potent arms to Ukraine for fear of escalation, potentially nuclear. This helps explain the U.S. refusal in early 2022 to transfer Polish MiG-29s to Ukraine. Last month, Germany refused to supply Taurus cruise missiles because of escalation worries. On May 3, British Foreign Secretary Lord David Cameron said sending NATO troops to Ukraine would amount to “dangerous escalation.”

Moscow might have expected that NATO would counter the deployment of 9M729 missiles. This is what it did in the 1980s when the USSR secretly fielded SS-20 missiles aimed at Europe and Japan. 

But this time NATO did not deploy a counter. The Kremlin might have seen this as a sign of NATO weakness. More recently, Russia could have perceived as passive the absence of a strong NATO response to Russia’s moving nuclear arms to Belarus.

In sum, the Kremlin might think its nuclear scare tactics are working and are largely cost-free. This could be dangerous. But some NATO allies may be stirred to action.

Last month, Polish President Andrzej Duda called for expanding NATO’s nuclear sharing program to include Poland. Five NATO members — Belgium, Germany, Italy, The Netherlands, and Turkey — currently participate in the program. They have a certain number of dual-capable aircraft configured to deliver conventional or nuclear weapons. Some forces are being modernized with F-35 stealth aircraft armed with new U.S. B61 bombs with lower yield options. This has occasioned no notable controversy.

Warsaw may not have been reassured by NATO’s response to Duda’s bid. The alliance said it had “no plans” to deploy nuclear arms in additional member states. Like West Germany in the Cold War, Poland and Finland are large NATO allies bordering on the threat. Less exposed allies might be content with the alliance’s nuclear posture, but allies nearer the threat appear more concerned.

For all these reasons, Russian leaders could think NATO has become less supportive of its nuclear mission or is torn by strains that have frozen nuclear policy in place. In light of these possible risky perceptions, the alliance might be prudent to reexamine its nuclear stance. 

NATO might consider measures to raise the cost to Russia of its destabilizing nuclear threats. The alliance could, for example, reconsider policies, upgrade exercises or expand the nuclear sharing program. Other options might be possible, such as raising nuclear readiness. Deploying new U.S. nuclear forces in Europe could be controversial or militarily unnecessary.

William Courtney is an adjunct senior fellow at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND research organization. He was U.S. ambassador to Kazakhstan, Georgia and the U.S. Soviet Commission to implement the Threshold Test Ban Treaty.