Last month, Washington hosted one of the most significant shifts in the world’s security architecture since the collapse of the Soviet Union. On April 11, an unprecedented trilateral summit brought together U.S. allies Japan and the Philippines, potentially setting the stage for a spectacular shift in Asia’s Sino-American balance of power.
Before this summit, East Asian security was primarily upheld through a series of bilateral agreements between the United States and its partners. America has defense treaties with the Philippines, Japan and South Korea that do not include all other actors. This “hub and spokes” alliance system is now undergoing an upgrade. In its place, a “webbed” system of collective security is emerging, valuing intra-regional security cooperation in addition to bilateral contacts between the U.S. and its allies.
In short, we may be witnessing the dawn of a nascent “East Asian NATO.”
This shift is not limited in scope or confined to Japan and the Philippines, and it goes well beyond the summit held in Washington. After years of slowly thawing ties with America, Vietnam upgraded the relationship late last year, ushering in a new, more security-focused partnership. While not as groundbreaking as the agreements now taking shape between the U.S. and its other partners, this move is another marker of shifting attitudes and a growing interest in containing China. For years, Vietnam refrained from elevating ties for fear of sparking blowback from Beijing, its primary trading partner, and Russia, a key arms provider. The fact that Vietnam changed tack indicates that concerns about China’s actions in the South China Sea are sufficiently widespread to override past sentiments.
Further evidence is visible in the growing ties between Japan and South Korea. Despite historical animosity that once poisoned any agreements involving the two nations, Tokyo and Seoul are today in a broad geopolitical alignment. Their relationship hit new milestones last year, as South Korea, the U.S. and Japan for the first time held an Indo-Pacific Dialogue to discuss China’s forward-leaning strategy in the South China Sea. Several initiatives emerged, including trilateral aerial cooperation, real-time data sharing on missile launches and revived maritime collaboration, setting the stage for further military integration.
None of this should come as a surprise, as Seoul has also been the victim of Chinese truculence over recent few years. Most notably, a Chinese jet entered South Korea’s Air Defense Identification Zone without warning last year. Bold moves like these have done little to quell fears that China acts as it pleases. For South Korea, this attitude may represent an existential threat, as more than 90 percent of its trade moves through the South China Sea. If a conflict were to break out between China and its neighbors, the effects on the South Korean economy would be cataclysmic.
Beijing has denounced this strategic evolution, yet China’s claims of victimhood are likely to fall on deaf ears, as Beijing has encroached upon its neighbors’ territory. Even rulings by impartial tribunals, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration, have failed to deter Beijing, signaling to others that this behavior is the new norm. The use of escalating tactics, such as the deployment of water cannons by the Chinese coast guard against Philippine vessels, has deepened fears and pushed countries like Japan and the Philippines to embrace previously taboo policies.
Even Japanese pacifism is waning. Japan is increasingly diluting the reach and extent of Article 9 of its constitution, which states that “the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes.” Recent decisions include hikes to Tokyo’s defense spending, with plans to reach 2 percent of GDP, and the loosening of defense export restrictions.
More surprising still is the Philippines’ embrace of Japan as a potential security partner, as historical enmity between these two often seemed like an insurmountable obstacle on the road to greater cooperation. As is often the case, all that was needed was a common foe.
Given the stakes and China’s unceasing aggression, it is no surprise that attitudes are changing. Now it is up to the U.S. to build on these gains. This year’s presidential election will likely have an outsized impact on what happens next. Still, some troubling trends will likely persist whoever occupies the White House.
Free trade orthodoxy, for instance, is unlikely to make a triumphant return, no matter who wins in November. Even if proposed trans-Pacific trade deals don’t include China, any attempts to forge a free trade zone are unlikely to gain traction. Bipartisan willingness to scuttle foreign investments or buyouts of American companies by allies like Japan is misplaced. Japan does not pose a security threat, and Japanese carmakers have been in the U.S. for decades without incident.
Still more misguided is America’s unwillingness to follow through on legislative changes that might supercharge its alliance, building on diplomatic efforts in East Asia. One notable example is shipbuilding, as federal law prohibits the full use of Japan’s and South Korea’s shipbuilding capabilities for a much-needed U.S. naval buildup. This status quo, too, is unlikely to change regardless of the election outcome.
The next administration would do well to propose a full-fledged Pacific Security Alliance, with Asian members carrying full economic and personnel burden-sharing. The future Asian security organization should be supported by U.S. global-reach aerial transportation and intelligence capabilities, naval operational prowess and space-based reconnaissance capabilities. But unlike NATO members, which for decades relied on America’s security muscle, there should be no security free-loading.
The U.S. needs help tackling China’s territorial ambitions through a strategy of collective deterrence, especially with conflicts in Ukraine, Gaza and the Red Sea stretching American defense capabilities thin. Missing this historic opportunity would be a huge mistake.
Ariel Cohen is a nonresident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council’s Eurasia Center and a member of the Council of Foreign Relations. Wesley Alexander Hill the lead analyst and international program manager for the Energy, Growth, and Security Program at the International Tax and Investment Center.