Defense analysts have agreed for some time that the U.S. Navy would play a major role in any conflict that might take place between the United States and China. Often implicit in this view has been the sense that the Navy would have a diminished role in potential wartime operations in the European and Middle Eastern theaters. This is unlikely to be the case, however. The past two years, and especially the last 12 months, have witnessed significant maritime battles in both the Middle East and the Black Sea.
In the months after the start of the Israeli war with Hamas, Yemeni Houthi rebels have been launching missiles and drones, and in at least one case an unmanned underwater vessel, at both commercial vessels, including American ships, and at American and British warships. Despite confident assertions from Washington that the Navy and Air Force have seriously degraded Houthi capabilities, the Houthis continue drawing upon Iranian supplies and advisors and keep firing their weapons at American warships.
Indeed, the battle with the Houthis has been so intense that last week Vice Admiral Brad Cooper, commander of the naval component of Central Command, asserted that the naval fighting is at a historic level: “you’d have to go back to World War II where you have ships who are engaged in combat.” Even if the U.S. and its allies succeed in snuffing out Houthi operations, the need for an American presence, especially a naval presence, in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea will remain critical in order to deter further aggression by Iran or the nonstate actors it sponsors.
The Black Sea has also been the scene of major maritime operations. Since the beginning of the Russian-Ukrainian war, Ukrainian forces have successfully targeted Russian surface warships, most notably when Kyiv’s Neptune anti-ship missiles seriously damaged the Moskva, a Salva-class cruiser on April 13, 2022; the ship sank the next day.
Over the past seven months, Ukrainian forces have destroyed or damaged about one-third of the Russian Black Sea fleet, including as many as 25 Russian surface ships. These have included four Russian Ropucha-class troop landing ships, among them the Caesar Kunikov, that Magura V sea-drones sank on Feb. 14. In addition, Storm Shadow cruise missiles destroyed a Kilo-class attack submarine, while earlier this month Ukrainian naval drones also sank a missile corvette. As a result of its maritime successes, Ukraine has resumed grain shipments through the Black Sea for the first time since the Russian invasion.
American warships have not been operating in the Black Sea; Turkey has prevented them from doing so, according to its interpretation of the Montreux Convention. Nevertheless, Turkey has permitted Navy ships to dock in Istanbul, much to Moscow’s consternation. The need for an American presence adjacent to the Black Sea will only grow once the war comes to an end, because Russia will continue to pose a threat to an independent Ukraine.
Finally, there is a growing need for American naval presence in the Arctic and Baltic regions. Russia has withdrawn from the Baltic Council and this week stopped its payments to the Arctic Council. Both actions are yet more signs of Moscow’s hostility toward NATO, which dominates the Baltic Sea, and which has stepped up its exercises in the Far North and holds seven of the eight seats on the Arctic Council, the eighth being Russia itself.
All of these developments indicate that, apart from the ongoing need for maritime forces in the Pacific, the Navy must have sufficient forces to maintain its presence in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea, the scene of Houthi attacks, as well as both the Eastern Mediterranean and the Arctic.
The administration’s fiscal year 2024 shipbuilding budget does little to alleviate the Navy’s shortfalls; it actually calls for fewer ships — nine — than the dozen that were enacted in fiscal year 2023. The Armed Services Committees have authorized the construction of 10 new ships and have also reduced the number of ships that the administration has proposed to decommission. Even these adjustments to the shipbuilding budget are insufficient to meet the Navy’s growing requirement, and the appropriation itself has yet to win congressional approval.
It is probably too late for the Navy to expect any more relief from Congress in 2024. The following fiscal year is another matter; however, the shipbuilding budget must increase significantly in 2025, or else the Navy may find itself forced to relinquish at least one of the missions that heretofore has been deemed critical to the nation’s security.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.