Stop letting Iran hide behind its proxies and strike them head-on

With U.S. strikes against Iran-linked targets on Feb. 2, President Biden attempted to fulfill his vow to “hold all those responsible to account” for a Jan. 28 drone attack on a U.S. outpost in Jordan by Iran-backed militia that killed three U.S. service members and injured at least 40 more.

But the United States has been trying to stop Iran’s metastasizing aggression for three months without success. This is because its strikes — including those on Feb. 2 — largely have allowed Iran to hide behind its proxies.

If the U.S. hopes to deter Iran from endangering — and killing — more Americans, the United States needs a strategy that addresses the source of the problem by striking Iran directly to degrade the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps’ (IRGC) military capabilities, economic interests, and ability to transfer weapons, training, and direct military assistance to proxies. 

The U.S. strikes on Feb. 2 hit 85 targets at 7 locations in Iraq and Syria and killed approximately 40 people, making them significantly stronger and deadlier than previous U.S. efforts to degrade or deter Iran-linked forces. Since Oct. 17, Iran-backed groups have launched at least 169 attacks that have left 120 injured, yet the United States has conducted only eleven airstrikes in Iraq and Syria in an attempt to degrade the capabilities of Iranian proxies and deter further attacks.

While both President Biden and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin indicated that the strikes on Feb. 2 were only the start of a “multi-tiered response,” delaying them for five days limited their effectiveness by enabling Iran-linked fighters to vacate their facilities. Meanwhile, the Biden administration’s public messaging that it does “not seek conflict in the Middle East or anywhere else” undermined the deterrent value of U.S. airstrikes, as did similar statements after previous strikes. 

Indeed, not fearing the U.S. response, Iran-backed militia have continued to launch multiple attacks against U.S. personnel after the deadly Jan. 28 attack and have already launched multiple attacks against U.S. personnel since the U.S. strikes on Feb. 2. 

There is little reason to believe that whatever action the United States is planning next will have a different effect. Previous limited U.S. strikes merely provoked further attacks. At best, they caused the Iranian regime merely to move its attacks elsewhere.

Just as the United States shifted from targeting Iran-backed groups in Syria to striking in Iraq in late Nov. 2023, the Iran-backed Houthis in Yemen escalated on another front. They have since conducted approximately 60 attacks on ships in nearby waterways, particularly the southern Red Sea. Six days after the United States began hitting the Houthis in Yemen, Iran-backed groups attacked U.S. forces in Jordan on Jan. 28, the first time its attacks struck Jordan or killed U.S. troops since the escalation began. 

When asked whether U.S. strikes have succeeded, President Biden said, “Are they stopping the Houthis? No. Are they going to continue? Yes.” 

The failure of limited strikes against Iran-backed groups should not be surprising. The same approach failed to produce deterrence from 2021 to early 2023.

Iran-backed militia conducted roughly 90 attacks against U.S. personnel in Iraq and Syria between January 2021 and March 2023. Yet, the United States only launched four rounds of airstrikes targeting those groups over that period and none against their benefactors in Iran. This U.S. approach only serves to validate Iran’s proxy strategy, reassuring it that it can continue attacking the United States and its interests and partners without triggering blowback against itself.  

Unlike the United States, Israel has targeted the Islamic Republic of Iran officials and assets, including the IRGC, which organizes Iranian proxies. Under former Prime Minister Naftali Bennett, Israel began what it calls an “Octopus Doctrine” to target the Iranian regime as the head of the octopus for the aggression of its tentacles — the proxies. On Dec. 25, a reportedly Israeli airstrike in Syria killed the IRGC brigadier general responsible for coordinating with the Syrian military and acting as a key weapons proliferator to Hezbollah in Lebanon. 

It is past time for the United States to also strike the head of the octopus. Establishing deterrence will require the United States to use stronger, faster, more frequent, and more persistent military force against targets in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and — most importantly — Iran.

Beyond targeting Tehran’s proxies and IRGC facilities, the United States should target the IRGC’s officers, military capabilities, economic interests, and logistics network that sends weaponry to its proxies. Bolstering deterrence will also require ending messages of reluctance to use military force, clear signals that the United States will continue hitting IRGC targets so long as its attacks continue, and rapid, unpredictable targeting to ensure Iran-backed fighters cannot evade U.S. strikes. 

Simultaneously, the U.S. Department of Defense should ensure that the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) has sufficient air defense assets, tactics, techniques and procedures in place to prevent another Iranian projectile from hitting American troops. With initial reports indicating that the Iranian drone approached its target at the same time that a U.S. drone was returning to the base in Jordan, CENTCOM will need to ensure it can adequately distinguish friend from foe and has the capabilities to neutralize Iranian drones, rockets, and missiles. 

The United States has engaged in an occasional tit-for-tat with the Iranian regime’s proxies as Tehran has waged a concerted strategy of proxy warfare. If the United States does not impose prohibitive costs on the Iranian puppet master, its puppets’ aggression will only get deadlier. 

Retired U.S. VADM John W. Miller served as Commander, U.S. Naval Forces Central Command (NAVCENT)/Commander, U.S. Fifth Fleet and was a participant on the Jewish Institute for National Security of America’s (JINSA) 2018 Generals and Admirals Program. Ari Cicurel is the assistant director of foreign policy at JINSA.