America cannot leave the Middle East, however much it wants to

The drone strike on an American facility in Jordan called Tower 22 that resulted in the deaths of three soldiers and the wounding of at least 34 others prompted President Joe Biden to blame Iran-backed militias for the attack. Indeed, the so-called Islamic Resistance in Iraq took credit for the attack. While Biden promised an American response “at a time and in a manner [of] our choosing” he did not specify the nature of that response. Admiral John Kirby, the National Security Counsel spokesperson, asserted that whatever that response might be, “we do not seek another war. We do not seek to escalate.” He added that “we will respond … on our schedule in our own time.”

The White House has employed that or a similar phrase when reacting to previous attacks by Iranian proxies, be they Yemeni Houthis in the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden or militias in Syria and Iraq. The attackers have asserted that they are striking at American forces because of Washington’s support for Israel in its war with Hamas; there have been over 150 strikes against American troops since the onset of the Israel-Gaza War.

Yet even were the Gaza war to end today, and despite the Islamic Resistance in Iraq’s announcement that it is suspending attacks on American forces, the threat that Iran and its proxies pose to the United States and its friends in the Gulf would not disappear. However much Washington might wish to disengage from the Middle East, it will find, as it has in the past, that it is unable to do so.

The Biden administration’s clear desire to downgrade its role in the Middle East is hardly new. As Peter Baker and Susan Glasser record in their biography of James Baker, George H.W. Bush’s incoming Secretary of State “especially wanted to stay away from the Middle East and the endless failed quest for peace between Israel and the Arabs.” Staying away from the Middle East was easier said than done, however. Baker knew that as well as anyone. He had been Ronald Reagan’s chief of staff in 1982 when the Marines were twice dispatched to Lebanon in the wake of the Israeli invasion of that country. He was still chief of staff when the U.S. Embassy in Beirut was bombed in April 1983 and when Hezbollah terrorists detonated explosives in the Marine barracks killing 241 personnel, which led the Reagan administration to carry out what it termed a “strategic redeployment” the following year. Yet eight years later, despite his desire to “stay away from the region,” Baker too was ensnared by the search for peace in the Middle East, and played a leading role as sponsor of the 1991 Madrid Peace Conference.

Every administration since then has found itself at some point searching for a peaceful resolution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Yet even were that conflict somehow to be resolved, the U.S. would still find that it could not disengage from the Middle East. The Islamic State group is still operating in Syria and American troops continue to seek its elimination. And Iranian proxies will continue to attack American forces because Tehran seeks to dominate the region and can only do so if it expels the “Great Satan.”

The United States has had a continuous military presence, primarily naval, in the Middle East since 1948. That presence has grown from three relatively small warships to a deployment of the Navy’s Fifth Fleet and both air and land forces throughout the Gulf. America’s efforts to deter both an aggressive China and an expansionist Russia call for major force presence in East Asia and Europe, but as long as the Iranian mullahs remain in power, America will continue to find that it cannot fully withdraw from the eternally volatile Middle East — even if it wishes to do so.

Moreover, Iran has moved increasingly closer both to China and to Russia, with Iran supplying Moscow with drones and ballistic missiles to support Russia’s war in Ukraine. In doing so, Tehran has in effect undermined the long-standing presumption of American defense planners that the U.S. could deter — and if necessary defeat — its foes consecutively because they are unlikely to coordinate their plans and actions. On the contrary, Iran’s behavior demonstrates that the United States needs to maintain a simultaneous capability to deter its leading adversaries not only in Europe and East Asia but in the Middle East as well. Yet the nation has far too few resources with which to do so.

America’s allies certainly could help relieve the inevitable strain on its forces that would result from having to maintain a credible deterrent in all three major theaters. Our allies have never been able to substitute for American military power, however; even with increased defense spending they are unlikely to do so for years to come.

Thus, unless America is willing to cede the Middle East to Iran, Washington will have to face up to the unpleasant reality that it must increase its own defense spending significantly, and do so quickly. That may be difficult in today’s political climate, but the alternatives could prove far more costly were the United States to find itself combatting aggression on more than a single front and against more than a single enemy.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.