Four retired Marine generals on how to rebuild America’s crisis response force

The U.S. national security establishment has identified China as America’s “pacing threat” and has reoriented military capabilities toward that threat. So be it. But identifying a primary threat does not mean the United States does not also need a “911” force to deal with fast-developing crises.

Thoughtfully designed, such a force would also be able to contribute to a major war effort. If asked to design the ideal “911” force for our nation, we would build it with six distinct capabilities.

First, it would be an expeditionary force-in-readiness, capable of rapidly deploying to a crisis area by sea and air. The seaborne component would consist of forward-deployed amphibious forces, continuously on patrol in key areas around the world. They would be backed up by strategically positioned squadrons of prepositioning ships, which would be loaded with tailored supplies and equipment. Each maritime prepositioning squadron would be linked with trained and packaged fly-in forces that could quickly marry up with the equipment to form powerful and sustainable combat brigades. For reinforcements, additional amphibious ships located at our East Coast, West Coast and overseas bases could rapidly load customized combat forces to join the forward-deployed units. At the home bases of these forces, air-alert and air-contingency units would also be at the ready and prepared to augment the forward forces. Where appropriate, land prepositioning sites would be established and maintained to strengthen this force.

Second, it would be a force of balanced combined arms, optimized to operate in austere environments. Its aviation elements would be capable of operating from expeditionary airfields or would include vertical take-off and landing aircraft that did not require existing airfields at all. The amphibious ships coupled with the at-sea offload capabilities of the prepositioning ships would negate the initial requirement for an existing port and airfield.

Third, this expeditionary force would be capable of task-organizing for any mission, consisting of flexible forces that could easily converge and composite into larger combat formation. It would not be “purpose designed” for any specific or narrow role or mission, but would be a general purpose force.

Fourth, the force would have a global focus and be capable of operating across the spectrum of conflict. It would not be overly focused on a single threat or region, nor chase a “pacing threat.” It could operate in any “clime and place.” It would not be restricted to any domain such as air, land, sea or littorals. 

Fifth, this 911 force would be oriented to meet the requirements of all combatant commands, not a narrow few. Its service component commands would actively seek ways to contribute to all combatant commanders’ requests for forces.

And sixth, this premier emergency response force would have a training, education and concepts base for its doctrine, organization and equipping that emphasized maneuver, close combat, adaptability and flexibility. Its ethos would be built around a strong sense of these attributes, plus individual leadership traits such as trust, honor, discipline and initiative.

But wait, you may be thinking — the nation previously had such a force! It was the United States Marine Corps, which possessed all the capabilities needed to respond quickly and effectively to any threat, worldwide. The Marine Corps was once America’s premier 911 force.

Unfortunately, this national treasure has been dismantled, divested, purpose-designed and reoriented into a static, missile-based reconnaissance and surveillance force focused on a single threat and region. The number of amphibious and prepositioning ships that supported U.S. Marines in peace and in war has been greatly reduced, and those remaining are in a poor state of readiness. America no longer has the full-time (24/7) presence of forward-deployed expeditionary units in strategically important regions, nor the air readiness units needed to rapidly reinforce them.

Recent Marine Corps leaders purposely neglected some combatant command requirements and cherry-picked those the Marines would, or could, fill. These leaders created single-mission units at the expense of balanced combined-arms teams. This past leadership abandoned the Corps’ primary and unique purpose of being the nation’s 911 force to instead chase the “pacing threat.”

Meanwhile, we see crises in other parts of the world that were very predictable, and we scramble to find a 911 force to deal with them — crises that, if tasked, the Marine Corps would be hard-pressed to meet with current capabilities.

National security and military dilettantes, plus some members of Congress misled by a few defense officials, have lured us down this garden path. We now have new leadership in the Corps. It is critically important to undo the damage done and return the Marines to their traditional role. The new leadership working with an engaged Congress must begin the process of rebuilding a Marine Corps that our national security requires.

Gen. Charles Krulak USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commandant of the Marine Corps. Gen. Charles Wilhelm USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commander, United States Southern Command. Gen. Anthony Zinni USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commander, United States Central Command. Gen. James Conway USMC (Ret.) is a career infantry officer. His last assignment was as commandant of the Marine Corps.