After two months, Ukraine’s counteroffensive is not achieving the level of success Western observers expected. This reflects less of Kyiv’s performance and more of the failure of expectation management by Western political leaders and policymakers.
What is needed now is not a defeatist attitude, but a more sober reflection on the objectives of Ukraine’s counteroffensive, the analytical shortcomings of the definition of success and a determination of what comes next.
To be clear, Ukraine is encountering stiff resistance, perhaps even more than it expected. Yet, the analytical framework for Ukraine’s counteroffensive was, in effect, rigged from the start. Save for a handful of serious defense analysts and professional Russia and Ukraine watchers, none of the policy community articulated clear measures for near or long-term success.
Was it simply retaking territory? If so, how much would Kyiv have to retake to qualify as a success? If it was, as professional analysts such as Rob Lee suggested, more a question of the ability of both Russia and Ukraine to generate forces over the longer term, success would only be measurable in the weeks and months ahead.
Success also means different things to different audiences. Politicians in Washington needed (and continue to need) to see Ukraine making progress on the battlefield to ensure sustained support among their American constituents. It is far easier to continue providing arms and aid to a country that appears to be making progress on the battlefield, however that is measured. A stalled counteroffensive, or the perception thereof, makes it politically more challenging to sustain large-scale arms packages.
The failure of those politicians, President Biden included, to manage expectations and to communicate to the American people both why this war matters to the United States and that this war will not be resolved by a single counteroffensive risks the very support necessary for Ukraine’s future success.
This is an issue that will take on greater urgency as the war continues and as the 2024 presidential election in America draws nearer. Ukraine is already becoming a politically contentious issue — low-hanging fruit for isolationist populists and those more sensible pundits closer to the center who see support for Ukraine as detracting from the more pressing issue of China and the Indo-Pacific.
For Russia, this political dynamic within the United States and in Europe is invaluable. It opens up opportunities to sow division and exploit schisms in support of Ukraine — almost certainly what Russian President Vladimir Putin is hoping to leverage for an end to the conflict. Washington’s own analytical weaknesses and the constant news cycle are creating inertia that Russia will exploit and leverage for the Kremlin’s own advantage. At this stage, holding the line and buying time for Western political schisms to emerge may well be considered a success in Putin’s mind.
Perceptions of Ukraine’s counteroffensive were also warped by a lack of understanding of the basic principles of warfare. Attacking an entrenched adversary that developed defense in depth is among the most challenging operations in warfare. As Ukraine trained with Western arms and prepared for its counteroffensive, Russia dug in and dug deeply, building lines of trenches and extensive fortifications. Indeed, while the West debated whether and when it should deliver tanks to Ukraine, Russia fortified its position, a development visible through satellite imagery. Russia sowed minefields between 3 miles and 10 miles deep.
Russia was clearly prepared for Ukraine’s counteroffensive. The failure of politicians and pundits alike to appreciate the fact that Russia’s forces were learning and adapting was and remains a key analytical failure. The Russian military may have learned slowly, but it was nonetheless learning.
Equally, preliminary assessments missed the fact that probing operations are not the same as a counteroffensive, leading many to confuse the two. Ukraine’s early efforts to probe Russian lines were a prelude to attempting to exploit perceived weaknesses. Shaping operations, feints and other battlefield operations were assumed to be the long-awaited offensive leading many to prematurely question the success of Ukraine’s efforts.
Had the West wanted to see achieve Ukraine maximal success, it would have begun arming Kyiv far sooner and in far greater numbers. As it stands, many of the promised arms have not begun to arrive in Ukraine — the M1A1 main battle tanks are some weeks off from delivery and F-16 training is still in preliminary stages. The United States, wary of Russian escalation, has been, and remains, reluctant to deliver the long-range ATACMS missile and other more capable systems.
If Ukraine is to achieve success going forward, it is critical that the West both manage expectations and set Ukraine to make continued progress. In the case of the former, the West needs to make clear to domestic audiences that this war will not be resolved in the near term and that sustained support for Kyiv is the only way to achieve long-term success. At the same time, the West must define what near and long-term success looks like — supporting Ukraine “for as long as it takes” is not a strategically achievable, defined political/military objective; it is a well-meaning but ultimately hollow platitude.
Defining this strategic objective will inform what support is necessary for Ukraine to achieve that outcome. There is no silver bullet or single weapon that will turn the tide of the war, despite what social media analysts would suggest. The fixation on red herrings of main battle tanks and F-16 fighter jets masks Ukraine’s real needs in the near term, among which are breaching capabilities, mine-clearing assets and long-range precision fires — decidedly less attractive things about which to discuss.
If the United States and its European partners decide to back Ukraine in its goal of returning to the 1991 borders, then the package of arms will look considerably different than if it is merely to create conditions for some form of a negotiated settlement. In the absence of that clarity, any tactical gains on the battlefield are divorced from strategic progress.
The West’s frustration at the lack of progress is understandable at a surface level given the amount of investment, but one can’t be frustrated for not achieving a goal when the goal was never clearly articulated, and insufficient resources were allocated to achieve what was an already nebulous outcome.
Such poor policymaking is a disservice to the American taxpayer, but more importantly Ukraine’s fighters.
Joshua C. Huminski is the director of the Mike Rogers Center for Intelligence & Global Affairs at the Center for the Study of the Presidency & Congress. He is also a book reviewer for the Diplomatic Courier and a fellow at George Mason University’s National Security Institute. He can be found on Twitter at @joshuachuminski.