Where does Kennedy’s nuclear legacy leave us 60 years later?

It is extraordinarily challenging to re-read President Kennedy’s speech at American University 60 years ago and not feel a profound loss for a historical moment when negotiations on arms control were nascent and seen as an indispensable instrument for peace and stability worldwide.

Coming out of the perilous Cuban Missile Crisis, President Kennedy understood the importance of negotiating with the Soviet Union a set of guardrails and principles that could mitigate — although not eliminate — the risks of a nuclear confrontation. One of the concrete proposals mentioned by Kennedy in his speech, for instance, was the decision by the United States to halt nuclear tests in the atmosphere (so long as other states did follow suit) while negotiating a more permanent treaty. The adoption of the U.S. moratorium would eventually lead to the adoption of the Partial Test Ban Treaty.  

While cooperation was costly, Nikita Khrushchev and Kennedy knew the alternative would have been far more catastrophic. As Kennedy powerfully stated: “Among the many traits the peoples of our two countries have in common, none is stronger than our mutual abhorrence of war.” The possible consequences of a nuclear confrontation between the U.S. and the Russian Federation remain acute and dangerous today, and working to prevent it must remain a central priority for both countries, no matter our ideological and political differences.

While Kennedy’s speech launched a golden age of arms control negotiations, we today stand on the brink of a dangerous escalation between NATO and Russia over Ukraine, and on the rubble of the arms control architecture that was painstakingly built over the last 40 years. New START, the last standing arms control agreement between the two parties, is on life support after Russia’s recent decision to suspend its participation. The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces, Conventional Armed Forces in Europe and the Open Skies treaties — the cornerstones of Europe’s arms control architecture — have all been dismantled.

Where, when and how do we rebuild?

Kennedy stated: “While defending our own vital interests, nuclear powers must avert those confrontations which bring an adversary to a choice of either a humiliating retreat or a nuclear war.” It is hard to imagine a diplomatic way forward with Russia after the illegal and unjustifiable invasion of its neighbor Ukraine. Yet, while continuing our support to Ukraine, we owe it to future generations to try our best to avoid a direct clash between NATO and the Russian Federation. Striking a balance between assessing realistic risks of escalation and maintaining our steadfast support for Ukraine will prove increasingly challenging as the war endures.

So, what ought to be done to achieve such a balancing act? Kennedy’s words might provide helpful guidance.

First, let’s work to deter without provoking. To achieve this goal, we have to balance our allocation of resources better between the Pentagon and the State Department. We need strategic communicators, diplomats, intelligence specialists, country specialists, and social scientists to help understand Russia’s intentions and calibrate our responses. However costly, the U.S. must strike to achieve a challenging balance between deterring credibly the Russian Federation while avoiding overreacting to Russia’s dishonest information warfare.

Taking the higher moral ground and offering restraint is costly, and, to some, it might appear as appeasement — the idea that Russia understands nothing but brutal force is dominating our policy discourses and debates. Yet, long-term, a strategy of equilibrated deterrence and containment will pay off (as it did during the Cold War).

Second, let’s have a frank discussion on the costs and benefits of arms control with Russia today. While NEW START was well received and deeply supported by our allies in Europe, another round of arms control negotiations with Russia will most likely be cast as a betrayal of our commitment to Ukraine and an unacceptable act of appeasement to a murderous regime. Instead of simply telling ourselves “We need arms control with Russia,” let’s ask the question “why and under what conditions?”

Most importantly, let’s get clear-eyed on what we are prepared to concede should the Russians accept to come to the table and negotiate new arms control proposals. For any arms control agreement we propose, the U.S. must be ready to give something in return. What are we willing to put on the table? Are the costs of our concessions to the Russians worth the benefits we will accrue in return?

I fully support the argument that halting the arms race is for the mutual benefit of both countries. I am not certain, however, that we are prepared to pay the costs of what diplomacy would require. I am even less certain our allies will be thrilled to see us cooperate with the Russians.

Finally, let’s think seriously about how we can fight and win against the Russian propaganda machine. To win the battle for hearts and minds, we have to get comfortable with using multilateral mechanisms more effectively. More than many other administrations in the past, the Biden administration has shown interest and attention in multilateral forums. But we can do more.We ought to ask not only what to communicate to the many countries in the Global South under the spell of Vladimir Putin but how.

I fully support Kennedy’s vision for a peaceful world. However, Putin is not Khrushchev, and today’s America is no longer Kennedy’s America. We have to be aware of these profound historical differences and begin rethinking our approach to arms control, nonproliferation and disarmament with that clarity in mind. But we should never give up our hope and aspirations for greater peace and a more harmonious world. We ought it to the whole humanity who will come after us.

Francesca Giovannini is executive director of the Project on Managing the Atom at the Harvard Kennedy School’s Belfer Center for Science & International Affairs, and adjunct associate professor at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University. Previously, she served as strategy and policy officer to the executive secretary of the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization.