Questions on Ukraine, NATO and the ‘no limits’ Russia-China partnership

Last week, I volleyed a list of questions at President Biden surrounding Vice President Harris’s fitness for the higher office, Ukraine’s pending counteroffensive and the refusal of China’s new minister of defense, Li Shangfu, to meet with Pentagon chief Lloyd Austin in Singapore, to name a few. 

With NATO’s heads of government and state summit at Vilnius, Lithuania, next month, the focus of this piece will be on Ukraine. The difference is, this time, some answers will be provided regarding the summit.  

But first, why did Li duck a meeting with Austin?

The snub is a real-life example of the irrationality of the Sino-American relationship. In 2018, the U.S. sanctioned Li before he became minister of defense this March. Did the U.S. forget that sanction? If not, why was it unable or reluctant to change that status as a signal to show a dialogue was deemed important, especially after China buzzed a U.S. warship and “performed an unnecessarily aggressive maneuver” against a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft over the Taiwan Straits?

On the same note, in negotiating an end to the war in Ukraine, how does one conduct diplomacy when Russia’s president has been declared a war criminal? No answers are there either.

At the NATO summit, the first priority will be welcoming Finland, and hopefully, after Turkey reelected Recep Tayyip Erdoğan as president, Sweden, as new members. Fulfilling the objectives of last year’s Madrid summit for deterrence and defense and reinforcing the eastern flank likewise will be high on the agenda. But what might be the new and innovative ideas President Biden and the U.S. delegation bring to respond to the transformational changes that have taken place over the last year, given the “no limits” Sino-Russo partnership?

Also, despite calls for Ukrainian membership, that will not happen at this summit with the war still waging — and may never occur. Which of these initiatives might the alliance consider for sustaining Ukrainian sovereignty and recovery?

Last, what might be the “sleeping” issues that could become ticking time bombs that so far have been undetected or missed?

NATO requires consensus to make decision. In this case, that means all 31 members must agree — 32 if Sweden is approved by Ankara. Since the alliance remains divided over critical issues such as actually spending at least 2 percent of GDP on defense and admitting Ukraine, the first initiative should be allowing NATO members greater freedom of action in coalitions of the willing. Such coalitions that act as members of, but not as part of, NATO could draw together non-NATO states as appropriate.

The best example is how the Scandinavian states with a total of about 250 F-35’s coordinate independently to train and operate this combined force outside the alliance. Surely this model can be followed regarding Ukraine. Here are several ways that can happen.

Ukraine can be offered de facto membership in the Joint Expeditionary Force. Led by the United Kingdom and fellow NATO members Denmark, Finland, Estonia, Iceland, Latvia, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden (pending approval), this could be a first step toward closer integration for Ukraine with NATO.

Using the coalition of the willing approach, a Taiwan relations-like act could be put in place with the coalition to sustain Ukraine’s sovereignty and security and even extended to recovery and reconstruction. As an alliance, NATO might have the resources to fill this role. But members, along with non-NATO states and other international organizations such as the World Bank, could.

Last, latent ticking time bombs are important to defuse in advance. Russian escalation is understood. But Article 5 related to China is not. Article 5 means that an attack on one shall be considered an attack on all.

Suppose China threatens to or invades Taiwan. The U.S. responds militarily. China threatens retaliation if the U.S. does not withdraw. The U.S. refuses. China launches kinetic and non-kinetic attacks on the U.S. mainland as a warning.

Would Article 5 be invoked? Would all members vote to approve it? And could NATO find itself in a war with China?

Before 9/11, no one would have believed NATO’s first war would be fought in Afghanistan. Could that happen again vis-a-vis China? Who knows? But do not dismiss that possibility too lightly.

Harlan Ullman is a senior adviser at the Washington, D.C., Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” doctrine. His 12th  book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD:  How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.