A security dilemma? How China views the AUKUS submarine deal

During a recent trip to China, I had the chance to take in the newly renovated Qingdao Chinese Navy Museum. What used to be a sleepy and rusting collection of exotica (near to a more impressive museum about the famous local Tsingtao brew) has now graduated to the big time.

Along with detailed battle maps of actions against the Taiwan Navy from the late 1950s, large-scale dioramas depicting the 1988 action against Vietnam in the South China Sea, and another seemingly demonstrating a hypothetical amphibious assault against Taiwan, one can also find an actual nuclear submarine — quite a striking view.

While that boat was tied up at the pier and not open to visitors, plenty of exhibits inside the cavernous and packed halls extolled the achievements of the Chinese submarine force, from its very first assembled hull in 1957 to the endurance record by a Chinese nuclear submarine in 1985. One can see the mug used by Peng Shilu and the eyeglasses of Huang Xuhua — the two most famous designers of China’s very first nuclear submarine.

While such artifacts might seem a bit quaint, the issue of the intensifying U.S.-China naval rivalry is now in the headlines almost every day, not least due to the recent AUKUS agreement, uniting Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. in one single nuclear attack submarine enterprise. This agreement was further solidified at the recently concluded G7 in a meeting between President Joe Biden and Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese.

Of very substantial interest to this naval analyst in the renovated Chinese Navy Museum were the numerous models showing off the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) clutch of new naval anti-ship cruise missiles, including both YJ-12 as well as YJ-18 — supersonic missiles that pose a significant challenge to the U.S. Navy.

The latter is a submarine-fired weapon. According to the November 2022 Pentagon report on Chinese military power, this missile has an impressive range of 290 miles, so that it can be fired from outside of the anti-submarine screen of an American carrier battle group. Indeed, these Chinese anti-ship cruise missiles have both superior speed and range when compared to American equivalents.

Another theme of that recent Pentagon assessment was a logical focus on the emerging threat of the Chinese Navy deploying land-attack cruise missiles throughout its naval force. Such missiles could threaten not only Taiwan but also U.S. and allied bases throughout the Indo-Pacific, even potentially reaching into Alaska and the continental U.S.

Fully understanding the import of such weapons, the Chinese Navy Museum is not shy. It prominently displays a hunk of twisted metal that is labeled as “piece of a land-attack missile fired from a nuclear-powered attack submarine.”

It is clear that the naval arms race in the western Pacific is now heating to a boiling point. In mid-March, President Joe Biden made a symbolic visit to San Diego to meet with prime ministers from the UK and Australia, in order to take the next steps on the AUKUS endeavor.

The three leaders agreed to co-production of a future nuclear attack submarine for the long term and “an enhanced rotational presence” of four to five U.S. and UK submarines into Perth for the near term. Australia might also purchase several Virginia-class boats to close the gap until the newly designed submarines are ready.

To be sure, there are positive aspects of the AUKUS deal, primarily that nations of the Asia-Pacific region themselves should take up the burden of their own defense. However, more than a few Australian experts have raised serious objections.

Concerns go well beyond the large financial burden, estimated to be $180-240 billion, and the extended timeline. For those worried about nuclear and high-tech weapons proliferation, what kind of precedent is this? Does Australia now become a high priority target for Chinese long-range (and nuclear) weaponry? What do other Asians make of this project, and why does it seem only to comprise former subjects of the British Empire?

Jakarta, for one, has indicated serious misgivings. This should surprise no one, since it may now become a future battleground as China would logically try to stop submarines surging north by attacking and seeking to block narrow straits in and around the Indonesian archipelago.

Putting aside that the Australian naval port of Perth is actually not close to the Taiwan Strait (just over 3,500 miles), few seem to understand that nuclear attack submarines, while a formidable, versatile and survivable naval platform, are not quite the “silver bullet” to the volatile Taiwan issue that some might imagine. They have certain vulnerabilities, for example to sea mines or drones. Most critically, their firepower is not especially large, given constrained space for munitions — quite insufficient to turn the tide in a Taiwan scenario. In addition, the vital Taiwan Strait is actually an extremely shallow maritime domain, hardly optimal for employment of large nuclear submarines.

Finally, there is that not inconsiderable issue of China’s reaction. One retired Chinese admiral I spoke with in Beijing noted that the Chinese Navy’s countermeasures would be robust. An influential Shanghai strategist likewise asserted that China’s naval buildup would continue apace. 

In a little-noticed but critical development, the Chinese Navy appears to be testing its first robotic submarine prototypes. That is an additional sign that Beijing is now going all out to close the undersea warfare technology gap.

Another not-too-subtle theme of the Chinese Navy Museum in Qingdao is that Russian assistance has twice in modern history led to enormous leaps in Chinese naval combat capability. Given the challenge of AUKUS, a third leap is now highly likely, wherein the PLA Navy takes full advantage of Russian nuclear submarine prowess.

Lyle Goldstein is director of Asia Engagement for the Washington think tank Defense Priorities. He is also visiting professor at the Watson Institute for Public and International Affairs at Brown University.