For the last two weeks, commentators have eagerly reported on the massive intelligence leaks in the U.S. But few analyses have seen fit to “connect the dots” or discuss what these leaks mean for actual policy.
For example, one highly publicized leak contended that Ukraine’s long-awaited counteroffensive will likely not be as successful as expected, in no small measure due to an insufficiency of arms. Specifically, Ukraine was unlikely to gain more than “modest territorial gains because Kyiv was facing significant “force generation and sustainment shortfalls.” Beyond this, other intelligence assessments revealed that Ukraine’s air defenses were in danger of collapsing, thereby giving Russia uncontested air superiority.
Yet, nobody seemed to write that allied dithering, i.e. not only the U.S. but also European procrastination, was more than a little responsible for this state of affairs. Despite the fact that these leaks also underscored Washington’s possibly unprecedented intelligence penetration of the Russian government, intelligence and military, the crippling and increasingly unsubstantiated fear on both sides of the Atlantic that Russia might escalate still holds allied governments in thrall and also prevented the decisive, timely delivery of necessary weapons and training to Ukraine’s army after its successful September offensive.
Thus, there is good reason to argue that allied fears of giving Ukraine tanks, air and air defense assets prevented it from obtaining those weapons and then extending its offensive and administering what might have been close to a decisive defeat to Russian forces. Instead, Moscow gained time to mobilize new forces, construct defenses in depth across the entire front and even launch its own offensives, which are increasingly seen as futile.
Nevertheless, thousands of people on both sides were killed, and much more destruction was wreaked upon Ukraine.
The cumulative assessment coming out of these leaks fails to acknowledge Western fear and the absence of any coherent strategic response to the crisis. This fear and incoherence undoubtedly contribute to fortifying Putin’s resolve that Ukraine and/or its allies will lose heart or collapse before he or Russia does, a conclusion that appears to be reinforced by the statements and threats of such loyalists and/or sycophants like Nikolai Patrushev and Dmitry Medvedev. Thus, even if Putin is living inside a self-constructed bubble, we are not doing enough to exploit that situation and achieve a decisive victory that will secure Ukraine, ensure European security and administer a stinging and decisive defeat to the Sino-Russian alliance.
The failure of both Washington and Brussels to state their strategy suggests the absence of one or fear of victory, both of which are grist for Putin’s mill. He, his entourage and intelligence assessments that we know are biased to accord with his prejudices will invoke demonstrations in Europe due to energy and economic issues, and public opinion polls that show declining support for Ukraine will be used as justifications for prolonging the war to save his power.
Therefore, Washington and Brussels must not only proclaim a strategy and vision and then implement it, but they must also take it to their electorates and win public support for it. This strategy goes beyond giving Ukraine the weapons it needs now. We must also reinvigorate Western defenses and defense industrial bases to meet the Russian threat by creating a superior conventional deterrent for NATO from the Arctic to the Black Sea. The fact that Germany still cannot create even minimal conventional forces is not just a bad joke, it also reveals Germany’s unwillingness to face reality, and that of too many of its allies.
At the same time, we must take Ukraine’s case to Western electorates to strengthen public support for it. The assessment (probably a correct one) that no matter what happens on the battlefield, negotiations are unlikely in 2023, cannot become a pretext for more self-denying policies. Putin still thinks he can somehow win or swindle a victory from an irresolute West and will not negotiate, since retreat is both psychologically and politically unacceptable to him and his court. Therefore, victory is, in fact, the only acceptable reply to his aggression here.
In any case, Putin violated at least eight international treaties signed by Russia — The Helsinki Treaty (as amended after the Cold War), the Tashkent Treaty of 1992, the Russo-Ukraine treaties of 1997 and 2010, the Budapest Accords, the START Treaty of 1993, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the United Nations Charter and the NATO-Russia agreement — to launch this war, so it is difficult to see what advocating for negotiations brings other than a time-out before the next round begins.
Thus, these assessments reveal a government and alliance adrift on the seas of mounting wars and crises. While we must act to prevent a recurrence of such intelligence disasters; we must also act to advance our interests and values, and those of our allies. Neither other governments, nor history, will forgive us if we fail to rise to this occasion.
As President Lincoln observed in a similar time of war, crisis, and testing, “We, even we here, hold the power, and bear the responsibility.”
Stephen Blank, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War College. Blank is an independent consultant focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia.