A counterterrorism mission doesn’t make Somalia a ‘vital US interest’

In the coming days, the House will consider a privileged resolution under the War Powers Act to remove all U.S forces from Somalia, introduced by Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-Fla.). There are approximately 500 American troops on the ground in Somalia conducting counterterrorism operations against the Somali Islamic extremist group Al-Shabaab. The decision to place our armed forces into harm’s way is the most serious matter the government can consider. Thus, the pending vote is on the gravest of matters and it is proper to give due consideration to the question of whether the risk of America’s involvement in Somalia is worth any perceived reward. 

The answer, in my judgment, is no. Somalia is not, in any capacity, a vital interest of the United States. Furthermore, the U.S. counterterrorism mission in Somalia rests on a spurious legal footing that should be revisited.

What is a vital U.S. interest? The Commission on America’s National Interests defined a vital interest as one “necessary to enhance America’s survival.” Former Secretary of State Colin Powell explained in his “Powell Doctrine” the number one consideration for using military force is whether or not “a vital national security interest is threatened.” This sets a high bar on employing the armed forces of the U.S. into harm’s way. The 2022 National Defense Strategy sets a similar bar in Africa specifically, stating that defense efforts in Africa will focus on “vital U.S. national interests” and “threats against the homeland.” Clearly, the counterterrorism mission against Al-Shabaab in Somalia does not meet these standards.

Al-Shabaab is a terror group whose primary objective is to create an Islamic state in Somalia. Al-Shabaab is not a global jihadist group or a group that is particularly interested in attacking the U.S. homeland. A congressional hearing in 2009 found that Al-Shabaab was not too concerned with conducting insider attacks in America; it focused its recruiting efforts on pulling Somali refugees back to Somalia to fight in the civil war. Al-Shabaab’s attacks on U.S. forces and partners in the region can be understood only within the context of our active participation in the civil war. This is not an apology for Al-Shabaab’s indiscriminate brutality. However, if the U.S. were not an active player in the civil war, it would not be in Al-Shabaab’s interest to attack U.S. interests abroad.

Beyond terrorism, Somalia is of little strategic value. There is certainly no threat to U.S. economic interests. Somalia’s economy is among the worst in the world and it ranks 168th on the list of U.S. trading partners. One could argue that Somalia’s proximity to the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the entrance of the Red Sea, is of strategic value. However, the main threat to this waterway from Somalia is piracy. Combined Task Force 151, the international counter-piracy military mission in the region, has “virtually eliminated all acts of piracy.” 

Finally, Africa has once again become like a game of “Risk” for great powers, a game often viewed as zero-sum. If the U.S. is not involved in Somalia, China or Russia will move in, so the argument goes. Perhaps having our adversaries bogged down in a decades-long civil war in the prototypical failed state is not such a bad idea. U.S. resources are better suited elsewhere.

The legal framework used to justify America’s continued military operations against Al-Shabaab, the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF), is questionable. The 2001 AUMF was a response to the al Qaeda-led terror attacks of 9/11. Congress authorized the president to “… use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed or aided the terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001, or harbored such organizations or persons, in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or persons.”

We know that Al-Shabaab was not involved in 9/11; they had nothing to do with it. They did not plan it, authorize it, commit it or aid in it. The 9/11 Commission report only mentions Somalia in the historical context of al Qaeda’s development as a group. It was not until 2016 that the Obama administration provided the legal framework for tying Al-Shabaab to the 2001 AUMF. This framework justified war in Somalia by asserting that Al-Shabaab is an “associated force” of al Qaeda. The Obama framework is worth citing in full:

“al-Shabaab has pledged loyalty to al-Qa’ida in its public statements; made clear that it considers the United States one of its enemies; and has been responsible for numerous attacks, threats, and plots against U.S. persons and interests in East Africa. In short, al-Shabaab has entered the fight alongside al-Qa’ida and is a co-belligerent with al-Qa’ida in hostilities against the United States, making it an “associated force” and therefore within the scope of the 2001 AUMF.”

Al-Shabaab did not enter the fight “alongside Al Qaeda.” It was already fighting a civil war and pursuing its own localized interests. The “loyalty pledge” justification is the weakest of arguments. The loyalty pledge phenomenon is ubiquitous in Islamic extremism. Smaller, local, and/or regional groups rebrand themselves with the major player in the global jihadist movement of the time. When ISIS spread across Iraq and Syria, jihadist groups everywhere, to include Somalia, were all of sudden proclaiming themselves “ISIS in the “fill in the blank.” Local and/or regional jihadist groups around the world try to associate themselves with the major group at any given time to boost their own local standing and recruiting. In effect, it’s like an off-brand cola throwing on a Coca-Cola label.

The upcoming vote on War Powers and Somalia is not likely to garner much media coverage. The news cycles are dominated by domestic politics and, frankly, the average American does not think much about Somalia. I am sure most do not even know where it is. And yet, this resolution is of the utmost importance because it involves the question of committing the armed forces to hostilities. 

American lives are on the line. Given Somalia’s limited interest to the United States, unclear objectives, and the questionable legal framework used to justify the use of the armed forces there, Congress should give this resolution serious consideration. Is a crisply folded American flag in the hands of a surviving family member worth whatever objective the U.S. is seeking in Somalia? That is the ultimate question for lawmakers to consider.

Brandon Temple, Ph.D., is an Air Force Special Warfare Officer serving as a legislative liaison to the U.S. House of Representatives. He previously was a Defense Legislative Fellow serving as national security adviser to a member of Congress. All views expressed here are his alone and do not represent the position of any branch of the U.S. government, Department of Defense, or  Department of the Air Force.