Why do we think Putin won’t use ‘the bomb’?

Recently, Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Colin Kahl told Congress that the odds Russia would use nuclear weapons are low: “I don’t think they’re likely to do so.” The Washington-based Institute for the Study of War reported in March that “Russian invocations of nuclear threats … do not represent any material Russian intent to employ nuclear weapons.”

Why do we think Vladimir Putin will not use “the bomb” when there is so much evidence that he will?

Russia’s war in Ukraine has created many strategic risks, none more important to America than the possibility of a nuclear weapon. Western leaders wonder what “red lines” Putin might be watching and how to avoid crossing them while supporting Ukraine. But Putin is not waiting for a misstep by the West. He has been building the conditions for nuclear use since early in the war and is ready to use a nuclear weapon whenever he decides. He has done all this in the open, so there can be no doubt that he is serious about the nuclear threat.

In the first three months of 2023, Putin has taken several public steps to make his nuclear threats real. In February, he signed a law “suspending” Russia’s participation in the strategic nuclear arms treaty, START. In March, Putin announced he will “place tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus,” where nuclear capable Iskander missile systems are already deployed. These steps come as Putin and his inner circle continue their threats to use nuclear weapons.  

When asked the odds that Putin might use a nuclear weapon in the current struggle, we opine “not likely” or “less than 50 percent.” Similar assessments were wrong about Russia’s invasion of Ukraine last year. We can’t afford to be wrong about nuclear weapons now.  

So far, the threat of a nuclear strike has not been enough to convince the West to withdraw support of Ukraine, limit NATO, or end the so-called meddling in Russia’s near abroad — all demands by Putin. From Putin’s perch, continuing to threaten a nuclear attack without doing it carries perhaps as much risk as doing it.  

Besides warning the West many times that he might use a nuclear weapon, Putin and his leadership have, step by step, prepared the Russian people with reasons why he should.  

Putin has referenced American nuclear strikes on Hiroshima and Nagasaki several times and equated American goals — to save soldiers’ lives and shorten the war — to Russian goals today.  

Official Russian documents spell out when Russia might use nuclear weapons — the so-called “red lines.” Reasons include  “aggression with conventional weapons against the Russian Federation, when the very existence of the state is threatened”; or “attacks … against critical governmental or military sites of the Russian Federation, disruption of which would undermine nuclear forces response actions.” Putin has made clear to the Russian people that these lines have been crossed.  

Putin has claimed repeatedly that the very survival of Russia is at stake in the war — a clear red line. He has asserted that Crimea and other Ukrainian lands are Russian territory, even going through the ruse of sham annexations. From the Russian perspective, fighting there is on Russian territory (another red line). Russian media have reported strikes by Ukrainian drones deep into Russian territory, including some that hit Russian strategic nuclear bombers — more red lines.  All these claims, real and fabricated, establish the pretext for Putin to use nuclear weapons.  

Some observers claim we have not yet seen tangible signs of intent to use nuclear weapons. But there are tangible signs.  

Last fall, Kyiv officials reported that Russia was firing “nuclear-capable Kh-55 cruise missiles” without their nuclear warheads as part of mass rocket and missile attacks on Ukraine. Some observers suggested they were launched to “decoy” air defenses, a claim that makes little sense.  Missiles are valuable to shorthanded Russia. But launching the Cold War-era missiles to ensure their readiness for use in a nuclear strike would be a good reason for what we saw.  

Another sign of Russia’s increasing readiness to use nuclear weapons is the recent change in leadership of the war. In January, Putin appointed Chief of the General Staff, Valery Gerasimov, as head of the military operation in Ukraine. Putin also appointed the head of Russia’s ground forces and the head of Russia’s aerospace forces as Gerasimov’s main deputies. Not since the Second World War has the chief of the general staff commanded a military operation for Russia.  This underscores Putin’s assertion that Russia is fighting for its survival. But even more worrisome, under Russian doctrine, Gerasimov and his two deputies control all tactical nuclear weapons in ground operations. The three senior-most officers with authority to employ tactical nuclear weapons are now in charge of the war.

Putin sees the current war as existential, and epic in its scope. He has declared that Russia is fighting the entire West, with its nuclear states. His people have listened to his arguments and largely support him. And his military is ready and positioned to use nuclear weapons. What evidence do people have that makes them assign low odds to Putin’s using a nuclear weapon?   

Retired Brig. Gen. Kevin Ryan is a senior fellow at Harvard University’s Kennedy School Belfer Center. He served as U.S. defense attaché to Moscow and deputy director for strategy, plans and policy on the Army staff.