How Washington can make the most of Finland’s NATO membership

Finland’s accession to NATO certainly provides the alliance with a capable, well-trained military that is poised to defend its 832-mile border with Russia. It will continue to field a capable conscript military and a powerful reserve, though it may have to reconsider how that military operates in full conjunction with its new NATO allies. It certainly will maintain what may be Europe’s most powerful artillery force. 

Finland learned from its two wars with the Soviet Union — the Winter War of 1939-40 and the so-called Continuation War that began the following year — that as long as it had sufficient artillery tubes and shells, it could devastate the vastly larger Soviet invading force. That lesson remains viable today, as the Ukrainian army’s artillery operations continue to demonstrate.

Moreover, Finnish cooperation with Sweden, which is so tight that it includes joint exercises under rotating commands from each country, will proceed apace, certainly until such time as Stockholm finally gains NATO entry. In addition, Finnish military partnership with its other Scandinavian allies, already solid, will become even tighter now that Finland is their NATO partner.

Finnish membership brings to the alliance capabilities that will complicate Russian operations well beyond its land border. Helsinki’s accession renders the Baltic Sea very much a NATO lake. With Poland, the Baltic States and now Finland joining them in NATO, St. Petersburg — located some 93 miles from the Finnish border, and from which some 25 percent of all Russian oil and gas exports emanate — is vulnerable to either NATO blockade or attack. So, too, is Kaliningrad, where the Baltic fleet is home-ported and most of Russia’s Baltic land, air and missile forces are located. The last time Russia, then the Soviet Union, faced such a threat was during World War II after Germany conquered Poland; Kaliningrad was the German city of Konigsberg and Finland was Germany’s ally.

Throughout the Cold War, the situation in the Baltic region was very much the opposite. The Soviet Union, which incorporated Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, and its Warsaw Pact partners Poland and East Germany controlled the eastern portion of the Baltic sea. Sweden and Finland were non-aligned, essentially expanding Soviet dominance further to the west. Indeed, throughout much of the Cold War, Finnish military briefers would show their visitors maps that postulated attacks coming from the West — that is, NATO — rather than from the east. Although some of those briefers would nod and wink that the arrows on the maps should be read as coming from the opposite direction from that which they portrayed, they did indicate the constraints under which Finland labored.

NATO’s challenge during the Cold War, therefore, was to prevent a Warsaw Pact amphibious assault on Denmark’s Jutland peninsula. A successful operation would have allowed the Soviets to break through the Kattegat Sea and the Skagerrak Strait that border Jutland. They then could have entered the North Sea and joined the Soviet North Sea fleet to pursue attacks on North American convoys that were intended to reinforce NATO forces defending against Soviet penetration of Europe’s central front.

Finland’s entry into NATO renders Denmark no longer a front-line Baltic state, however. Instead, like Norway, Denmark constitutes NATO’s Baltic strategic reserve. Once again, Russia finds itself cornered in the Baltic region.

The Finnish archipelago and its ability to mine the Gulf of Finland further complicate Russian operational planning. Finland has longstanding experience in both offensive and defensive mine warfare. Indeed, not that long ago it collaborated with Russia in upgrading obsolete Soviet mines. Moreover, most of Russia’s Baltic fleet will have considerable difficulty not only avoiding Finnish minefields, but also moving through Finland’s numerous islands and the relatively shallow water around them. 

On the other hand, Finland’s surface naval forces are primarily shallow draft warships, as are the three new corvettes that it is acquiring. At 4,000 tons displacement, and brandishing state-of-the-art weaponry, these ships are actually powerful small frigates. Finally, Finland fields shore-based anti-ship missile systems to support its naval operations.

Finland has yet to decide whether it will welcome the permanent stationing of allied troops on its soil, as Poland has done, or whether it will follow Norway’s example of permitting exercises on its soil but no permanent allied bases. At a minimum, Washington should work with Helsinki to enable the pre-stocking of Marine equipment on Finnish territory, much as it does in Norway. In addition, the Marines should increase the frequency of their Baltic training exercises with Finland, and Sweden, so as to underscore NATO’s deterrent against any potential Russian aggression in the Baltic region.

It has been widely reported that Russia has drawn down its Baltic land forces and deployed them to the Ukrainian theater. Nevertheless, Russia embodies a serious threat to the three small Baltic states in particular. Indeed, Russia has characterized Finland’s joining the alliance as an “assault” on its interests and has threatened unspecified strategic and tactical “counter-measures.” There can be little doubt that Moscow will reinforce its Baltic force presence as soon as it can. 

For that reason, Washington should capitalize on Finland’s accession and immediately lay the groundwork for bolstering the already critical deterrent that its newest ally contributes to the alliance.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under secretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy under secretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.