Like Sputnik, China’s balloon should ignite America’s will to innovate and advance strategic technologies

In 1957, the Soviet Union launched a satellite that traversed the continental United States, just as did the recent Chinese surveillance balloon. The former itself posed no direct security threat, although the rocket capability that launched it did; it had no intelligence-gathering capability and was unarmed. We are still not sure about the precise extent of the Chinese balloon’s intelligence-gathering capability. However, China’s intelligence gathering can pose serious security threats — and we have lots of evidence that it has been actively engaged in this process for some time, using numerous advanced techniques. 

The public and political impact of both events were enormous. They were highly and blatantly visible, creating a public sense of vulnerability here: feeding fears of major strategic threats to the U.S. in the future and vividly demonstrating that both launching countries were increasingly bold technological and geostrategic competitors in critical areas.

The obvious visibility to millions of Americans of both objects over a vast swath of our nation made this penetration especially dramatic to the public. I vividly recall watching Sputnik pass over our neighborhood in Baltimore several times, as it did over neighborhoods throughout the country. I remember the stunned disbelief of my parents and their friends at realizing that the Soviets were ahead of America in the “space race.” The Chinese balloon was seen by virtually all Americans, whether from the mountains of Montana or countless hours of pictures broadcast over TV or the internet. 

Both Sputnik several decades ago and the recent surveillance balloon stoked Americans’ fears about future perils, not primarily from these devices themselves but from the perception of rising threat capabilities of the countries that launched them. The devices symbolized U.S. vulnerability. They became emotional lightning rods around which Americans of both parties could rally to demand tough action by the U.S. government.

Regarding the balloon, the question Washington must now ask is what, if any, additional actions our country should take toward China, not just because of the balloon but because of a wider range of concerns. The balloon was an attention-getter but there are deeper issues. 

Should the U.S. reaction be solely an escalation of angry criticism and tougher sanctions? These are occurring already and will continue for a while given the state of U.S. politics. But that alone is not likely to be the answer. There are longer-term measures the U.S. should pursue to strengthen strategically important areas of our technology and harden our defenses against foreign intelligence-gathering and cyber hacking.

In the 1960s and ’70s, while hostility towards the Soviet Union remained high, Presidents Dwight Eisenhower and John Kennedy rallied Americans around our rocket and space programs and government support for science and advanced technology. There was widespread, bipartisan support for devoting large amounts of resources to building bigger, better rockets and for going into space. Astronauts and rocket scientists were national heroes. And we attracted the best and brightest from around the world to help.

This was not, of course, the outcome Moscow had intended. Indeed, several years ago, I had a conversation with Sergei Khrushchev about this. He said that shortly after his father, Soviet Premier Nikita Khruschev, saw the Western press reporting on Sputnik, he realized that this dramatic event was about to backfire. Whereas the launch was intended to impress and intimidate the West by showing off the lift capacity of Soviet rockets, rather than just demonstrate that the Soviets were the first to put a satellite into space, it triggered an enormous reaction of another sort — an American effort to pour funds and talent into its rocket and space program. And, as Nikita Khruschev ultimately feared, the U.S. forged ahead of the Soviets in both, culminating with Apollo 11 and two Americans walking on the moon. Our investments in the space race also spawned massive innovations in many other technologies that enhanced American industrial leadership in other sectors. 

Parenthetically, but importantly, it did not deter the U.S. from continuing to pursue a dialogue with Moscow on how to reduce the danger of miscalculations or poor communication that could lead to war and on efforts to find ways to curb the then ongoing nuclear race — an important bit of history to remember in the current environment. Today’s friction should not derail, and in fact strengthens the need for, communication between Washington and Beijing now.

If the Chinese balloon episode is to have a beneficial effect, we must avoid dwelling only on transgressions of China and instead focus on strengthening our own technological capacities. 

I imagine that there are members of China’s leadership who are lamenting this event — not so much because the balloon was detected, which many must have expected, or shot down, which most also should have anticipated as well, but because, like Khrushchev, they believe it will rally Americans to intensify our efforts to out-compete China in numerous advanced technologies.

Indeed, an acceleration of technological advances and government support for them were already occurring before this incident. Congress passed the vitally important CHIPS and Science Act. And extraordinary progress has been made by innovative American private-sector companies in such areas as 5G, quantum computing and artificial intelligence. New ideas and technologies are emerging in such sectors regularly and rapidly. The balloon incident actually can have a positive effect, as Sputnik did, if government support and private efforts shift into a higher gear.

That shift should include increased efforts by the government to work in partnership with U.S. companies to support advanced technologies. It also should include efforts to improve the competitive environment through, for example, supporting an Open Radio Access Network to advance 5G telecommunication innovation. Increased funding and more personnel are also required for the Quantum Office of the White House’s Office of Science and Technology; it contains great expertise but needs more resources, especially in view of China’s declared goal of becoming world leader in quantum and the highly disruptive impact on many aspects of America’s national security and much of our economy if this power is misused. There are no international rules regarding quantum or AI, so abuse is a palpable risk and there are serious ancillary dangers.

An enhanced U.S. technology program also must make sure that diverse, small, innovative startup companies have the financial resources they need, as well as the innovative large ones — and encourage collaboration among them.

It also means that the U.S. should harden our capabilities to protect ourselves and our networks against cyber intrusions and foreign intelligence penetration of all sorts, and should work closely with friends and allies to ensure that we reinforce trusted information networks, data exchanges and research collaboration. One of my successors at the State Department is leading just such an effort through the Krach Center at Purdue. 

We should recall that we did not succeed in the post-Sputnik period alone; we welcomed scientists from many countries and strengthened our alliances. We should do so now with like-minded countries who also fear that advanced technologies in the wrong hands or used with the wrong motives can threaten our common security and permeate our societies, fomenting internal divisions, spreading disinformation, interfering in elections and augmenting social and political polarization.

All the implications of China’s balloon episode have yet to be understood and probably won’t be for some time. In any case, we need to go into high gear to respond to the technological challenge this optic made more vivid to Americans. Anger and tough rhetoric are not policies. Sustaining a strong governmental, private sector and robust scientific response to advance innovative technology at home, and with trusted allies and partners, are called for now and for several decades — as they were after Sputnik. This is our generation’s chance to rise to the new challenge we face.

Robert Hormats is former under secretary of State for economic growth, energy and the environment, and a visiting lecturer at Yale University. Follow him on Twitter @BobHormats.