So far, US intervention in Syria looks like it accomplished the objective
Did last week’s raid in Syria accomplish its objectives? So far, the answer is yes.
In the lead-up to Friday’s strike on Syria’s chemical weapons infrastructure, critics charged that President Trump’s threats of force in retaliation for the April 7 chemical attack at Douma showed an administration in disarray. They likewise charged that he was sending mixed signals, since the administration had recently discussed pulling out U.S. troops assisting in the fight against ISIS in eastern Syria. Some feared that a strike would lead to inevitable escalation, retaliation on U.S. forces, conflict with Russia or Iran, and being drawn into open warfare in the Syrian quagmire.
{mosads}When the attack came, it was precise, discriminate and limited. If in the runup some feared an attack might do too much, in its aftermath the skeptical narrative was that it did too little. Yet, fundamentally, the raid only needed to accomplish one thing: deter the use of chemical weapons. That, indeed, was the stated objective of the operation. The only certain way to assess the success of the attack is to see if the Assad regime uses these weapons again. If not, then it is, in fact, “mission accomplished,” as the president has said.
Of course, there is always a risk in using limited force that the adversary may not get the message. This was the lesson learned in the Vietnam War, when strategic bombing under the Johnson administration was gradually escalated, de-escalated, paused and restarted in the vain search for a formula that would convince the North Vietnamese to open peace negotiations. In fact, all the modulation of force accomplished was to teach Hanoi how to cope.
In the case of Syria, limited force has been deployed in the service of a discreet objective, that of deterring the use of chemical weapons. This is not a hard argument to make. No countries publicly approve of the indiscriminate use of chemical weapons, especially against noncombatants, and most uses are illegal under the Chemical Weapons Convention to which Syria is a signatory. We know that the Assad regime understands that using these weapons is illicit because it denies doing so. And chemical weapons have little practical utility outside of inspiring terror, which is hardly a legitimate military objective.
As such, the use of force in retaliation for chemical weapons usage represents a good candidate for humanitarian intervention by raising the cost of illicit behavior while not otherwise interfering with the conduct of the ongoing civil war. It is also a good deterrent strategy, one intended to both punish the regime for its April 8 atrocity and communicate the message that future such attacks would be costly.
It is easy to second-guess the target list, to say the attack was not well calibrated, to argue for more or fewer missile to have been launched. But again, the best metric for measuring success or failure is the regime’s behavior. We know they got the memo if they don’t use the weapons.
This was the same message that the United States intended to send in 2017, when it carried out a similar targeted missile strike on Syria in response to the regime’s use chemical weapons in Khan Sheikhoun — something that appeared to have a deterrent effect, at least temporarily. Last week’s strike, however, involved more targets, a greater variety of weapons delivered by forces from three countries, and aimed at the chemical weapons infrastructure rather than the tactical delivery systems. As such, it was a bit more of a serious message, and one that may serve as a more lasting reminder to the Assad regime of the consequences of WMD usage.
In the meantime, the United States has stated that it remains “locked and loaded” in case the Assad regime decides to test American resolve. This is prudent; the U.S. and its coalition partners must be ready to take further action in order to maintain the credibility of their deterrent message. This will involve continuous monitoring and intelligence collection to see if Syria decides to use chemical weapons yet again. It will also require contingency planning for future strikes, against even more strategically significant targets. It cannot be a Vietnam-style search for the perfect bombing algorithm, but rather must be calibrated to convey a more pointed message: stop gassing your people or face serious consequences.
At the same time, the United States can engage other elements of national power to further penalize Damascus for its use of chemical weapons. Investigations could seek to determine who was responsible for this illegal, and who gave the order to do so, and sanctions can be levied if appropriate. This effort, in turn, could potentially become part of the diplomatic resolution of the civil war and the post-conflict reorganization of Syria’s government through the UN-sponsored Geneva Process, which should be reconstituted.
The United States has never had any intention of settling Syria’s civil war by force. Yet the U.S. has opposed the use of chemical weapons in that conflict in a policy that reaches back to the Obama administration. Previous attempts at disarmament and dissuasion have failed, and the results of the latest strike remain to be seen. We can only hope that Damascus got the message.
James S. Robbins is senior fellow for national security affairs at the American Foreign Policy Council in Washington, D.C.