Earlier this week, the United States and Sweden announced they have begun negotiations to complete a Defense Cooperation Agreement that would be what the Swedish defense ministry termed a “natural development of Sweden’s and the USA’s long-term cooperation in the area of security and defense.” In commenting on the proposed agreement, Swedish Defense Minister Pal Jonson indicated that it would cover American troop presence and “legal status in Sweden, storage of defense material, and investments in infrastructure that are important so that Sweden as a host country can provide support.”
The agreement would build upon more than a decade of increasingly close military cooperation between Stockholm and Washington. It also would go beyond a memorandum of understanding that Sweden ratified in 2016 for Host Nation Support to NATO. This agreement allows NATO forces to conduct joint training exercises on Swedish soil, as well as logistical support to allied forces located on or in transit through Finnish or Swedish territory during exercises or in a crisis.
Swedish forces have exercised with their American and NATO counterparts for some time. An active participant in NATO’s BALTOPS exercise, Sweden has also included American forces in its major Aurora exercise. Last year, American and Swedish forces conducted several bilateral drills, most notably from Feb. 20-22, when Swedish JAS 39 Gripen fighter aircraft escorted American B-52 bombers in an exercise over southern Sweden; in June when American Marines joined the Swedish Gotland Brigade in an exercise on the strategic Baltic Sea island of that name; and in November, when an American Special Operations unit participated in a Swedish military exercise on the Baltic coast.
The negotiations for a new Defense Cooperation Agreement should be seen in the context of Sweden’s and Finland’s applications to join NATO. Even prior to its application — on the heels of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine — Sweden had responded with alarm to Russia’s increasingly aggressive behavior. It was for that reason that the previously demilitarized Gotland once again became a focus of Swedish military activity.
The accession of the two Scandinavian states will certainly enhance NATO’s defenses against Russia in the Baltic region, as well as the Far North. But there will still be a need for a visible American deterrent in the area. At a minimum, the Defense Cooperation Agreement would enable the U.S. Air Force to station aircraft in Sweden, at least on a rotational basis; doing so would certainly enhance NATO’s deterrent.
As the Marine exercise on Gotland indicates, however, there is a need for more than U.S. air power to be present in the region. Both Gotland and the Danish island of Bornholm are strategically vital for the defense of the entire Baltic area; if seized by Russia, it would significantly expand Moscow’s military reach. Marine forces could be crucial not only to deter any such attempt to invade one or both of the islands, but also to provide a threat to Kaliningrad, the Russian Baltic exclave that is brimming with missiles of all types, probably to include nuclear-tipped Iskander missiles.
Even as the U.S. and Sweden were announcing the negotiations, the visit of Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida to Washington, and Japan’s dramatic new increases in its planned military capability, occasioned the announcement of a new Marine Corps posture in the Western Pacific. The announcement reflects Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger’s pathbreaking vision for Marine Corps operations to counter Chinese aggression. Given Sweden and Finland’s momentous decisions to join NATO — after two centuries of Swedish non-alignment and Finnish non-alignment since the end of World War II — the Marine Corps also should give serious consideration to a new posture in the Baltic region.
Whether or not Vladimir Putin survives the end of the Ukrainian war that he so viciously launched, Russia will remain a major threat — not only to the small Baltic states but also to all of Scandinavia. An increased Marine presence would provide that air power and sea-based land power as well, a combination that would create a powerful deterrent against Russian adventurism throughout the entire Baltic Sea area.
Danish Brigadier General Michael H. Clemmesen put it well in a recent article, in which he offered a Danish perspective on the accession of its two neighbors: “Without a U.S. intent to support the defense of the Baltic States with strong air power deployed to Northern Europe, the game is still open in spite of Russian limitations.” Washington, and the Marines, should take note — and act accordingly.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under secretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy under secretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.