The Land Down Under the sea: AUKUS is about submarines, not bombers

A recent article by Mitchell Center for Aerospace Studies expert Robert Haddick asserts that the Australian government should acquire the B-21 Raider strategic bomber, instead of the nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) planned under the AUKUS trilateral partnership agreement between Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Such a replacement could seem appealing after a year-long period of concerns mainly due to Australia’s capability gaps that may be caused by delivery timeline and overburdened defense industries in the U.S. and U.K. The argument, however, does not comport with the fundamentals of the AUKUS partnership and the platform requirements desired by Australia.

Since 2007, the Royal Australian Navy (RAN) wanted to replace its current Collins-class submarines as they have been problematic since their design phase. The Australian government eventually selected Naval Group’s Barracuda-class as a replacement in 2016. Recent changes in the external environment, and notably in Australia’s relationship with China, however, drastically changed Australia’s threat perception. In addition to the direct threat posed by China through coercion and election interference in the past six years, illegal territorial claims and the use of maritime militia in the South China Sea convinced the nation to adapt its military force structure to the evolving strategic environment. As a nation that has to cover the world’s third-largest Exclusive Economic Zone, Australia has explicated in its 2016 Defense White Paper that its priority is to acquire “regionally superior submarines with a high degree of interoperability with the United States” that provides “a strategic advantage in terms of surveillance and protection” of Australia’s maritime approaches.

As the Australian Defense Minister Richrad Marles explained, “For a three-ocean nation, the heart of deterrence is undersea capability.” While long-range strategic bombers are an important part of nuclear deterrence and conventional strike mission, they are not a stand-alone, independent replacement for a joint force. The strategic and operational roles are evidently different. Thanks to inherent stealth, endurance, firepower and mobility, the SSNs can support a wide range of maritime operations that the bombers cannot — anti-submarine warfare; special operations forces support; irregular warfare; mine warfare; (constant and mobile) forward presence. Most importantly, Australia is not a great power that maintains a doctrine of employing a long-range strategic bomber against an adversary. A bomber force would present more lifetime costs to the Australians than would a nuclear submarine force. Simply, acquiring the B-21 is not now in the interest of the Australian government.

Despite the concern, Australia’s lack of a civilian nuclear industry is “not an indicator of naval nuclear competence” due to the fundamental difference in the basic design of reactors. Also, the British Royal Navy has already started training the RAN submariners on their Astute-class SSN and the U.S. Congress is striving to “establish a joint training pipeline between the U.S. Navy and the RAN” for a future fleet of RAN SSNs. Most importantly, the mature U.S. Navy Virginia-class SSNs, and Royal Navy Astute-class SSNs will mitigate the current capability gap in Australian joint and naval force capabilities. The subsequent establishment of a submarine tender support base in Australia will enable better interoperability between the three nations’ navies to conduct more effective operations in the wider Indo-Pacific region.

The AUKUS partnership is more than just a “submarine deal.” By creating 17 working groups, some of which have already begun, the three nations are creating a “seamless” defense industrial base between them that fosters closer collaboration. Out of the 17 groups, nine are dedicated to the development of the SSN; the rest are geared toward other advanced capabilities, including unmanned underwater vehicles, quantum, artificial intelligence, cyber, hypersonics and electronic warfare. The ultimate goal of the partnership is to advance the Australian defense industry’s capability and capacity to an extent where the country can sustain its own defense requirements and effectively contribute to the shared regional interests.

The British Astute-class (just under $2 billion each,) and U.S. Virginia-class subs ($3.5 billion with the payload module and $2.8 billion without that space for additional missiles) have been proposed as potential AUKUS platforms and are in service. The U.S. Air Force B-21 Raider is not yet in full rate production, and the cost for 100 such aircraft for the Air Force has been estimated at $203 billion by the Congressional Research Service. Australia might buy, for example, one-third of that amount (30-plus aircraft) but would still face a lifetime cost of $67 billion in U.S. dollars. If Australia bought six Virginia-class submarines, the total lifetime cost instead would be less than $45 billion for an equal, 30-year lifespan. An Australian study suggested that eight nuclear boats would cost $70 billion (Australian dollars), or about $47 billion in U.S. dollars. Either way, the nuclear submarine looks to be more cost effective than the bomber.

Unlike the surface ship model, where 30 percent of the lifetime cost is paid in acquiring the platform and 70 percent paid later in maintenance and upgrade over its lifetime, a nuclear submarine’s cost balance is 45 to 50 percent up front and the same for service over its lifetime. Neither cost estimate includes the infrastructure needed to support both platforms, but the submarine starts out $20 billion in the lead. The B-21 is still a new platform and no doubt will have “teething” issues, but the Virginia and Astute-class SSNs are mature platforms in full rate production. Australia is already buying the F-35A as a strike fighter asset and has defined its air defense envelope that acquisition will support. The B-21 does not fit that requirement. The B-21 was examined for Australian use but the nuclear submarine was still the first choice.

Comparing the B-21 and the nuclear submarine option for AUKUS is like comparing apples and oranges. Both offer capability for deterrence and for conventional combat. However, Australia was first seeking a submarine combat capability before AUKUS was agreed upon, and not a long-range strike bomber. The nuclear submarine option has broad Australian public support. 

The Australian government will announce its choice of model and discuss the operational timeline in the first quarter of 2023. A nuclear submarine force for the RAN is a reachable goal. Loaning the Australians a refueled Los Angeles-class SSN and hosting Australian sailors aboard a Virginia-class SSN for training can speed the process.

Andrew I. Park is a senior analyst for the Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy League of the United States, primarily responsible for leading the center’s research and projects on the Indo-Pacific region. He is also president of the nonprofit Sejong Society of Washington and a non-resident fellow at the Pacific Forum.

Steven Wills, Ph.D., a retired U.S. Navy officer, is a navalist for the Center for Maritime Strategy at the Navy League of the United States. He is an expert in U.S. Navy strategy and policy and surface warfare programs and platforms.