End the Ukraine war well

Ending the Ukraine war requires not just stopping the fighting but also creating a sufficiently durable, political arrangement that addresses the underlying confrontation between Russia and Ukraine and sets the conditions for a better peace. 

The conflicting objectives between Volodymyr Zelensky and Vladimir Putin are stark and longstanding.  Zelensky desires self-determination for Ukraine — a future in which the people of Ukraine can determine their own political and economic interests. Putin wants Ukraine as a Russian vassal. 

In an address at the Cooper Union in February 1860, Abraham Lincoln asked, “What will satisfy them [the people of America’s south]?” His answer, “This and this only: Cease to call slavery wrong, and join them in calling it right.” Lincoln would not agree to that. And we know what will satisfy Putin — but neither Ukraine, the U.S., nor NATO can agree to that.

Ukraine wants only what it is entitled to: self-determination, political sovereignty, and territorial integrity. Like other states, it can legitimately defend these rights against illegal aggression.  Further, any state has a right to assist Ukraine in its justified self-defense. The Ukraine war is not a proxy war. It’s a war of self-defense and defense of others — both clearly permitted by international law.

Putin has been trying to undermine Ukraine’s self-determination and political sovereignty for almost 20 years. He first tried to manipulate domestic Ukrainian affairs by promoting false narratives about the 2004 Orange Revolution and later about the 2013 Euromaidan Revolution.  He backed pro-Russia Viktor Yanukovych as Ukraine’s president, first in 2004 (Yanukovych lost that election) then again in 2010 when he won. Putin believed these indirect means would get what he wanted: a compliant Ukraine controlled by Moscow. 

When indirect means failed, he blamed American dominance for Ukraine’s movement away from Russian control and took direct action by invading and annexing parts of the Donbas and all of Crimea in 2014. That was not enough to stop Ukraine from exercising its political sovereignty, so Putin again invaded in 2022, intending to topple the Zelensky government and install one that would bend to his will. 

A ceasefire en route to negotiations now would provide Putin with the strategic pause he desperately needs. When his quick-win plan failed, he moved to Plan B: partition Ukraine by force, strangle it economically by seizing all but one of its major ports, and destroy its social-political-cultural infrastructure by physical destruction and forced deportation. Putin believes that — with winter setting in and the allies’ resolve possibly weakening — he has set the conditions to succeed in the long run. He’s not going to give up on this aim after a few months of brutal war, multiple war crimes, and threats of nuclear weapons. For him, Russia may be on its heels, but is not yet knocked down.

Ukraine and its supporting allies should not provide Putin the breathing space he seeks. The Zelensky administration must negotiate from a position of strength. The successful counteroffensive in Ukraine’s north and east, as well as the recent Russian withdrawal from Kherson, certainly improves Zelensky’s position. But Russia still holds territory along Ukraine’s southern coast that is directly related to Ukraine’s economic prosperity. Fighting is what improved Zelensky’s bargaining power, and more fighting is necessary to put Putin in the right frame of mind for any potential serious negotiations. Force compelled the Russians to withdraw from Kyiv, from Kharkiv, and from Kherson.  Force — or the threat of its successful continuation — will eject Russia from southern Ukraine. With this done, Putin will be compelled to realize his 2022 invasion failed and his 2014 annexations are at risk.

This is a hard line, but war is hard business. A durable, political solution to the confrontation between Russia and Ukraine will not result from Putin believing he can dictate the timing and terms of negotiations or still has ways to limit Ukraine’s political sovereignty. Putin brought war and war crimes to Ukraine and Europe; he cannot reap reward from the death and destruction he caused. Peace in Ukraine must rest on sufficiently addressing the underlying confrontation. To do this, Ukraine may be willing to compromise on some of what it deserves, maybe even on portions of its territory. But no negotiations should demand eroding its core rights to self-determination. 

Before negotiations, Ukraine, the U.S. and NATO must agree to the answers to this question: Where is the trade space between what Putin seeks and Zelensky wants? Whatever the answers to this question are, it begs another: Can Putin be trusted to live up to his side of whatever bargain he agrees to? 

To bound the confrontation between Ukraine and Russia, the war’s end must include firm guarantees concerning Ukraine’s future physical security and assistance to help the Ukraine people recover their economic prosperity. Russia is unlikely to agree to such guarantees unless it is forced to do so. But that’s the price of their aggression. Should there be negotiations between Ukraine and Russia? Yes, but that time has not yet come. Should fighting continue? Yes. To negotiate now risks Putin’s aggression being rewarded, his quest to subjugate Ukraine remaining possible, and the global principle of non-aggression meaning little.

James M. Dubik, Ph.D., a retired lieutenant general of the U.S. Army, is a senior fellow at the Institute for the Study of War. He served in military command and operational roles in Bosnia, Haiti and Iraq, and helped train forces in Afghanistan, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Honduras, and many NATO countries