Biden’s National Security Strategy: A vision more aspirational than realistic

The Biden administration’s updated National Security Strategy reflects the changes in the international environment that have taken place since the White House released its Interim National Security Strategic Guidance in March 2021. The new document rightly points out that “the post-Cold War era is definitively over … Democracies and autocracies are engaged in a contest to show which system of governance can best deliver for their people and the world.”

In addition, while continuing to identify China as the longer-term, pacing threat, the strategy devotes considerable attention to Russia in light of its invasion of Ukraine. Moreover, it recognizes that the Russian threat is not a temporary one. Rather it is “an ongoing [my emphasis] threat to the regional security order in Europe and it is a source of disruption and instability globally.”

At the same time, however, the strategy is as much an outline of goals and objectives as it is one of the means to realize them — and it is not at all clear that those goals are sufficiently realistic or that the means it outlines are truly achievable.

To achieve its goals, the strategy posits that America “will combine … [its] strengths to achieve maximum effect in deterring acts of aggression,” what the administration has termed “integrated deterrence.” It lists five components of this concept: integration “across domains” both military and non-military; across the world’s regions; across the “spectrum of conflict,” ranging from strategic nuclear to hybrid warfare; across the government’s agencies; and integration with allies and partners.

The term “integrated deterrence” is relatively new, but its components are not. Yet “integrated deterrence” did not deter Russia’s Vladimir Putin.

Deploying by popular opinion?

The strategy rightly posits that America will only call upon its military as a “last resort,” when all other elements of power — economic, financial, commercial — have failed to dissuade an aggressor. In addition, however, it presages military action “only when the objectives and mission are clear and achievable, consistent with our values and laws, alongside non-military tools, and the mission is undertaken with the informed consent of the American people.”

Yet, in outlining all of these preconditions for a military operation, the Biden administration may well be undermining the very deterrent it seeks to enhance, since a potential aggressor may conclude that its actions will not provoke public support for an American military response.

The document asserts that the United States, in concert with its allies, “will work to strengthen democracy around the world.” That surely is a tall order, given that democracy appears to be in retreat even within the NATO alliance. Moreover, America has maintained long-standing relationships, notably in the military sphere, with states such as the Gulf kingdoms and emirates that neither are, nor consider themselves to be, democracies. The strategy neither proposes, nor truly addresses, a way forward for sustaining Washington’s relations with these states given its commitment to democratic change.

Indeed, it is difficult to see how, in order “to advance shared prosperity domestically and to uphold the rights of all Americans,” the United States can achieve its goal to “proactively shape the international order in line with our interests and values.” Far too many nations resist American efforts to “shape” the international order. These states are not only America’s enemies, such as China, Russia, Iran, North Korea or Venezuela.” States such as India, Brazil, Vietnam, South Africa and even the Gulf states, among many others, cooperate with America but seek their own independent path on the world stage.

Midterms’ impact on strategy

The upcoming U.S. congressional elections may further complicate the administration’s goals, including making good on its promise to “support Ukraine in its fight for its freedom … [and] help Ukraine recover economically.”

All current projections indicate that the Republicans will take the House, with the attendant likelihood of an empowered Freedom Caucus, many of whose members oppose further aid to Ukraine. In fact, some elements of that caucus might support reductions in the defense budget, thereby undermining a key — if not the key — component of America’s deterrent.

In short, the administration’s National Security Strategy, while certainly an improvement over its interim predecessor, nevertheless leaves a number of issues that call for further clarification. It is not at all evident that the 2022 National Defense Strategy that was released in March and to which the new document refers, resolves any of these issues.

That no doubt will be the focus of the congressionally mandated 2022 Commission on National Defense Strategy, much as it was when its 2018 predecessor found the previous strategy equally if not more wanting.

Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was under secretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy under secretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.