The White House periodically announces sending Ukraine some arbitrary number of this weapons system, another few of that system, and so on. Isolationists insist we are doing too much; anguished Ukrainians watching their people be slaughtered say they need much more.
Our goal should be to allow the Ukrainians to reclaim their lands and safeguard their people as quickly as possible. That will save lives — both Ukrainian and Russian — as well as minimize disruption of the world economy and check the imminent famine created by Russia’s blockade of Ukrainian grain exports.
And the only way to achieve that goal is to strengthen the Ukrainians.
Sanctions are important to weakening Russia, but they will not force Putin to end his invasion. Individual sanctions have little more than entertainment value. We may enjoy the thought of Russian oligarchs being temporarily denied use of their yachts, but even if some oligarchs do have the temerity to complain to Putin — several leading oligarchs and their families have died in “murder-suicides” since the war began — Putin will not abandon a war on which he has gambled so much just to restore their creature comforts. After all, Putin made the oligarchs, not the other way around.
Economic sanctions hold more promise. They could work in various ways. In theory, they could deprive Putin of the cash needed to keep fighting. That was the hope behind western governments’ freezes on Russian reserves held overseas. In fact, Europe’s continued heavy purchases of Russian oil and gas have left Putin flush with funds so that cost is no object in buying what he needs to conduct the war. Cutting off purchases of Russian gas would cause broad economic dislocation that Europe to date has been unwilling to accept.
Another set of sanctions prevent Russia from purchasing critical parts and components. Eventually, the lack of microchips and spare parts for western-made equipment will do severe damage to the Russian economy. Similarly, excluding some Russian banks from the international financial system is gradually isolating the Russian economy. Those long-term effects, however, will not affect Putin’s commitment to a war on which he has staked his political survival.
Nor can we count on an early military defeat for Putin. Large numbers of Russian soldiers are dying, but Putin evidently does not care. Corruption, poverty, and inequality in Russia have forced disproportionate numbers of indigenous Siberians and Muslims into the army. As a result, they, not well-connected Russians from the Moscow and St. Petersburg areas, are the ones dying. Putin’s puppet states in Luhansk and Donetsk have even drafted Ukrainians in their 50s to fight with crude weapons against their own country’s army, with over half dead or wounded. None of these losses affect the regime’s political stability in the least.
Similarly, although Ukrainian success is increasingly forcing Russia to rely on Cold War-era tanks long in storage, these tanks can still cause enormous harm. They are considered obsolete because of their vulnerability to opposing fire, but again Putin does not care how many minority group members die in his tanks.
Daily battle reports tell us little. With a long frontline, either side can punch through if it concentrates enough forces in one place and is willing to take disproportionate losses from attacking entrenched positions. Russia has done this in the East, achieving real but modest gains at high cost. Ukraine is less willing to sacrifice its under-supported soldiers but has reclaimed significant land in the South.
Parsimonious supplying of Ukraine risks letting this conflict settle into a war of attrition, which will result in more pulverized cities, needlessly wasted lives, and a possible waning of European solidarity if Russia threatens their natural gas supplies when heating season returns.
The U.S. never deliberately engages in wars of attrition. And when it has done so by accident, it has fared badly. Wars of attrition favor dictators, whose power does not depend on popular support, over democracies whose voters grow fatigued.
To avoid this, the U.S. does not try to finely calibrate how much force it brings to bear. We likely could have evicted Saddam Hussein from Kuwait, or later deposed him, with one-third of the force we brought to bear. Half the planes would have been enough to drive Slobodan Milosevic from Kosovo. We brought overwhelming force to shorten the conflict and minimize casualties.
In the same spirit — because we cannot know exactly how much weaponry the Ukrainians needs to prevail — we should send the Ukrainians anything that might help them secure an advantage. Valuable time, and lives, are lost if we try half-measures and then wait to assess the results.
We need not worry about depleting our or other western countries’ arsenals. The primary purpose of our tanks, artillery, anti-tank weapons, and ammunition is to prevent Russia from overrunning Europe. Any Russian tanks or artillery the Ukrainians destroy is that many fewer for us to worry about.
Nowhere else in the world are we likely to face a protracted ground battle like that underway in Europe. Any battle over Taiwan will be fought primarily in the air and in the sea. North Korea might invade South Korea by land, but our planned response has always depended overwhelmingly on air and naval power. Russia is our only plausible adversary heavily dependent on tanks and artillery.
We also need to stop tying the Ukrainians’ hands behind their backs. Ukraine has repeatedly and persuasively disavowed any interest in seizing Russian territory, but we should not ask the Ukrainians to forego attacks on Russian military targets threatening them wherever they may be. Several Ukrainian cities, including Kharkiv, are so close to the border that their citizens may never be safe unless Ukraine can remove Russian artillery and rocket launchers across the border.
The risks — to Ukraine, to Europe, to world peace and prosperity, and to our own economy — of giving the Ukrainians too little are far greater than the risks of giving them too much. The time is now.
David A. Super is a professor of law at Georgetown Law. He also served for several years as the general counsel for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Follow him on Twitter @DavidASuper1