After more than a year of “all-of-government” strategic reviews, the Biden administration last week finally presented its new Indo-Pacific strategy. The new policy includes lofty goals such as strengthening U.S. presence in the region and building collective capacity, but few concrete actions that can be implemented today.
A “senior administration official” who briefed reporters on background stated that “this is not our China strategy,” an assertion that immediately raises the questions: What is the China policy? What specific steps is the administration taking? And when can we see the plan?
Meanwhile, the same senior official described vague action items in Asia such as driving new resources, launching new frameworks, reinforcing deterrence, delivering on potential and supporting good governance. Those broad statements are fodder for academic debate but no substitute for a detailed strategic framework outlining the specific steps the U.S. and its allies desperately need to take today – not another year or two from now – to meet the China challenge.
To be sure, the U.S. trade representative (USTR) purported to roll out a “top-to-bottom” review of China trade policy last October in the form of a speech and a fact sheet. But details were scarce and future developments were mostly contingent on whether China fulfilled its purchase commitments under the phase one deal.
Now that USTR has confirmed China’s failure to live up to the deal, trade officials have hinted at a new Asia regional strategy “in weeks, not months.” The same officials have signaled that the new proposal will not include Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) accession, new market access commitments or pledges requiring congressional approval.
No one will be surprised when a new plan focused instead on important, but lower-priority items such as digital trade, supply chain security, workers’ rights and environmental protection are greeted around the world with only modest enthusiasm — and a hunger for much more.
Handwringing with the Biden administration and fear of criticism for “softness” on China has created an indefinite policy void. Biden’s default approach has consisted of Trump legacy policies, a more businesslike tone and promises of policy rollouts to come. But no one doubts that the administration owes America and its allies more.
Into that void has stepped Congress. Both Houses passed China competition bills that need to be sorted out through the conference committee process. The two bills include a collection of other bills – including the much-needed Creating Helpful Incentives to Produce Semiconductors (CHIPS) for America Act, which enjoys a congressional consensus – along with a sprinkling of unrelated priorities.
Unfortunately, the bills read like a collection of uncoordinated measures related in some way to China but not coordinated to constitute an all-of-government approach. Congressional support for specific provisions seems to hinge on perceptions of whether terms are tough enough on China, a goal widely shared in Congress, rather than strategic relevance.
Congress will probably produce a final bill that President Biden can sign, but the process would have benefitted from a clear articulation of Biden administration strategy many months ago. Democratic Party priorities are reflected in the bills, of course, but an understanding of the relationship between the bill and America’s broader China strategy would have strengthened both the advocacy for and effectiveness of proposed policies and programs.
The Biden team’s abdication of its responsibility to provide that strategic guidance early in the administration explains in part the uncoordinated hodgepodge of provisions now under consideration.
It’s time to re-shore China policy to the White House with a mandate for concrete action.
Jeff Moon is a China trade and government relations consultant who served previously as assistant U.S. trade representative for China affairs.