The Iranian nuclear talks offer Biden much-needed bipartisan consensus

President Biden enters 2022 facing daunting challenges at home and abroad, due to forces beyond his control. Russian revanchism, a specter that has stalked Europe for centuries, has returned in force. So has consumer inflation, fueled by global trends affected by, but ultimately outside of, the White House’s grasp. And, of course, there is the coronavirus pandemic, which has defied a world’s worth of government attempts to bring it to heel.  

Given all this, one might ask why Biden should wade into the treacherous waters of Middle Eastern diplomacy, and especially the seemingly intractable challenge of the Iranian nuclear negotiations. The answer, I believe, is twofold.  

First, because it is a task Biden and his party long set for themselves. And with good reason. Successfully negotiating an end to the Iranian nuclear menace would relieve tens of millions from a threat of cataclysmic conflict which has loomed over the region for nearly two decades. Americans rightly feel they have had more than their fair share of war. Middle Easterners, whose region has been trapped in a cycle of conflict for decades, could not agree more.   

Second, though many believe as an article of faith that bipartisan policymaking is now impossible — despite recent landmark legislation that suggests otherwise — I believe that the negotiations with Iran offer an ideal opportunity. They present a rare, low-cost opportunity to incorporate his opponents’ best thinking without incurring the wrath of powerful domestic interests. To understand how calls for a closer look at the current state of play in Vienna.  

Since entering office, the administration has been animated by the belief that reaching an agreement required maximal conciliation of Tehran’s demands across a range of fronts. It removed sanctions on Iranian proxies. It ignored an attempted kidnapping operation by Iranian intelligence on U.S. soil. And barely a month back in office, the administration announced it would shelve snapback sanctions — meeting Tehran’s most cherished objective — before talks even began. This, as well as other concessions, were offered merely to begin the process of negotiations.   

These offers speak to the open-handed and generous spirit with which Americans often approach other nations. Unfortunately, the last year has made it plain that Tehran does not share this spirit, as evidenced by some of the behavior of Washington’s interlocutors in Iran.   

Nearly one year later, the Vienna talks are in dire need of a reset. Nine rounds of talks do not appear to have brought the parties meaningfully closer. To the contrary, the American negotiating team is in disarray, beset by multiple resignations. America’s European allies are openly speaking of the “end” of the process. And Tehran has shown a willingness to drag along negotiations for months, only to arbitrarily wipe the slate clean and force the process to begin from scratch.      

So, what can be done? In short, Biden should take a page out of the Iranian playbook. Rather than signal a willingness to offer concessions in advance, he should apply pressure on non-nuclear fronts. In so doing, the administration would likely win support from congressional Republicans, who have long been critical of the administration’s attempt to revive the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JPCOA).    

The logical place to begin is with Iran’s regional proxies: Hezbollah, Hamas and the Houthis. Here, a wide consensus already exists. Indeed, the JCPOA’s silence on these groups was one of its main vulnerabilities in the American debate. By abandoning the effort to induce Iranian pliability through indulgence of its proxies — pliability which, if the last nine rounds of talks are any indication, is not forthcoming in any case — the administration can both create new leverage and defang one of its main political liabilities.   

The easiest place to begin would be to redesignate the Houthis as a terrorist group. On its own merits, this would be eminently defensible. As the administration itself has noted and condemned, the Houthis have launched attacks against civilians in Saudi Arabia and international shipping; seized the American Embassy in Yemen — which included taking its local staff hostage — and even obstructed the movement of humanitarian aid within that war-torn country.   

Hamas and Hezbollah present somewhat more intricate challenges. Both have long been designated terrorist entities and are sanctioned as such. But, as the Trump administration’s rapid deployment of a functionally unilateral sanctions regime against Iran demonstrated, a great deal depends on the vigor and extent with which secondary sanctions are applied. Should the Biden administration prioritize closing off the financial lungs through which these entities breathe — in Turkey, Qatar, Latin America and elsewhere — Tehran would suddenly find its most dependable regional assets cash-starved and desperate for relief.   

One year ago, Biden took the pressure off his predecessor’s sanctions campaign in a well-meaning attempt to build trust with Tehran. By now it should be Tehran’s turn to seek to build trust with him.   

Ahmed Charai is a publisher of The Jerusalem Strategic Tribune. He is on the board of directors for the Atlantic Council, an international counselor of the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington.