Why ‘land for peace’ won’t work in Ukraine

“Land for peace” is in the air.

Who could be against a land for peace deal in Ukraine? Imagine: The Ukrainians give up some land, the Russians agree to peace, and everyone lives happily ever after. Small wonder that former President Donald Trump says he can pull it off in 24 hours. Heck, 60 minutes, the length of his TV show “The Apprentice,” should be enough.

First you tell the Ukrainians that, if they refuse to negotiate, the United States will immediately stop supplying them with weapons. How can they say no? Then you tell the Russians that, if they refuse to negotiate, the U.S. will increase its supplies of weapons to Ukraine. How can they say no?

Finally, once they’re at the table, you invoke the “land for peace” formula and everyone is happy.

So what’s wrong with this scheme? Virtually everything.

Start with the Ukrainians. Thanks to recent efforts by Europe and NATO, Ukraine will continue to get weapons and financial assistance for at least a few more years, even if Washington cuts off all aid.

Continue with the Russians. Thanks to the unconcealed MAGA Republican disdain for Ukraine, Russia will suspect that the U.S. is bluffing about increasing its support of Ukraine.

Since neither side will want to be the spoiler, they’ll agree to negotiate while knowing the American hand is weak. The U.S., meanwhile, will be under the false impression that it compelled both sides to the negotiating table because its hand is strong.

And then the “land for peace” discussion begins. Both sides will ask: How much of which land for what kind of peace?

There is no easy answer to that question. All we can say with certainty is that the Ukrainians will want to give up as little land for as much peace, while the Russians will want to keep as much land for as little peace. Some theoretical midpoint may exist, and the Ukrainians might be induced to accept it. The Russians will cross their arms and say “nyet.”

Reconciling these antithetical positions will be possible only if some outside force compels both sides to accept a compromise. NATO? Russia would never agree. China? Ukraine won’t agree. Hungary? It’s the mouse that roared. The United Nations? Another roaring mouse.

What about Donald Trump? Ironically, he might be the only person in the world with some measure of legitimacy, credibility and support in the United States, Russia and Ukraine.

Could Trump pull it off? Unfortunately, no — unless…

As already pointed out, Trump lacks credible means of strong-arming Ukraine or Russia. The Ukrainians will count on continued European support, while the Russians will suspect the U.S. is bluffing.

Were Trump to have expert knowledge of both countries, he might be able to take advantage of their weaknesses, avoid their strengths, manipulate their ambitions, run circles around their pretentions and then make offers they can’t refuse. But he doesn’t. Neither does J.D. Vance or Rand Paul or other leading conservatives who want to end the war. All of them are rank amateurs when it comes to navigating the byzantine ways of Russia and Ukraine.

Banging his fist, losing his temper and making threats won’t work either. The Ukrainians and Russians would regard that as childish. At the end of the day, Trump too would fail.

Unless he does one of two things. He could find an ally with clout that would enable him to force a deal on both sides. The Ukrainians would be far more impressionable and might cave, but the Russians would, given their cultural predilections, merely cross their arms and say “nyet.” Besides, who would that ally be? The Chinese and Europeans have the requisite clout, but it’s hard to imagine a man of Trump’s pride and ego going to either of them hat in hand.

The other option is to side with the Ukrainians against the Russians or with the Russians against the Ukrainians: by actually arming the Ukrainians to such an extent that their victory becomes inevitable or by throwing the Ukrainians to the Russian wolves. Both alternatives would indeed end the war.

A Ukrainian victory would obviously be preferable for all sorts of reasons. It would save Ukraine and Europe from the Russians; reinforce the postwar security architecture; humiliate China, North Korea and Iran; and compel Russia to abandon its imperial dreams.

A Russian victory would end the war by ending Ukraine and Ukrainians, but it would also unleash a wave of Russian imperialism on Europe and Central Asia, with unimaginably destabilizing consequences for Eurasia and the world.

When faced with these alternatives, what would Trump choose? The future of the world may matter to him, but his sense of genius will matter more. Fortunately, both argue for a Ukrainian victory, as losing to the world’s other self-declared genius, Vladimir Putin, would be more than Trump’s ego could handle.

Ironically, Trump may be forced to make the right choice and save Ukraine and himself. If the road to hell is paved with good intentions, perhaps the one to heaven is paved with narcissism, intransigeance and ignorance?

Alexander J. Motyl is a professor of political science at Rutgers University-Newark. A specialist on Ukraine, Russia and the USSR, and on nationalism, revolutions, empires and theory, he is the author of 10 books of nonfiction, as well as “Imperial Ends: The Decay, Collapse, and Revival of Empires” and “Why Empires Reemerge: Imperial Collapse and Imperial Revival in Comparative Perspective.”