‘Hamas is an idea’ Post-war lessons from Baghdad to Jerusalem

Military officers seldom disagree publicly with their civilian masters in the middle of a war. That fact makes Israel Defense Forces spokesman Rear Adm. Daniel Hagari’s interview on Israel’s Channel 13 news all the more noteworthy. 

In a direct challenge to Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who insists on the eradication of Hamas, Hagari declared, “Hamas is an idea, Hamas is a party. It’s rooted in the hearts of the people — whoever thinks we can eliminate Hamas is wrong.” 

As for what to do with post-war Gaza, he warned, “If we don’t bring something else to Gaza, at the end of the day, we will get Hamas.”

Hagari’s remarks echo a lesson U.S. forces learned the hard way in Iraq: “In counterinsurgency, you cannot kill your way to victory.” 

Soldiers understand the limits of military power better than the civilians who send them to war. 

In 2003, the United States and its allies invaded Iraq expecting rapid success. They planned to remove Saddam Hussain, install a democratic government and withdraw soon after.  

Because the Bush administration did not want to get bogged down in a protracted counterinsurgency campaign, the Pentagon did not develop an adequate post-conflict stabilization plan. 

As Iraq descended into chaos, the U.S. had no choice but to create the Coalition Provisional Authority under the leadership of L. Paul Bremer III, who almost immediately disbanded the army without pay and disqualified former Baath Party members from holding office. 

These decisions deprived Iraq of the civil servants needed to govern and drove angry, armed former soldiers into the ranks of a growing insurgency.  

Foreign fighters flocked into the country, adding to the insecurity. It took the U.S. and its allies three years to defeat the insurgents, and ISIS rose from the ashes, causing instability that persists to the present. 

Conditions in Gaza are far worse than they were in post-invasion Iraq.  

According to a Boston University study, 70 percent of its housing has been destroyed. As many as 37,000 people have been killed, and 1.7 million internally displaced. 

Gaza’s health system has collapsed. Garbage collection has all but ceased. With no one policing the territory, lawlessness threatens the distribution of humanitarian aid. 

Poor sanitation, heat and lack of potable water are contributing to disease, especially among children. The United Nations warns that over 1 million people will be in danger of starvation by mid-July. 

The U.N. estimates that it will take 16 years to rebuild Gaza at a cost of $40 billion. And someone will have to govern and administer the territory. The IDF does not want the job any more than the U.S. military wanted it in Iraq. Occupying a densely populated, heavily urbanized area is a labor-intensive task for which soldiers are neither trained nor equipped. 

With a war against Hezbollah looming in the North — and with it the risk of a wider conflagration — the IDF can ill afford to tie down troops in Gaza.  

Shortly after the invasion began, Netanyahu said Israel did not want to occupy it but would need to maintain a “credible force” there to maintain security for the foreseeable future. 

He did not specify precisely how that would work. 

Early in the war, the Biden administration floated the idea of an international peacekeeping force. The history of U.N. peacekeeping does not bode well for the success of such a mission.  

Lightly armed multinational forces can be useful in separating warring factions that have agreed to a ceasefire, as they have done on the island of Cyprus for the last 60 years. But the experiences of Somalia and Bosnia make clear that peacekeepers cannot end a civil war, combat an insurgency or police territory in the face of armed opposition. 

The UN Interim Force in Lebanon, deployed since 1978, has not prevented intermittent conflict between Israel and Hezbollah.  

For several months, the proposal of an international force was moot, since no nation volunteered to staff it. In May, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Morocco said they would consider contributing troops, but only if the U.S. recognized a Palestinian state. That demand is a non-starter for the current Israeli government. 

In January, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant proposed a four-part plan for post-war Gaza: IDF control of security, a coalition of U.S. and moderate Arab states in charge of rebuilding, local Palestinian control of civil affairs and no Jewish settlements in Gaza. 

The far right, led by Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich, opposed the plan. The Israeli right also opposes any role for the Palestinian Authority, which currently governs Palestinian-controlled territory in the West Bank. 

The hardliners have their own plan, which the U.S. has categorically condemned: Expel the Palestinians and replace them with Israeli settlers. National Security Minister Itamar Ben Gvir said the Israeli government should promote “voluntary emigration” of Palestinians from Gaza. 

If the behavior of ultra-Zionist settlers in the West Bank is any guide, “voluntary emigration” would mean making life so miserable that residents have no choice but to leave. And even if Palestinians wished to emigrate, there is nowhere for them to go. Surrounding Arab countries neither want nor can afford more refugees. 

Without a peace plan, occupation by the IDF is very likely, even if the military hates the idea. Yet as the 18-year Israeli occupation of southern Lebanon illustrates, that is not a permanent solution. Sooner or later, some form of civilian government must be established. 

Israel is also running out of time. Netanyahu has announced that the “intense phase” of the war in Gaza is coming to an end. As heavy fighting decreases, the question of “what next” looms ever larger. 

In answering it, Netanyahu would do well to consider the wisdom of Union Gen. William Tecumseh Sherman: “War’s legitimate object is a more perfect peace.” 

In the case of Gaza, such peace can only be achieved by installing a government that enjoys the support of its Palestinian citizens. 

Tom Mockaitis is a professor of history at DePaul University and the author of  “Iraq and the Challenge of Counterinsurgency.”