The future of the ‘special relationship’: What can Britain offer America?

The foreign policy establishment in London secretly lives in fear of a “Mad Men” meme. It shows Jon Hamm as Don Draper in an elevator with a junior colleague who says, “I feel bad for you.” The advertising guru, blank-faced, replies, “I don’t think about you at all.”

There is an abiding fear that the United Kingdom is that junior colleague. The so-called “special relationship” with the United States is an ever-present concern, constantly being dissected and analyzed, but the anxiety always lurks in the background that the decision-makers in Washington do not think about Britain at all.

There was some reassurance for Brits recently. The U.S. ambassador in London, Jane Hartley, interviewed on Politico’s Power Play podcast, said that the special relationship was “not just special” but “essential” to America. She went on to say that whether the current government is reelected in July’s general election or, as widely anticipated, the opposition Labour Party wins, she expects continuity in trans-Atlantic relations.

Hartley is a diplomat, and it is part of her role to flatter her hosts. Her words should not be wholly dismissed, but they are a useful starting point for a different perspective on the special relationship. Politicians and officials in London should conduct a thought experiment: What does the U.S. need from Britain in foreign policy terms?

There is a brutal reality to be faced: The United States, despite all the geopolitical change of recent years, remains the only true superpower and can if necessary act alone and do what it likes. Equally, however, Washington prefers to act in concert with allies, and in particular with the U.K., because of shared language, experiences, culture and doctrine. This was true 20 years ago when the decision was taken to invade Iraq and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told a reporter that British support would “obviously be welcomed.” He qualified that by saying that, if London felt unable to participate, “there are workarounds.”

This preference has been reflected recently in air strikes against Houthi targets in Yemen, to which the Royal Air Force has made the largely nominal contribution of four Eurofighter Typhoon FGR4s operating from Akrotiri in Cyprus. British aircraft were also involved in the defense of Israel against Iranian missiles, rockets and drones in April this year. In both of these cases, the importance has not so much been the capabilities which the RAF has added as the fact that another major power — a permanent member of the UN Security Council, part of the G7 and a founding member of NATO — has taken part in the action. It is a political as much as a military act.

A slightly more substantial effort, though again with major political significance, has been the U.K.’s willingness to contribute to Operation Prosperity Guardian, the U.S.-led naval security effort to protect maritime commerce in the Red Sea. When Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin announced the formation of the force in December, he named nine countries, including the U.K., that were participating. Some of the European partners had second thoughts or made desultory efforts: Norway has contributed 10 staff officers, while Spain, Italy and France distanced themselves from the task force.

Britain did rather better than that. The guided missile destroyer HMS Diamond has been active in shooting down missiles and drones, and will be relieved by her sister ship HMS Duncan, and the Royal Navy has also deployed the frigates HMS Richmond and HMS Lancaster. These are vastly capable ships, able to identify, track and intercept hundreds of targets at once at ranges of up to 75 miles.

This is not, however, the focus on America’s security policy, which is much more inclined towards the Pacific, relations with China and the U.S. network of defense agreements and alliances with Japan, Taiwan, South Korea and the Philippines. The current potential flashpoint is, of course, Taiwan. I wrote in January about the urgency of reinforcing strategic commitments to Taiwan and the importance the island has in China’s future plans. Shortly after the inauguration of the new president in Taipei, Chinese naval and air units conducted provocative exercises very close to the Taiwanese coast.

There is not much the U.K. can offer directly here, especially if the worst-case scenario is realized and there is a shooting war in the South China Sea. However, the U.K. is part of the tripartite AUKUS agreement with the U.S. and Australia, which aims to strengthen deterrence in the Indo-Pacific region through the sharing of military technology.

Underlying all of this is the participation of the U.K. intelligence and security services in the Five Eyes intelligence partnership, which began during the Second World War and now includes Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The work of Britain’s Secret Intelligence Service (SIS or MI6) and Government Communications Headquarters is genuinely valued: SIS has a strong reputation for human intelligence while GCHQ has developed some exceptional surveillance technologies.

But realists in London know that the U.K.’s resources are not just finite but under exceptional strain. The Conservative government has promised to increase defense spending to 2.5 percent of GDP by 2030, which would at least make good some current gaps in capability, but that has yet to be matched by its would-be successors in the Labour Party. A new government would reassess its priorities and strategic interests, but there cannot be time-consuming and insular navel-gazing.

Washington wants a reliable partner. There are some hard-power capabilities it will welcome, but more than that it wants an ally who thinks in the same way, who shares a worldview. The challenge for British political leaders is identifying where it can offer most value, whether that is contributing to areas on which the U.S. is focused, or “minding the shop” elsewhere and easing America’s commitments. But then, if foreign policy were easy, everyone would be doing it.

Eliot Wilson is a freelance writer on politics and international affairs and the co-founder of Pivot Point Group. He was senior official in the U.K. House of Commons from 2005 to 2016, including serving as a clerk of the Defence Committee and secretary of the U.K. delegation to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly.