Last week, we celebrated the 82nd anniversary of the “Doolittle Raid.” A handful of U.S. Army Air Force B-25s operating from a base President Franklin Roosevelt called Shangri-La, bombed Tokyo in the first direct American attack on the Japanese mainland after Pearl Harbor.
Little damage was done, but the psychological effect on the Japanese was a powerful warning to the public that it was no longer safe from attack.
After Iran’s massive drone and missile strike on Israel, the question of what if anything Israel would do loomed like a damoclean sword over the region. Last Friday, Israel launched a modest strike against targets in Isfahan; a city well inside Iran, not unlike in scope to the Doolittle. The critical question now is whether that will end the crisis or merely make it a starting point for escalation.
Some Israeli domestic factions as well as other supporters abroad believe Iran’s attack created the opportunity and rationale to destroy Iran’s nuclear infrastructure once and for all. That would be catastrophic. But suppose such an option was still under consideration.
Iran’s nuclear infrastructure, including personnel, is spread out over vast areas and in some places deeply buried underground. An attack plan that would use unmanned air-breathing missiles and drones and manned aircraft would have to fly over Syria and/or Iraq and Saudi Arabia. The distances to targets are not trivial. And no matter how formidable the Israel Defense Forces may be, it is unlikely that it has the numerical and qualitative capacity as well as tankers and supporting forces to disable those facilities for a substantial period.
In this regard, Israel must answer two questions. First, will the “shadow war” in place lead to further escalation and a “real” war? Thus, is Israel prepared to go to war if it decides further retaliation is essential? Iran has already stated that any attack on its nuclear facilities would be equivalent to an act of war by Israel.
Second, if the Israeli aim were to destroy these facilities, if not permanently but for a very extended period, the only means to accomplish this task would be nuclear weapons. Even if Israel had enough so-called “conventional bunker busters” with several tons of explosive power, delivering them to a large number of targets is almost certainly beyond the IDF’s means. And despite the destructive power of nuclear weapons, the chance of near-permanent elimination of all of Iran’s nuclear weapons potential is very unlikely.
Why? During the October 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, one option presented to President John F. Kennedy was U.S. air strikes against these facilities. Recall that the missiles were land-based and had no protective shelters, making them easy targets. However, Kennedy was told that the complete destruction of the missiles and associated logistics and launching equipment could not be guaranteed.
For a military planner, not just destroying, but also incapacitating Iran’s nuclear weapons programs presents a nearly impossible scenario.
If Israel were to employ nuclear weapons — and this would not be one or two but probably tens — collateral damage would be vast. Minimizing casualties and using nuclear weapons is the ultimate contradiction. And what about subsequent radiation? The trade winds blow east. And who lies east of Iran — Russia and China.
The use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons has been deemed “unthinkable.” But on a number of occasions during the Cold War, both the U.S. and USSR came frighteningly close to making a catastrophic miscalculation. Exercise Able Archer is one such example.
Whether Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu and his war cabinet would even consider using nuclear weapons or not, surely, a scenario aimed at crippling some of Iran’s nuclear weapons programs must be on the table. This then gets back to first principles.
Is Israel prepared for an all-out war with Iran? If it is, would there be any limits on the range of actions it might or might not take? Would it consider using nuclear weapons or not? If the answer is yes, would Israel be capable of understanding the titanic consequences in short or long-term impact?
The possibility of further Israeli retaliation cannot be discounted. While President Joe Biden and other leaders do not have the power to force or prevent certain Israeli actions, at the least, the prime minister and his team must be starkly warned of the dire consequences of attacking Iran’s nuclear facilities.
April/May 2024 must not become August 1914.
Harlan Ullman Ph.D. is a senior advisor at the Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” military doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD: How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.