Partitioning Ukraine to end the war simply won’t work

Sweden broke from its centuries-old tradition of military neutrality this month to become the 32nd member of NATO, almost a year after neighboring Finland joined the growing alliance. Yet as Russia’s invasion of Ukraine continues to strengthen Europe’s security posture, it is weakening support for besieged democracies elsewhere. According to a December Pew Research survey, 31 percent of Americans want the U.S. to reduce the amount of aid it sends to Ukraine. 

Accompanying these views are calls for the U.S. to take care of its own and let others do the same, namely Europe. There is merit to this angle, especially considering the obligations of NATO members to spend more on defense. But one of the recommended solutions might be worse than the problem. In January, Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico stated that a negotiated partition in which Ukraine cedes land to Russia is the only potential solution to the war. 

Fico’s comments follow similar statements from senior NATO official Stian Jenssen and Sen. J.D. Vance (R-Ohio), among others. Even the most cautious analysts are doing their best to tip toe around the issue by framing President Volodymyr Zelensky as “maximalist” for refusing to negotiate with Russia. This discussion has led more Americans to believe that Ukraine must surrender land to end the war.

The logic underpinning such ideas warrants scrutiny, especially considering America’s complicated history with supervising redrawn national borders. 

When World War II ended in 1945, the Allies created two Koreas by dividing the peninsula horizontally along the 38th parallel. China and Russia eventually lent their support to the north. When North Korean forces crossed that line in June 1950, the United Nations was obligated to respond militarily.

Since the Soviet Union had tested its first atomic bomb the previous year, President Harry Truman restricted the northern advance of American forces to avoid risking a larger war in Korea. But this caution also resulted in a permanent U.S. military presence in South Korea to monitor the 1953 armistice — and a nuclear-armed despot in control of the north some 71 years later. Still, the lure of partitioning for peace endured.

Another consequence of Japan’s World War II loss was the removal of Japanese forces from Indochina, which consisted of Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam. France then occupied this area in 1946 and created a military union to fight guerrillas there. When 10,000 French forces suffered a crippling defeat at Dien Bien Phu near the Laos border in 1954, the U.S. agreed to mediate the fallout. 

This resulted in Vietnam’s partition and the signing of the “Manila Pact” later that year, in which a collection of nations, including the U.S., agreed to support South Vietnam’s newfound independence. This negotiated peace emboldened not only the North Vietnamese but also the major Communist powers backing them, including Chairman Mao Zedong, who had seized power in China five years prior. 

By the time President John F. Kennedy took office in 1961, he was ready to put his new “flexible response” strategy to work countering guerrillas in Asia. Escalation ensued as U.S. military advisors came under attack in South Vietnam, and President Lyndon Johnson’s administration began major operations there in 1965.

The rest, as they say, is history. A new border guaranteed by international treaty thus demands of its signatories a certain investment in its integrity. 

Who, then, would guarantee the sovereignty of a new border in Ukraine? 

Even if Zelensky decides to negotiate, he will almost certainly demand additional security guarantees from the West in exchange for relinquishing territory to Russia. This would place the White House and NATO in a precarious position, considering the Kremlin’s initial aim of seizing Kyiv — an objective more likely delayed rather than abandoned. 

If Russia can acquire territory by crossing international borders and compelling negotiations, what kind of deterrent effect would new borders have on subsequent acquisitions that the old borders did not? Any peace agreement would hinge on this question, and it is one that Kyiv evidently cannot answer alone.

If opponents of aid to Ukraine want to save money and prevent war, indulging Moscow’s imperialist designs will only undermine those goals. Foreign military aid to Ukraine avoids the escalatory tracks that led America into some of its costliest wars while also denying legitimacy to Russia’s unprovoked assault.

There are plenty of policy issues to debate this election year, including how to balance the burden of international security with domestic priorities, and even the appropriate ratio of economic-to-military aid going to Ukraine. The merits of state-sponsored terror as a tool for political reconciliation in the 21st century, however, should not be one of those issues.

Capt. Michael P. Ferguson, U.S. Army, is a Ph.D. student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, where he studies early Cold War military history. He is coauthor of “The Military Legacy of Alexander the Great: Lessons for the Information Age.” The views expressed are those of the author and do not reflect the official policies or positions of the Army, Department of Defense or U.S. Government.