Xi’s paranoid press shutdown is about controlling the narrative

One of the most noteworthy developments at the recently convened Chinese National People’s Congress and the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is the decision to scrap the premier’s post-parliament news conference, which was widely followed. 

Many observers interpret this move as an attempt by Chinese leader Xi Jinping to weaken Premier Li Qiang’s authority. However, after carefully examining the replacement press conference featuring multiple Chinese economic bureaucrats, I have arrived at a different conclusion. 

To explain why the premiere’s press conference was concealed this year, we need to delve into the journey of the prime minister’s press conference during the two sessions and see how it has transformed over the years. It all began in 1988 when Premier Li Peng led a team of leaders to face the press. From Li Peng to Zhu Rongji, Wen Jiabao, Li Keqiang and finally Li Qiang, each premier brought their own style to the podium. 

Pressers had a bit more spontaneity during the era from Zhu Rongji to Li Keqiang. Foreign reporters played a significant role, asking questions that weren’t necessarily pre-screened. While the answers were typically aligned with the party’s stance, there was still a sense of authenticity. 

But as we moved from Zhu Rongji to Li Keqiang, from what I saw, the personal touch seemed to fade. Answers became more predictable, with occasional moments of unscripted insight. Li Qiang’s arrival, however, marked a significant shift in tone and format. Foreign reporters significantly dwindled, and questions felt orchestrated, lacking the edge of genuine inquiry. 

In a sense, Li Qiang stands apart from previous premiers. He was appointed directly by Xi Jinping, whereas previous premiers were chosen by the concurrent general secretary of the party and other party elders. This unspoken institutional safeguard, established by Deng Xiaoping, aimed to prevent party secretaries from wielding dictatorial power. 

However, with Xi Jinping breaking the two-term limit for general secretaries of the party, he gained the authority to appoint his own premier. Consequently, Premier Li Qiang has become his complete yes-man. 

The relationship between him and Xi is one of superior and subordinate, not competition. Therefore, Xi does not need to suppress Li. When Xi makes appointments like these, I think the main reason is that he wants to put everything under his complete control.  

Looking at this year’s economic-themed conference, it’s evident that every detail was meticulously planned. Attendees were top economic bureaucrats. Questions were carefully curated and answers were read from scripts with detailed facts and figures. 

The press conference lasted for two and a half hours with no English translations provided and CNBC as the sole Western media outlet asking questions. It was more than twice the length of the previous press conferences by premiers. It would have been impossible for Premier Li Qiang to read scripted answers for two and a half hours in the old setting. 

The message was clear: China’s economy is on a steady path forward, and the government has everything under control. The bureaucrats specifically stressed the first two months’ macroeconomic data to prove that China’s economy in 2024 is off to a good start. 

But underneath the polished surface lies a reality that’s not addressed. Pressing issues like the real estate crisis and demographic challenges were conspicuously absent from the discourse. 

This tightly controlled narrative reflects Xi’s desire for complete authority over all aspects of Chinese rule. I believe Xi would feel more insecure without this level of control. The paranoia stemming from this insecurity is now permeating his bureaucracy and spreading to the masses. Everyone is either lying flat or succumbing to it. 

Xi’s desire for control is also linked to China’s current challenges. In reality, the country’s trajectory is largely beyond his grasp, especially in the economic sphere. By the end of 2023, the Chinese Communist Party’s policy tools had proven ineffective. Despite government interventions, the stock market, real estate, exports and investment remained stagnant. As this persists, Xi increasingly clutches onto areas he can command, striving to project an image of complete authority. 

In the end, while Xi’s quest for control may seem justified in the face of mounting challenges, it risks perpetuating a culture of rigidity that hampers long-term progress. As we navigate through 2024, it remains to be seen how effective this top-down, non-transparent approach will be in addressing China’s complex economic realities. 

Simone Gao is a journalist and the host of the online current affairs program “Simone Gao.”