Firing Ukraine’s top general would be a mistake

Rumors are swirling that Valeryi Zaluzhnyi, the top general in Ukraine’s armed forces, may soon be fired. The chatter prompted the Ukrainian Ministry of Defense to post on Telegram, “Dear journalists, we immediately answer everyone: No, it’s not true.”

Zaluzhnyi, who is responsible for organizing Ukraine’s defense and taking advantage of Russian disorganization to mount limited counterattacks, is not irreplaceable, but Ukraine would lose a competent, respected and combat-tested leader at a particularly delicate moment during the nation’s fight to hang onto its territory. This would be a mistake.

A country can survive mistakes and still win a war — especially a war of defense. Defense is difficult to organize but achievable given motivated and disciplined soldiers and a unified country. War on the defense is a kind of combat multiplier that can offset even substantial logistical and manpower disadvantages. But defense still requires organization, motivation and trusted leadership. The Ukrainian military has enjoyed such a leader in Zaluzhnyi.

Zaluzhnyi may be fired, as far as I can tell, for a number of small reasons and one big reason: the failure of 2023’s counteroffensive. The smaller reasons, no matter how numerous, ought not to have resulted in his firing; petty disputes between him and Volodymyr Zelensky, his own growing cult of personality, disagreements over strategy — these pale in comparison with the esteem in which Zaluzhnyi is held — and he is held in high esteem by the soldiers of the military, and by his subcommanders.

2023’s counteroffensive — the training for which I was present, and in which I participated, leaving Ukraine in mid-May as it was beginning — was doomed from the outset. The military lacked the weapons needed to fight and win while attacking anywhere, particularly in the south, which was heavily fortified by Russia. The military was not afforded enough time to train units for offense, which is a particularly difficult thing to coordinate in modern war. Furthermore, the counteroffensive was micromanaged not only by internal politics, which required it, but also by external allies desperate for Ukrainian victory.

Under such circumstances, it is a miracle Zaluzhnyi was able to hang onto any Ukrainian combat power — there were leaders in the West who seemed like they wanted the Ukrainian military to carry out a bayonet charge of the Russian lines from Kharkiv to Kherson.

War is filled with hinge points — moments when the direction of the conflict can go one way or another. Ukraine still has substantial combat power, albeit dwindling artillery ammunition. It has maneuver assets and a robust defense. It is, at present, reconstituting its reserves, mobilizing more people and training them for combat.

To fire Zaluzhnyi now is to accept that a general could do anything differently at his level. It’s not clear to me that he could. The general is mustering and organizing a mostly static defense line to protect as much territory as possible. He is bolstering the morale of his soldiers and providing the outside world with a recognizable and admirable face that can still animate foreign supporters who have become tired of Zelensky (through no fault of the president’s own; he has been subjected to an undeserved, vicious and disgraceful smear campaign). Finally, no general in Ukraine has more familiarity with what the nation has, needs or can possibly do at the tactical and operational level.

Typically in war a general is only fired for incompetence, for an inability to lead or organize their military. To fire Zaluzhnyi now, simply on the basis that he was not able to succeed on the offense while Ukraine had more men and equipment, would be a mistake. To fire him because he threatens Zelensky would also be a mistake.

Unless there is some horrible information about him that is not public, the domestic and international political focus ought to be on providing him with the personnel and weapons he requires to maintain a healthy defense, with an eye toward someday transitioning over to an opportunistic offense.

Adrian Bonenberger is a writer and a veteran of the U.S. Army. He edits and writes for Military Media.