When Xi Jinping visited Moscow in March he and Vladimir Putin hailed their deepening economic and political ties and personal relationship.
In public proclamations, Beijing and Moscow keep no secret of their disdain for the dollar-dominated international order. For many observers, the prospect of closer China-Russian relations seems an irresistible trajectory.
But appearances are deceptive.
The benefits for Moscow are apparent. China provides a replacement market for exports to Europe. Beijing’s support also undercuts Western attempts to isolate Russia from the global economy. Together, China and Russia offer an alternative to the West for the Global South. The counterpoise has inhibited sanctions and subdued the developing world’s condemnation of the war in Ukraine.
Meanwhile, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) depends on Russian fuel supplies and raw materials. The Kremlin’s desperation for a powerful trading partner enables China to pay for Russia’s commodities at a discount and in Chinese renminbi. The continuation of the Russian Federation also reassures the PRC against local instability. Further, Xi and Putin share a nostalgia for the power politics of the Cold War and a dread of color revolutions. But, more essentially, the driver of a Sino-Russo alliance is a common enemy — the United States.
As compelling as such motives and reasoning appear, Xi understands that he is strong because China is strong. On the other hand, Russia is weak because Putin is strong. During the early stages, Putin’s invasion of Ukraine cost him $900 million a day. His economy has been hit with over 13,000 sanctions. The exit of Western companies deprives Russia of 35 percent of its GDP, according to a report by Fortune.
“It appears Russia is on its way to long-held worst fear: becoming a weak economic dependent of China — a source of cheap raw materials,” it reads.
China has also learned that doing business in Russia can be as difficult for itself as it is for other countries. The infrastructure in Russia’s far east is so underdeveloped and degraded that the PRC has made substantial investments to get access to the resources it wants. By most accounts, those investments are not paying off.
There may be parallels between these two authoritarian states, but also fundamental differences. Russia is working to undermine an international system from which China continues to benefit. The PRC does not work to break the current order, it works to bend it toward its benefit.
Xi’s Belt and Road Initiative is a risky enterprise, and he knows he will eventually need some cooperation with Washington or Brussels to save it. He also sees in Russia an economy on a precarious vector. Therefore, China and Russia’s “no limits” partnership has its limits. It is full of posture but mostly empty in action.
China has not yet recognized Russia’s annexation of Crimea and refuses to provide lethal weapons to Russia for fear of Western sanctions. Neither has China followed through with direct investments in Russian assets (e.g. the Power of Siberia II pipeline). In 2022, the China-based Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank froze lending to Russia and Belarus.
Beijing realizes Moscow’s ambition of becoming a great power, but also sees systemic limitations. Following the downing of a Russian fighter jet by a Turkish F-16 in 2015, discussions surfaced of a hypothetical Russo-Turco war. Most assertions claimed that Turkey would overrun the Russian Army.
The second Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020 reinforced their conclusions. After decades of intermittent skirmishes, Azerbaijan won a decisive victory over Armenia in just 44 days. Military analysts credited their success to precision weapons and command and control technology supplied by Turkey. Meanwhile, lower-quality Russian-supplied equipment and training contributed to Armenian losses.
At the time of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, Russia was undergoing a massive military reform. Its victory over Georgia in 2008 exposed Russian vulnerabilities. Overstretched supply lines, inadequate situational awareness, poor tactical planning, ineffective command and control systems and low troop readiness and morale emerged from after-action reports. Internal testimony admitted that only 10 percent of the Russian military’s equipment could be classified as modern. The revelations incited calls for drastic institutional changes.
However, despite being touted as the greatest transformation of the Russian military since the creation of the Red Army, the military proved too resistant to change and too sworn to Soviet-style large-scale operations and mass mobilization. Ultimately, reforms lay fallow, and the defense minister was sacked. Russia’s military-industrial complex is stagnant, and its armed forces are corrupt.
By contrast, China built the world’s largest navy (370 warships and submarines). Many experts concede that the People’s Liberation Army Air Force is close to matching Western forces. Russian and Chinese forces have conducted joint exercises in recent years, but the nations do not have a mutual defense pact. What exists corresponds to an informal, temporal mechanism of training maneuvers.
Research and development in Russia have been degraded by the flight of brains and capital. The Swedish Defense Research Agency estimates that between 1996 and 2008 the number of Russian researchers dropped from 1,225,000 to 376,000. Since the war with Ukraine, the fear of military conscription has sent nearly 1 million Russians abroad. The exodus has kneecapped research and development, and crippled industrial production and construction.
The USSR imploded because of corruption and administrative turf battles. In Putin’s Russia, a mesh of competing ministries, agencies and private interests similarly keeps the system dysfunctional. The chaos prevents Russia from creating an effective economy and developing coherently.
Putin, as the final arbiter, owes his authority and indispensability to this dysfunctionality. His fondness for unrest moves him to export it. Causing fissures among his foreign opponents, dividing them internally and destabilizing their political systems will, he believes, weaken liberal democracies and clear a path for Russia’s ascent.
These central differences in global influence and world visions undermine Russia’s and China’s so-called limitless partnership. Their geopolitical history is fundamentally antagonistic and inevitably distrustful. Each understands that as long as the U.S. continues to be seen as an adversary their pact will hold. But the moment an opportunity arises for a constructive relationship with Washington this marriage of convenience will end with one partner stranded at the altar.
Jack Jarmon is a visiting scholar at the Harriman Institute at Columbia University. He has taught international relations at the University of Pennsylvania and Rutgers University and was a USAID technical advisor for the Russian Federation. He has authored and co-authored five books.