An Israeli invasion of Gaza — in response to Hamas’s horrific attack against Israel, resulting in the killing and injuring of innocent Israelis and Palestinians — is under way.
Securing Gaza to prevent future attacks, along with spiraling anti-Israeli sentiment and fear of the conflict spreading, leaves the world scrambling to find a way to fill the void left by the terrorist organization.
Palestinian leaders privately dismiss the idea of the besieged Palestinian Authority being able to conduct elections following an Israeli withdrawal from Gaza. The PA, unpopular in the West Bank and reviled in Gaza, can’t be seen as riding in on the backs of Israeli tanks. Just this week, President Mahmoud Abbas declared that a clear path to an independent Palestinian state as a precondition for the PA moving into Gaza. Abbas supports Biden’s recent call for a new generation of negotiations on a two-state solution, but most Palestinians view the official peace process with cynicism, talking for the sake of talking.
Breaking the cycle of violence requires bold new thinking untethered to the 30-year-old Oslo process. The parties realize that the new paradigm must ensure the Israelis’ promise of “never again” to the terror of October 7 while also addressing the Palestinian public’s commitment to “never surrender” to Israeli occupation.
All parties agree that a return to the status quo ante but without Hamas will not end the cycle of violence. Arab countries fear the conflict spreading, with demonstrations threatening their own stability. A potential gamechanger is that Saudi Arabia and Arab signatories to the Abraham Accords are now willing to be part of a solution, forming what Egyptian President Sisi has called a “Peace Coalition.” This fresh perspective on the need to solve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict presents a new opportunity for a peace agreement.
The unique vehicle used to transition Cambodia from bloody strife may serve as a model for a resolution in which all parties can declare victory. The United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia became the country’s governing body in 1991 after decades of civil war and foreign intervention. The Authority took control of the country, not as an enforcer or monitor, but with full governing power. Yasushi Akashi, a Japanese diplomat acting as head of state, commanded 15,900 soldiers, 3,600 police, and 2,500 civilian administrators from 46 countries.
The Cambodia experience was not without hiccups, earning more of a “B-” than an “A” grade. The short 18-month mandate focused resources on elections without achieving complete demilitarization of the various groups. The foreign troops also committed significant human rights abuses. However, Cambodia did transition to a more peaceful, democratic, modern state accepted into the international community. Essentially, the Authority stripped the Cambodian state to its bones, replaced the autocratic system, disarmed militias, established the rule of law and designed and conducted elections, before transferring control to the newly elected Cambodian body.
A similar approach could be applied to Palestine. The UN Security Council could mandate a four-year multinational transitional authority led by the U.S. and Arab countries, with participation from other member states and with significant Palestinian input. This authority would provide stability, facilitate humanitarian aid, establish the rule of law and protection of human rights, and create a new public administration in the West Bank and Gaza consistent with international standards from the ground up.
Depending on the success of this transitional authority — particularly in disarming militant groups, conducting free elections and reaching agreement on outstanding issues such as Jerusalem, borders and the status of Jewish settlements in the West Bank — power would be handed over to a new Palestinian government. Learning from the Cambodian experience, elections and transfer of power would be the outcome of the transitional authority, not just a precondition.
The advantage of this approach is that it creates an internationally endorsed canopy under which the parties accede to difficult compromises in a time-bound international process — compromises each side wants to make, but can’t make on their own. Palestinians would see relief from the devastation, tangible economic development and national elections without the tainted PA, and excluding Hamas and other terror elements.
Like in Cambodia, several agreements incentivizing the parties would be put into force with the establishment of the authority. To satisfy Israel’s security concerns, Hamas and Islamic Jihad would be designated terrorist organizations, binding all UN member states. The multinational administrative and security force would include significant contributions from the U.S. to satisfy an Israeli requirement. Arab participation through the Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, or individual countries would reassure the Palestinians. In return, Israel would immediately ease restrictions on the movement of people and goods, facilitate reconstruction and cease military incursions. A Likud-run Israeli government agreed to a similar quid pro quo presented by the U.S. in 2014. (Abbas ultimately objected.)
Without a clear political path for Palestinians and a new robust security regime for both peoples, the cycle of attacks on Israel followed by the retaliatory “mowing the grass,” targeting terrorists in whack-a-mole fashion, will continue.
While a multinational transitional authority faces many challenges, history shows that the tragedy of war can motivate parties to compromise and take bold new risks to avoid bloodshed. An empowered multinational mandate may offer the only possibility of permanent peace in the Middle East.
James Prince is the president of the nonprofit Democracy Council and a former consultant for reform to the Palestinian Authority. He also served as an electoral officer with the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia in 1992-1993. Hiba Husseini is a Palestinian attorney based in Ramallah and a former legal advisor to the Palestinians during the Olso Accords negotiations. Marshall Breger is a Professor of Law at the Catholic University of America Columbus School of Law and was Special Assistant to President Ronald Reagon and his liaison to the American Jewish Community.