The chaos set off by Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel poses difficult challenges for the future of the Middle East. How will Israel destroy Hamas without destroying Gaza or unnecessarily harming non-combatants? Who will govern Gaza after Hamas is defeated? Will the conflict escalate into a wider war with Hezbollah or Iran? Will the Arab states at peace with Israel be able to manage the support among their citizens for Hamas and their hatred of Israel?
The world is fixed on the idea that, somehow, the international community or the U.S. must find solutions to these and other issues. But calls for a ceasefire or other solutions short of destroying Hamas are certain to fail. Israel’s security — and the future of human rights and tolerance — depends on convincing Israel that the world, and the Arab states in particular, agree that it is a legitimate, sovereign state entitled to security, and that Hamas, like ISIS and the Nazis before them, represents an ideology and practices that are impermissible.
This crucial objective was on the way to being reached when Hamas attacked. Had Israel’s negotiations with Saudi Arabia that were underway on October 7 succeeded, it would have been Israel’s sixth normalization agreement with an Arab state. In each case, the states involved had demonstrated not only their willingness to accept Israel, but also their desire to help the Palestinians.
Egypt made a separate peace with Israel in 1979 after trying to secure an agreement for the Palestinians at Camp David. Jordan normalized in 1994 as part of the Madrid process that included a Palestinian track that resulted in the Oslo Accords. The UAE, Bahrain and Morocco normalized in 2020 as part of a negotiation in which Israel agreed to drop its plan to assert sovereignty over parts of the West Bank. The Saudis, too, were actively seeking to advance Palestinian interests as part of their negotiation with Israel.
Given this context, it is profoundly wrong to think that the Saudi-Israeli normalization process be put on hold. The Saudi leadership should see through Hamas’s destructive purpose and affirm support for normalizing relations with Israel. Saudi’s interests strongly favor that objective. And by continuing to pursue a normalization agreement with Israel, Saudi Arabia will be able, more effectively than any other country or group of countries, to advance legitimate Palestinian interests, minimize the dangers triggered by Hamas’s attack and greatly enhance its own international stature.
Normalization: Saudi Arabia would benefit in many ways from normalizing relations with Israel. It can expect major increases in commercial, scientific and human relations with Israel and with other countries, including America. The specific objectives it is pursuing in that negotiation related to Saudi security will be more attainable. For example, the U.S. and Israel will be more willing to accept the Saudi request for a peaceful nuclear program, which Iran undoubtedly wished to derail in supporting Hamas’s plans. Israel will be more willing to see the Saudis supplied with advanced weapons necessary to defend against the likes of Hamas.
Palestinian interests: The Saudis could also more effectively advance legitimate Palestinian interests by proceeding with normalization. The Saudis will not waste their leverage with Israel in trying to defend Hamas. They will focus on helping secure Israel’s agreement to allow for rational, peaceful control of Gaza in the interests of its Palestinian population. This in turn could lead Israel to agree to a corridor between the two separate Palestinian areas, which would make economic progress and peace negotiations more practicable.
Reducing risks: Through normalization and advancing Palestinian interests, Saudi leadership would also reduce many risks created by the current conflict. This would give greater credibility to Saudi efforts to convince Israel to limit its military actions to the strategic objective of destroying Hamas; make escalation of the conflict less likely; reduce the animosity for Israel and normalization on the “Arab street”; and help America achieve its difficult objectives.
Stature: The current crisis calls for Saudi Arabian leadership on an unprecedented scale. Saudi leaders should disregard the view that its negotiation with Israel cannot proceed and instead adopt a carefully crafted plan to complete normalization with Israel. This will not only advance its interests in general but will also establish its willingness to join in vesting the future of the Middle East in the control of rational sovereign governments, rather than in the reckless hands of fanatical murderers. Doing so will greatly enhance both the governance of that troubled region and the stature of Saudi Arabia as a leading force for peace and economic progress.
Abraham D. Sofaer is George P. Shultz Senior Fellow Emeritus at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University. He was Legal Adviser to the U.S. Department of State from 1985 to 1990, during which he led the settlement of the Taba dispute between Egypt and Israel.