The Ukraine counter-offensive is at a crossroads, in more ways than one.
NATO has been backing Ukraine with arms and training since Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the invasion of Ukraine 17 months ago. Three months ago, Ukraine, bolstered by NATO military gear, started their counter-offensive. The gains have been modest, but what are their realistic, immediate goals?
The main goal is to threaten Russia’s most prized Ukrainian possession, Crimea. To get here, the Ukrainians must reach Tokmak, and then Melitopol, cutting the Russian southern front in half. However, Tokmak is very heavily defended and mined.
More realistic goals are the eastern crossroads at Vasylivka and Mykhailivka. Crossroads have long been considered high-value military targets. As Gen. George Patton once wrote, “If the greatest study of mankind is man, surely the greatest study of war is the road net.” While the Russians have heavily mined the fields, they are obliged to keep the roads open to supply their troops with food, fuel and ammunition. Having broken the first lines of Russian defense in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast, despite the Russians attempting flanking counters, the Ukrainians must exploit the roads using their Western armor. They really have no choice.
Vasylivka, notable for being recently flooded by the Russians when they blew up the Zaporizhzhia Dam, is a key junction connecting the Kherson Oblast and the city of Melitopol. Its capture would cause supply problems along the river road supplying Nova Kakhovka and Crimea. It is just 16 miles north of Mykhailivka.
The Russians recognize how important the Mykhailivka junction is and thus have installed four layers of defense there. However, the region has a pro-Ukrainian population that often carries out attacks on Russian officials, and it also has a rail link to Crimea that is vulnerable.
Conquering both of these townships may not look impressive on the overall map of occupied Russian territories, but doing so would cause the Russians major issues on their east-west supply routes.
Another factor affecting the Ukrainian counter-offensive is the appointment of a new military commander. Ukrainian President Zelensky recently announced the removal of Defense Minister Oleksii Reznikov, replacing him with Rustem Umerov, a Muslim lawmaker. This is not only a change of personnel but a change of tactics.
Reznikov is a veteran — who ironically served in the Soviet Air Force — and a talented organizer. His negotiating skills have contributed to the large influx of Western military supplies to Ukraine. However, Reznikov has been a proponent of an attritional strategy, causing large Russian casualties, such as the Wagner forces decimated at Bakhmut, and preserving the lives of Ukrainian soldiers. He is a strategist, not a battlefield tactician. President Zelensky, and his Western backers, have been frustrated with Ukraine’s slow incremental progress.
Umerov, on the other hand, is younger and more aggressive. He has direct relationships with the Tartars of Crimea and is determined to remove Russians from the peninsula. Although he does not have the military background of Reznikov, his intense attacks on Ukrainian corruption denote a man of action. He will likely direct offensives away from the Bakhmut area. Though to be fair, recent Ukrainian advances in Andriivka and Klishchiivka, just south of Bakhmut, are tying Russian forces down.
So, what is the timeline?
Most pundits reckon that the Ukrainians have about eight weeks to achieve the above goals before the heavy rains arrive. The eastern Kherson region has potential, as the Russians have moved their best forces to Zaporizhzhia. In the next few weeks, expect “sneak and peak” tactics, using small infiltration groups performing reconnaissance to clear minefields, then assaulting with the support of artillery and air support, to be replaced with full-on assault. The Ukrainians can expect heavy casualties using this method, although some of the Western military gear such as Bradley fighting vehicles and Leopard 2 and Challenger tanks should give adequate protection.
As the brash, but highly successful, Patton also noted, “A good plan, violently executed now, is better than a perfect plan next week.” Even if Ukraine only advances to shelling distance of the goals above and Tokmak, with conventional artillery, it will further aggravate Russian supply problems.
Unfortunately, these tactics will not finish this war quickly.
Regardless of the Ukrainian battlefield tactics, the effectiveness of the Russian countermeasures will play a part. Then Russians are better prepared than they were a year ago. They have adopted an elastic defense — falling back when they must and exhausting the Ukrainian attackers with the devastating use of anti-tank guided missiles fired both by ground forces and attack helicopters. In addition, Russian electronic warfare capabilities were superb before the war and have only become better, especially in their ability to jam drone signals.
However, even if Russia restricts Ukraine to modest territorial gains, the short-term situation for them is not good. They are using up their best trained forces and face an acute shortage of artillery shells. Nonetheless, they do not seem to be running out of soldiers that President Putin is willing to sacrifice to keep this bloody war going.
Patrick Drennan is a journalist based in New Zealand, with a degree in American history and economics.