The Niger coup exposes Russia’s grand strategy for Africa

The recent coup in Niger helps to illuminate several issues in world politics, not only in Africa.  

First, Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has spawned global political transformations, among them the rising importance of the Global South. Putin’s recent convocation of a second Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg underscores both his recognition of this fact and its objective validity. Second, this coup simultaneously highlights Russia’s ambitious, even aggressive strategy, throughout Africa, as well as deep-seated challenges to governance and state-building there. Third, it also reveals that unmet regional challenges furnish a pretext for great power contestation across the continent.   

Whatever the local causes of this coup, its leaders claim that they acted because the government (as in Burkina Faso and Mali in the recent past) proved to be unable to deal with Islamist terrorism or overcome “poor economic and social governance.” While Islamic terrorism remains a stubborn adversary whose epicenter is now the Sahel, this coup and its linked international repercussions will probably be even more unsuccessful in attempting to overcome the terrorists.  

The Niger coup represents another overthrow of democratic governments by army officers who are clearly connected to Russia through arms sales or ties to the Wagner military corporation, which we now know is directly subsidized by Putin and the Russian government. The coups in Niger, Sudan, Burkina Faso and Mali display an astonishing resemblance to each other.  

In Sudan and now apparently, Niger, the coup plotters moved against essentially democratic governments because they feared their power over local military forces was endangered by democratic leadership. Indeed, contrary to the coup leaders’ allegations, the former government was encountering some success in meeting the challenge of terrorism, which exposes the flimsiness of their claims. 

Furthermore, in all these cases, the Russian hand, with long experience in the subversion of governments and the support of African clients for mutual economic-political gain, is discernible. To use the old Soviet neologism, it is probably no accident that one day after the coup in Niger, demonstrators appeared on the scene vocally chanting pro-Russian and anti-Western, particularly anti-French slogans.  

Joseph Siegele, director of research at the Africa Center for Security Studies in Washington, said that after the coup in Burkina Faso “Telegram accounts linked to Wagner that were openly saying ‘Niger is our next target,’” Siegele also observed that, “Russia has been interested in seeing a military takeover, which maybe provides an opportunity for them to get more influence.” 

If this analysis is right, then this coup was at least to some degree incited and facilitated by Russia’s intelligence and Wagner forces with several objectives in mind. One goal is to undermine if not overthrow democratic but beleaguered African governments and replace them With Russian proxies — often generals connected to Moscow through Russian arms sales if not corrupt partnerships — to reduce Western influence and foster authoritarian rule there. Moscow clearly exploits regional, tribal, ethnic, religious, or inter-state conflicts in Africa for its purposes. It also possesses an extensive and widely used information network that Russia deploys in tandem with its military, economic and political ties with local parties in order to promote its clients.   

By inserting itself into African states’ governance, Moscow — through the Wagner Group — obtains not only lucrative mining and other contracts but also creates a mechanism for an alternative government so it can easily replace a government it deems objectionable — or at least exercise constant pressure upon it. Then it can ensconce itself in the national economy through these contracts where it and its clients — exactly as in traditional colonialism — reap huge profits and rule by coercion. It then can foment trouble in neighboring states and press its clients for permanent military lodgments or naval/air bases, the ultimate manifestation of enduring Russian power. These applications, when orchestrated thusly, make up what we call hybrid warfare or gray area actions.   

The latest coup clarifies Russia’s instruments of power, tactics and goals for nations in Africa, if not, other developing states in other regions. It also may explain why Putin did not disband Wagner after the June mutiny, because of its centrality to Russia’s global strategy. Clearly the West, despite its superior aggregate power in all dimensions, still lacks any idea of how to coordinate them on behalf of a comprehensive strategy. Nor does it yet fully appreciate the rising importance of African countries to the global contest now underway. 

While it is not too late to forge such a strategy, if we want to help African states prosper, improve their conditions and reduce the likelihood of new conflicts, the time to begin doing so is now. 

Stephen Blank, Ph.D., is a senior fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He is a former professor of Russian national security studies and national security affairs at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College and a former MacArthur fellow at the U.S. Army War College. Blank is an independent consultant focused on the geopolitics and geostrategy of the former Soviet Union, Russia and Eurasia.