The vincible Bukele: Can the Millennial autocrat be stopped?

Applying the authoritarian playbook to the letter, El Salvador’s president, Nayib Bukele, advanced to entrench himself in power. On July 9, his party, New Ideas, officially nominated him for re-election for the 2024 elections, even though the Salvadoran constitution expressly prohibits re-election to back-to-back terms.

The Supreme Court, packed with Bukele loyalists, has simply allowed the Salvadoran leader to seek re-election. The decision earned him renewed international criticism. Former Colombian president, Ernesto Samper, called Bukele a “little Hitler in Central America.”

But Bukele’s authoritarian project will not be easily stopped. The self-proclaimed “coolest dictator in the world” is the most popular president in the Americas, given his successful security plan reducing gang crimes and homicide rates in what was once the most dangerous country in the world.

Since March 2022, El Salvador has been under a “State of Exception,” approved by the Bukele-controlled legislature, allowing the government to jail around 70,000 alleged criminals without due process. Roughly 80% of Salvadorans approve and consider the measures successful. The strong popular support allowed Bukele to swiftly seize control of the state and its institutions: the judiciary, legislature, and armed forces are all loyal to him. A recent territorial law further consolidated his power by reducing the number of municipalities from 242 to 44. This will make it easier for him to develop and control patronage networks.  

Against this backdrop, neither domestic opposition groups nor international pro-democratic pressure will place Bukele’s government back into a democratic path before the 2024 elections.

The domestic opposition parties have been highly de-legitimized and are considered corrupt. Recent opinion polls show voting intentions for the traditional left-wing FMLN and right-wing ARENA parties remain below 3 percent. 

International democracy promotion will also remain frustratingly inadequate and ineffective in halting Bukele’s authoritarian project. The U.S. and EU have confined themselves to half-baked measures, voicing concerns for human rights violations in El Salvador and issuing statements condemning Bukele’s erosion of democracy. The Biden administration has also sanctioned several close aides of Bukele via the Engel List, which merely revokes visas and potentially freezes assets for listed individuals.  

These actions have unintentionally but expectedly created the opposite effect. Western nations, Bukele hinted at the United Nations in 2022, cannot “boss us around.” If they do not cooperate with his policies, he added, “they should at least stay out of the way.”

With Western governments remaining in the way, Bukele has strategically sought closer diplomatic, political, and economic relations with China and blamed Western governments for the Russian invasion of Ukraine while abstaining in key UN General Assembly votes. 

But could there be a glimpse of hope for democracy in El Salvador after 2024? Indeed, the firm grip of Bukele’s personalist autocracy may be disrupted by a problem of his own making: an economic crisis stemming from an unsustainable and erratic economic plan.

First, Bukele’s adoption of Bitcoin as a legal tender in 2021 has been an utter failure. The measure has received considerable backlash among Salvadorans, as recent polls show that the cryptocurrency has done little for improving households’ standards of living, with roughly 80% of the population not using it. With seven in 10 Salvadorans viewing El Salvador’s main challenge as its economy, the continuation of such erratic policies will significantly harm Bukele’s popularity. 

Adding to the crypto risk, Bukele has invested hundreds of millions into building a stock of Bitcoin despite facing an unsustainable fiscal panorama. El Salvador is struggling with sinking international reserves, worsening current account deficits, and a short-term debt which, according to the IMF, “remains high and is on an unsustainable path.”

Consequently, it is highly unlikely that Bukele can keep the pace of financing his Bitcoin fiasco and funding his successful but costly security plan. Such economic fragility will also affect investment negatively in significant and politically sensitive sectors, such as infrastructure, pensions, and education. While Bukele has prided himself in upholding recent debt-service payments, risky fiscal imbalances and limited sources of financing will severely undermine El Salvador’s creditworthiness and economic stability. 

The ticking bomb that is Bukele’s economic plan could easily trigger an economic crisis that will likely undermine his government’s internal unity and fuel popular discontent. The plethora of complex economic problems will make Bukele’s development of clientelist networks—vital for lasting autocratic regimes — hard to consolidate. Without economic perks to bind close allies and security agents, a Bukele-made economic crisis can credibly undermine his government’s cohesiveness and provoke splits within the ruling elite which is, historically, “the most proximate cause for the exit of authoritarian regimes.”  

Signs of early divisions have already appeared. In February 2022, the Bukele-controlled legislature stripped two NI colleagues of their parliamentary immunity after allegations that they had taken bribes to create a split within the party.

Such events show that the Bukele-led network of patronage is still young, underdeveloped, ideologically diverse, and socio-economically heterogeneous. Strengthening a unified and loyal network of supporters to protect his autocratic rule will require immense economic resources and a well-established organization capable of co-opting and, if necessary, coercing Salvadoran society.  

As credible challenges to Bukele’s autocracy arise, it will be at that critical juncture that the international community can most credibly push for and plausibly expect democratizing reforms.

The U.S., as the main bilateral lender, buyer of Salvadoran exports, and source of much-needed investment, should be prepared to extend development aid, financial lifelines, and debt restructuring programs, but with clear conditions requiring Bukele to take specific steps to put El Salvador back on a democratic path. These include Bukele’s compliance with constitutional term-limits, a guarantee of the judiciary’s independence, and establishment of a commission to oversee the government’s security plan, whose success thus far is nonetheless tainted with rights violations.  

Ultimately, that strategy will require political realism to uphold a pro-democracy stance without pushing Bukele too far away from Washington’s orbit — especially into China’s arms. Recent half-baked statements and sanctions serve as a cautionary reminder that applying “pro-democratic” pressure merely for the sake of appearances can lead to unintended consequences.

If democracy in El Salvador is to thrive post-2024, international actors must exercise restraint and patience. But they must also be prepared to credibly demand and plausibly expect democratizing reforms and stronger democratic governance by capitalizing on their economic and political leverage at the right time. Otherwise, it might as well be the last chance to save El Salvador’s democracy before Bukele goes too far in installing a durable, full-blown hegemonic dictatorship. 

Leonardo Di Bonaventura Altuve is a doctoral student at the University of California Berkeley.