Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky did not get all that he wanted from the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, this week. Appearances to the contrary, neither did Sweden.
Zelensky had hoped for an announcement that Ukraine would soon join NATO. Instead, he received assurances that his country was on something of a fast track to entry; that NATO would continue to support Ukraine with both weapons and economic assistance during the war with Russia and after it comes to an end; and that the alliance would create a new NATO-Ukraine Council, which would nominally put Kyiv on an equal footing with its counterparts in the alliance.
Zelensky initially responded badly to what NATO offered, but subsequently walked back his more egregious assertions that demeaned the alliance’s offer. He acknowledged that it would be senseless for NATO to commit itself to the direct defense of Ukraine in the midst of the Russo-Ukrainian war, which could trigger an outright conflict between Russia and the Alliance.
Zelensky’s sense of urgency, however, is understandable. As a war leader, he must press for every advantage he could possibly achieve. After all, Winston Churchill acted no differently when urgently seeking maximum levels of American assistance before the U.S. entered World War II.
Moreover, Zelensky’s pressure for early entry into NATO no doubt also stems from the possibility that President Joe Biden will not return to the White House in January 2024; indeed, Russian President Vladimir Putin is known to hope for exactly that outcome.
Nevertheless, given NATO’s reluctance to change its procedures — which involve ratification by the parliaments of each of its members — Zelensky certainly accomplished much during the summit.
On its face, so did Sweden. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan dropped his objections to Swedish entry into the Alliance. Yet the required parliamentary vote to ratify Swedish entry to NATO is far from guaranteed, and Turkey’s parliament will not even take up the issue until October, when it returns from its summer recess. Erdoğan has demanded that Sweden both extradite Kurds that he claims are members of the outlawed PKK terrorist organization and lift its arms embargo against Turkey. And, in a last-minute addition to his wish list, he has pressed for Turkey’s speedy entry into the European Union.
By the time the summit commenced, Sweden had already altered its constitution, agreed to extradite several suspected PKK members and toughened its anti-terrorism laws. It also agreed to lift its arms embargo on Turkey. Finally, Sweden promised to press for Turkish entry to the European Union. For its part, the EU indicated that it would reconsider Turkey’s application for membership in that organization.
Erdoğan made it clear at the conclusion of the summit that he still expected more from Stockholm. He continued to voice outrage at the Swedish government’s failure to punish anti-Turkish protesters who burned the Koran; the most recent of these burnings had taken place only days before the summit. And he insisted that Sweden turn over even more Kurdish residents for prosecution in Turkey.
Erdoğan also had reason to be skeptical about the European Union’s promise to review Turkey’s bid for accession. Turkey first applied for membership in what was then the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1987. It signed a customs union agreement in 1995, and the European Union (EU), the successor to the EEC, finally accepted Turkey as a candidate for full membership in 1999.
There has been no real progress on the Turkish application since then, however, due not only to objections from Greece and Cyprus, which joined the EU in 2004, but also from Germany, France and Austria. While Germany and France may drop their objections thanks to Swedish entreaties, Cyprus and Austria, neither of which are NATO members, have less incentive to do so. Greece likely will also continue to object, especially as it has blamed Turkey for military provocations in the Aegean Sea. Should the EU backslide on Turkish entry, Erdoğan could well renege on his commitment to support Swedish accession to NATO.
Erdoğan also seeks to acquire F-16Bs from the United States. The Biden administration has made it clear it supports the sale, and there are indications that Sen. Bob Menendez (D-N.J.), who has opposed the sale, may at last be giving in to White House pressure to relent. Yet Menendez, who chairs the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, faces countervailing pressures from his strong supporters in the Greek, Armenian and Cypriot communities in America, who have honored him for standing up to Turkey. It is therefore not at all clear if the sale will finally go through.
Given these uncertainties, Erdoğan may yet ensure that his parliament does not ratify NATO’s offer. It would not be the first time the parliament has reneged on a Turkish commitment. In early 2003, just prior to the invasion of Iraq, the Turkish parliament shocked the Bush administration by demanding $10 billion as the price for letting the Fourth Infantry Division transit Turkish territory to attack Iraq. The administration refused to pay, and the Division was denied transit rights. Failure to meet at least some of Erdoğan’s demands could well result in a parliamentary reprise of 2003.
Yogi Berra once observed that it “ain’t over till it’s over.” With regard to Swedish entry to NATO, and indeed that of Ukraine, truer words were never spoken.
Dov S. Zakheim is a senior adviser at the Center for Strategic and International Studies and vice chairman of the board for the Foreign Policy Research Institute. He was undersecretary of Defense (comptroller) and chief financial officer for the Department of Defense from 2001 to 2004 and a deputy undersecretary of Defense from 1985 to 1987.