Two years after the mass demonstrations, Cuba remains as desperate as ever

With this week’s anniversary of the nationwide protests of July 11, 2021, Cuba continues in a precipitous downward spiral. The one-party communist nation continues to experience unprecedented rates of outward migration, protests and government repression.

It is also groaning under the implementation of a restrictive new penal code and a growing failure of leadership. In recent weeks, Cuba’s growing desperation has led to strengthened ties with both China and Russia, including concerning talk of installing a Chinese military and intelligence facility on the island’s eastern coast, just 90 miles from the U.S. mainland.

In 2022 alone, some 220,000 Cubans sought entry at the U.S.-Mexico border. From a historical perspective, these figures represent an exponential rise from previous years. The majority of Cubans now enter via Nicaragua, a close ally of Cuba’s leadership which eliminated visa requirements for Cubans. As a result, Cuban migrants now increasingly flock to the southwest border rather than their usual journey through the Straits of Florida.

This rise in outward migration is a response to vastly deteriorated economic and political conditions, with inflation estimated by some to be nearly 200 percent. Consequently, access to food, medicine and fuel has become a daily struggle for Cubans. Electricity blackouts remain commonplace. While a number of factors are to blame — including a contraction in Cuba’s tourism sector sparked by the pandemic, the loss of Venezuelan subsidies and the 2021 elimination of Cuba’s dual currency system — ultimately, the failure of Cuba’s centrally planned socialist system is to blame.

Internally, it appears many are also questioning the viability of Cuba’s leadership. In power since 2018, Cuban President Miguel Diaz-Canel has had a tumultuous tenure thus far. And although he was “reelected” a few weeks ago, voter abstention and the persistence of protests bodes poorly for his ability to lead effectively going forward.

But rather than consider viable solutions to Cuba’s current challenges, in the last year, Diaz-Canel has doubled down on repression and initiated a new penal code that further criminalizes dissent. Among other provisions, it criminalizes the use of social media and imposes more severe restrictions on challenges to the current pollical system.

In June 2022, the regime sentenced two prominent opposition leaders of the San Isidro Movement, an organization of artists, academics and other activists aimed at demanding political freedom. And just last month, new protests broke out near Guantanamo, leading to the arrest of dozens of demonstrators.

But the most concerning developments of the last year are Cuba’s recent activities on the international front. In addition to supporting Russia’s unprovoked war in Ukraine, Cuba’s regime has invited further Chinese influence, holding talks on expanding Chinese intelligence and military facilities and capabilities in Cuba.

As initially reported by the Wall Street Journal, these efforts appear to be part of China’s Project 141, where the Chinese government seeks to develop its military bases and logistical support capabilities in outposts abroad, including the United Arab Emirates and elsewhere. This comes at a time when China’s influence in Latin America has been on the rise for many years, as evidenced by major growth in trade, foreign direct investments, and partnerships in China’s Belt and Road Initiative. But this latest move, potentially placing Chinese military personnel in an official outpost less than 100 miles from the U.S. mainland, should be cause for serious alarm to the Biden Administration and to U.S. allies. It is all too reminiscent of the Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962.

This is in addition to the recent revelation of an agreement between the two countries to establish an eavesdropping facility on the island. Such an operation would potentially give China access to communications traffic in much of the southeastern U.S., which includes a number of military bases and installments, such as U.S. Southern Command located in South Florida.

Diaz-Canel has meanwhile pledged “unconditional” support for Russia’s war in Ukraine. Initially, this support was largely a rhetorical gesture, but in more recent months, some Cuban immigrants living in Russia have joined in the fighting alongside Russian regulars in an apparent swap for citizenship. Also, in May 2023, Cuba’s military signed an agreement to train Cuban military personnel in Belarus, which neighbors Ukraine and was used as a staging point early in the war. These activities add to other cooperative agreements already in place, including the Lourdes intelligence gathering facility located near Havana, which reopened in 2014 and is currently managed by Russia’s military intelligence unit and its Federal Agency for Government Communications.

Together, these developments demonstrate that Cuba’s vulnerability has reached critical levels. Over the last 64 years of revolution, Cuba has faced dozens of crises, but these last two years have been unprecedented in several ways. The escalating desperation of both Cuba’s leadership and its ordinary citizens will continue to lead to drastic choices. As the U.S. ponders its future policies toward Cuba, President Biden should remain concerned and vigilant about this economically strapped, politically weak and internally volatile nation

Cristina Lopez-Gottardi is assistant professor and chair of programming at the University of Virginia’s Miller Center.