Is Putin toast? Perhaps not

The stunning events that took place in Russia last weekend struck some as a 21st-century version of the October 1917 Revolution. Wagner Group chief Yevgeny Prigozhin appeared to have mutinied out of a combination of disgust over the incompetence of how Russia’s “special military operation” in Ukraine was being conducted and how Defense Minister Sergei Shoigu and Chief of General Staff Valery Gerasimov purposely failed to support the Wagner Group with ammunition and logistics. 

With some of his forces closing to within 150 miles of Moscow, Prigozhin suddenly reversed course and called off the advance.

As astounding, Belarus’s president, Alexander Lukashenko, immediately intervened to broker an agreement in which Prigozhin would self-exile in Belarus and, along with his troops, be granted immunity from all charges. This remains a highly unpredictable work in progress. Will Russian President Vladimir Putin exact revenge and, if so, on whom? What is the future of Shoigu and Gerasimov as well as Prigozhin? 

And, most importantly, does this extraordinary episode demonstrate cracks in the Kremlin and in Putin’s continued control of his country? Is Putin in grave political trouble and, if so, who might replace him? Conventional wisdom suggests that the answers are yes. But are they? 

While the evidence suggests that Putin is facing a crisis, one question must be answered because this revolt seemed a bit too neat. Given the sequence and compression in time of how these events unfolded, is it possible that the so-called Prigozhin “mutiny” was contrived, staged and otherwise orchestrated? Is this Russian maskirovka and deception and misdirection? If so, what is the purpose?

Let’s take a closer look. First, U.S. intelligence reportedly detected Wagner staging for this assault against Moscow a few days earlier. Why did Russian intelligence not do the same? Any repositioning of Wagner forces must have been detected by Russian commanders in the field.

Second, why did Prigozhin capitulate so quickly and how did Lukashenko react so immediately? General David Petraeus argued that Prigozhin lost his nerve. But that does not seem to fit his personality.

Third, this was relatively bloodless. The reaction of the citizens of Rostov-on-Don was passive or supportive. Why? Perhaps no one appreciated that this was a mutiny or an assault on the Kremlin.

Fourth, has the negative effect of this mutiny registered on the Russian troops fighting in Ukraine? It would seem that it must have, but cellphones have been removed for tactical reasons (Ukrainians were using them for targeting with a high degree of effectiveness), and news is greatly censored. Hence, it is not certain that the forces in the field are aware of these events, although gossip often spreads quickly at the front.  

Fifth, what might be the end game? Students of Russian and Soviet history know that czars and general secretaries have relied on mercenaries and outside elements to limit or neuter dissident circles at least since Peter the Great. Stalin likewise sent volunteers to fight in the Spanish Civil War as he purged the Red Army.

Putin must grasp that despite his overly optimistic public statements, Russia is not winning in Ukraine and is taking huge casualties and losses. Rebuilding the army and replacing weapons systems will take years. How then might Putin reverse the war?

Suppose Prigozhin’s move to Belarus is cover and deception for an attack from the west into Ukraine by Wagner. Even a small incursion could cause panic or at least disrupt Ukraine’s current counteroffensive. Is Putin that clever and that bold? And could secrecy be assured? We simply don’t know.

Or suppose Putin is looking to negotiate an end to the war. By staging a mock mutiny, clearly the appearance of weakness has been created. Through third parties (Lukashenko, Hungary’s Viktor Orban, China’s Xi Jinping or Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan), Putin could be extending an offer.

Unconventional answers must be considered. Too often, groupthink has led to many Western leaders failing to understand or comprehend the intentions and actions of others. For example, for too long, the U.S. expected and hoped that economic liberalization would lead to political liberalization.

After the implosion of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the economic inroads to China, the false conclusion was that politics would follow suit. They did not. Unfolding events in Russia will clarify and answer many questions. Until then, do not be complacent.

Harlan Ullman is a senior adviser at the Washington, D.C., Atlantic Council and the prime author of the “shock and awe” doctrine. His 12th book, “The Fifth Horseman and the New MAD:  How Massive Attacks of Disruption Became the Looming Existential Danger to a Divided Nation and the World at Large,” is available on Amazon. He can be reached on Twitter @harlankullman.