Why the US cannot turn its back on Turkey

The reelection of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to a third five-year term as president of Turkey sends a stark warning to the United States and its NATO allies: Be careful in dealing with Turkey, which is sure to veer between friendship with Moscow and highly qualified support for Ukraine in its war with the Russians.

Erdoğan’s victory was narrow — about 52 percent compared with 48 percent for the liberal Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu in a runoff election that challenged Erdoğan’s authoritarian rule. Erdoğan is likely to build on his reputation as a strongman while carving out almost a neutral position between Russia and the west.

In his zeal to revive Turkey’s place as a great power and bridge between Europe, the Middle East and the East bloc, it would be risky ever to count on Turkey for the unreserved support expected of a NATO ally. The Americans will have to court Erdoğan carefully, trying not to offend him by too much criticism of his dictatorial tendencies but also showing a certain respect for his desire to pursue a middle line at the vortex of swirling political, diplomatic and military currents.

American relations with Turkey are greatly complicated by the presence of about 5,000 American troops, American planes and even 50 nuclear bombs on bases in Turkey. The arrangement dates from Turkey’s once enthusiastic membership in NATO but now is at the center of ongoing difficulties between Turkey and the U.S. Problems range from Washington’s indirect ties with Kurdish forces that want to carve out their own independent Kurdistan, including bits of Turkey and Syria, to Turkey’s insistence on importing Russia’s S-400 missile defense system while also buying American F-16s.

Erdoğan by now is a master at playing the game of non-alignment between Washington and Moscow, playing up to Russia’s President Vladimir Putin while remaining on cordial terms with President Joe Biden. Both Putin and Biden were careful to congratulate him on his victory while Erdoğan hesitates to hint at breaking away from NATO.

In fact, Erdoğan, now that he is sure of another five years in office, is expected to endorse Sweden’s application for membership in NATO after having refused as a result of Sweden’s soft policy on Kurds seen as terrorists.

Turkey has such a pivotal geographic position — it guards entry to the Black Sea and maintains control over vessels moving to ports in Ukraine, including Russian-occupied Crimea, as well as to Russia — that it would be foolish for any NATO nation not to appreciate his desire to play both sides against the other. NATO should be thankful for his influence in opening the way for Ukraine to resume shipments of grain that are needed to sustain Ukraine’s embattled economy and to feed other countries.

Nor should it be forgotten that Turkey has exported drones, armored personnel carriers and body armor to Ukraine while importing Russian food and other products, notably iron and steel, that Moscow needs for its own shaky economy.

Turkey under Erdoğan, however, cannot be an enthusiastic voice for U.S. policy in the region while Washington remains at odds with Iran. Erdoğan is restoring Turkey to its roots, courting Islamic support while countering modern Turkey’s long history of democratic reform. While sharply criticizing Israel in clashes with Palestinians, however, Erdoğan is also restoring diplomatic relations with Israel. As in his dealings with NATO and Washington, he believes in a calculated move that will ensure a strong bargaining position for Turkey.

That outlook, however, puts the United States in a somewhat precarious position. Steve Cook at the Council on Foreign Relations has written that the U.S. can no longer be sure of free and full use of the Incirlik base in defending NATO interests.

“Because Erdogan’s domestic political needs can dictate Turkey’s foreign policy,” he said in a report for the Council, “use of the base to advance U.S. interests is no longer assured. American officials should never again be forced into a position that leaves U.S. security interests vulnerable to the changing interests of Turkish politicians.”

Cook’s criticism was sweeping. “Unlike in previous eras, Washington and Ankara no longer share overarching threats or interests that bind them together,” he wrote. Moreover, “Erdogan’s consolidation of power and corresponding suppression of journalists, academics, civil society organizations, and minorities” was against the concept of democracy that NATO is committed to defending. No way, he said, should Washington break off with the Kurdish-dominated People’s Defense Units — that is, the YPG — that had proven to be “an effective force fighting the Islamic State and stabilizing northeastern Syria.”

The Ukraine-Russian war, however, has obviously made it difficult for Washington to change the direction of its policy toward Turkey. Now that Erdoğan is sure to remain in power, it would be wrong for Washington to antagonize a long-time ally that can still play a useful role. It’s quite possible the U.S. and Turkey will remain allies, at least superficially, while Turkey acts as a buffer not only between Russia and the west but also between the west and diverse forces in the Middle East.

For South Korea, the implications are clear. President Yoon Suk-yeol, reluctant to provide military aid to Ukraine, should appreciate Erdoğan’s somewhat ambivalent position. While Korea imports vast quantities of oil from the Middle East, there is no reason to criticize Erdoğan for wanting to keep up relations with all sides in the contest for regional power.

Americans may have been disappointed to see Erdoğan cruise to another term in the run-off, but they can be thankful that Turkey is not radically changing course. As long as Turkey is not telling U.S. forces to go home, Washington is leaving them where they are in hopes that the status quo will not markedly change. The fact that American nuclear warheads are still stored inside Turkey underlines the importance of the relationship.

America cannot think about disrupting the Turkish-American alliance while defending Turkey with nukes that may be needed to remind Russia’s President Putin of the risks inherent in his threats of nuclear war.

Donald Kirk has been a journalist for more than 60 years, focusing much of his career on conflict in Asia and the Middle East, including as a correspondent for the Washington Star and Chicago Tribune. He currently is a freelance correspondent covering North and South Korea and is the author of several books about Asian affairs.