The only thing Russia and China have in common is undermining the US

Every meeting between Russia’s President Vladimir Putin and China’s President Xi Jinping is examined for signs of growing cooperation and dependency between the two nations, and this week’s meeting is no exception. Perhaps despite appearances, China and Russia are no closer today than they were before their summit. The constraints on their relationship and the limited grounds for cooperation between them are largely unchanged, although the power dynamic has certainly shifted in China’s favor since their February 2022 meeting, before Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

Russia and China’s relationship is highly constrained. Unlike democratic regimes, which share common values and have deeper connections that promote cooperation, authoritarian regimes typically limit their cooperation to issues of mutual national interest. In the case of Russia and China, one interest predominates: their mutual interest in undermining the U.S.-led liberal international order, which promotes democracy, human rights and free markets. A concurrent goal pursued by both states is the delegitimization of democracy and the promotion of autocracy as the more efficient model for economic development. Beyond those shared goals, and some resource and finance-related cooperation that gives each state short-term benefits, there is little that binds them. And Russia’s war in Ukraine is a strain on that limited partnership. 

Putin and Xi wish to change the shape of the U.S.-led international order, but differ radically in their preferred endgame. Putin’s position seems clear: It appears he would be happy to see the order burned to the ground — the sooner, the better. The international system operates as a constraint on his expansionist goals, his attempts to legitimize his increasingly authoritarian rule and even his personal enrichment. Putin is operating outside of the international order now, having gone unequivocally “rogue.” 

“Atomizing” states — breaking down their relationships with one another and making them believe it is best to operate in their selfish interests rather than cooperate — strengthens Putin’s position at home and abroad. It does so by undermining the very notion that states can cooperate and by making strong-man authoritarian governance seem like the only safe option in a violent world where states have no friends. Putin’s support for far-right nationalist candidates in Europe is part and parcel of this strategy to divide and conquer democratic states and damage the grounds on which they cooperate in the international system. 

China’s endgame appears to be quite different. China derives some benefits from the existing international order and its institutions, particularly in economic ways. It seems China wishes to reform the system, not burn it down. Analysts argue that China is playing a long game wherein China accumulates enough power to overtake the United States, eventually taking the helm of the international system and shaping it into something more to their liking. This international system would pursue economic development — a goal of the current system that has had mixed results — without the democratic- and human rights-promotion aspects of the current system. China’s current efforts in this direction involve working to gain support for their international leadership from the developing world through diplomacy and economic development efforts such as the Belt and Road Initiative. 

In terms of their shared goal of undermining the legitimacy of democracy, China appears happy to support the Kremlin’s efforts to undermine democracy and do its part to promote authoritarian governance. Painting democracies as ineffective, weak and hypocritical is a key goal of both Chinese and Russian information operations. 

Viewed through this lens, China’s reluctance to take Ukraine’s side in the current conflict is not surprising. Xi may be pleased to see a very public case study of democratization — in Ukraine — removed as a rallying cry for populations demanding democratic rule (the autocratic fear of “color revolutions” such as Ukraine’s in 2004 is well established). However, China’s neutrality on the issue also indicates limits on their support for Putin’s actions. China’s decision to abstain from voting on a United Nations General Assembly Resolution condemning Russia’s invasion should not be viewed as support for Russia. Perhaps, if Russia’s initial invasion had been a quick win for Putin, Xi would have seen this as a good omen for his own expansionist plans for Taiwan, and given more unequivocal support. But with Russia passing its first year in Ukraine and all signs pointing to a drawn out and ruinous war of attrition, Putin’s actions seem reckless and supporting him would be too costly. 

A marriage of convenience meant to weaken the liberal international system is what brought these two states together this week, but China seems unwilling to go too far to defend their “limitless friendship” at any cost. Ultimately, Xi will act in China’s interests, and in many ways that will not serve Putin’s. 

Renee Buhr is a professor of political science at the University of St. Thomas.