South Korea sides with the United States in a free Indo-Pacific

The announcement that President Biden will host his South Korean counterpart, President Yoon Suk-yeol, for a state visit in April comes at the perfect time for the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) alliance.

In late 2022, South Korea’s Foreign Minister Park Jin issued Seoul’s long-awaited Indo-Pacific strategy. Within hours, U.S. national security adviser Jake Sullivan had welcomed the strategy as a reflection of U.S.-South Korea “shared commitments” to the region. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman, Wang Wenbin, however, denounced Seoul’s joining “exclusive coteries,” code words for U.S.-led coalitions in the Indo-Pacific.Washington and Beijing had no doubts: Seoul has chosen sides.

Indeed, the Yoon government has labeled its Indo-Pacific approach a “Strategy for a Free, Peaceful, and Prosperous Indo-Pacific Region.” “Peaceful” and “prosperous” were a given. They are central to South Korea’s longstanding foreign policy in general, and its approach toward the Indo-Pacific in particular.

But the inclusion of “free” proved to be more open to internal discussion. This term firmly placed Yoon’s Indo-Pacific strategy in alignment with America’s “Free and Open Indo-Pacific” framework, along with multiple references to values, including democracy, the rule of law and human rights.

Thus, why has the Yoon government decided to launch a strategy that, while helping to boost ties with Washington and other Western countries, could increase tensions between Seoul and Beijing?

There are three key reasons behind this choice. To begin with, Yoon is making a point to designate values as an important component of South Korea’s foreign and security policy, even if critics argue that they don’t apply to domestic politics. For example, South Korea has joined the U.S. and other like-minded partners in United Nations General Assembly votes on North Korea, Russia and, most importantly, Xinjiang and, therefore, China at the UN.

Indeed, the Indo-Pacific strategy explicitly presents South Korea as a liberal democracy supportive of universal values, including freedom, democracy, the rule of law and human rights.  While these words are common for the U.S., the European Union, and Western countries in general, they certainly are not standard in Asia. In this sense, the Yoon government is making a choice in a region where few feel the need to do so.

Furthermore, there is good rapport between the Yoon government and the Biden administration. The latter has cleverly consulted with the former on the implementation of its own Indo-Pacific and other policies, supported Seoul’s North Korea approach, and made a point of making South Korea central to its foreign policy initiatives — from the “Chip 4” alliance to the upcoming Summit for Democracy. This type of recognition matters for Seoul.

Certainly, the relationship between the Yoon government and the Biden administration has suffered from some tensions, too. Yoon’s comments that South Korea may someday develop nuclear weapons and Biden’ Inflation Reduction Act have not gone over well with the other country. But top-level negotiations between the two parties have addressed these issues.

Also, South Korea sees the benefits of siding with the U.S. and other partners such as Japan, Australia, Europe or Canada. This should allow South Korea to be part of discussions about how to shape the security, economic and technological order of the Indo-Pacific and beyond, and to better protect itself against China’s potential retributions.

Seoul certainly could have decided to try to find a more balanced position between Washington and Beijing in the Indo-Pacific. Yet, South Korea apparently believes that its interests are better served by working together with those with whom it shares values.

Critics can point out that Seoul seems to be selective when it comes to values. The Yoon government, for example, is boosting ties with Vietnam — hardly a paragon of democracy and human rights. And the South Korean president has warmly embraced economic cooperation with Middle Eastern autocracies such as Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

But this misses the point. South Korea is taking a leaf from the approach underpinning America’s and Europe’s foreign and security policies: value-driven when it can, and interest-driven when necessary.

In this respect, it is unthinkable that South Korea will join openly anti-China coalitions and look to isolate its next-door neighbor. Sino-South Korean economic ties, China’s relationship with North Korea, and, quite simply, geography dictate that any South Korean government will try to maintain the best possible relationship with Beijing.

Yet, the Yoon government’s Indo-Pacific strategy also states that any cooperation in the region is based on three principles: “inclusiveness,” in that it does not exclude any particular country; “trust,” in that it seeks reliable partners; and “reciprocity,” in that cooperation should be mutually beneficial. There are no points for guessing who Seoul has in mind when it comes to emphasizing reliable partners engaging in a mutually beneficial relationship.

There are thus two main implications coming out of South Korea’s Indo-Pacific strategy. To begin with, South Korea will bring economic, security, political and soft-power resources to the U.S. camp. Whether directly or indirectly, these can help boost the appeal and practical implementation of policies and minilaterals in which South Korea agrees with the U.S., from respect for the law of the sea and green growth to Indo-Pacific Economic Framework for Prosperity (IPEF) and Quad+.

In addition, the position and policies of the U.S. in the region will become stronger. Differently from Japan, Washington’s closest partner in the Indo-Pacific — South Korea — has a longer history of pursuing a more independent foreign policy and not necessarily being in full alignment with the U.S. In this sense, Seoul can be seen as a more neutral actor. This may sometimes rattle proponents of a stronger U.S.-ROK alliance, but it has its benefits.

The Biden administration can now credibly claim that its policies are attractive to a country that in the past may have debated whether to strike a balance between the U.S. and China. Today, South Korea has made clear that its view of the Indo-Pacific aligns with Washington’s.

Ramon Pacheco Pardo (@rpachecopardo) is head of department and professor of international relations, Department of European & International Studies, King’s College, London, and regional envoy for East and Southeast Asia at King’s College. He is also the KF-VUB Korea Chair, Brussels School of Governance, Vrije Universiteit Brussel, and an adjunct nonresident fellow, Korea Chair, at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.