Russia and China should also worry about escalation — not just the West

Anxious Westerners still resist the reality that they are engaged in a new cold war with China.  Beijing, meanwhile, has moved inexorably closer to supplying weapons for Russia’s war in Ukraine, thus entering the proxy war against the United States and the world’s democracies — a decisive feature of a new cold war.

Despite repeated warnings of “consequences” if China sends arms to Russia, Secretary of State Antony Blinken noted last week that U.S. intelligence indicates Beijing is considering doing just that.  

Since the war began, China has been sending “non-lethal” aid to Russia — dual-use technology that can be employed for either civilian or military purposes, knowing full well that Russia uses it to kill Ukrainians and destroy Ukraine’s cities and infrastructure. 

Yet, despite the sanctions regime created to prevent economic or material support for Russia’s aggression, China has incurred no diplomatic or financial penalties for spurning yet another international norm. The release of U.S. intelligence anticipating Russia’s imminent invasion of Ukraine last year did not prevent it from happening. Washington obviously hopes the disclosure of China’s apparent intention to arm Russia will have a better deterrent effect.

The West’s restraint in calling Beijing to account is predicated on the default instinct that standing firm against China will “provoke” it to escalate its hostility and make a bad international situation worse — in addition to jeopardizing profitable economic relations. 

Western hesitancy is part of the preemptive self-deterrence mindset that has inhibited its response to Russian and Chinese assertiveness throughout the post-Cold War era. For example, the self-defeating premise in all tabletop exercises (TTX) simulating a war with China over Taiwan is that the U.S. will invariably seek to “manage” escalation. The working assumption in the exercise is that the United States can always be relied on to be the responsible party preventing things from spinning out of control.

That assurance of Western restraint provides a comfort zone for adversarial China and Russia, empowering them to maneuver advantageously behind their own threats of escalation while freezing an effective Western response.

Putting the onus of rational behavior entirely on America and the West is the reverse of the “madman” theory supposedly espoused by Richard Nixon during the Vietnam War, the psychology that employs unpredictability and irrationality to keep an adversary off-balance.  Russia and China (as well as North Korea and Iran) favor the madman model as they strive to deter effective Western responses to their aggressive behavior.

Both Russia, in its war on Ukraine, and China, in preparing for a war over Taiwan, have brandished the potential use of nuclear weapons to stifle a robust Western response and paralyze even its consideration.  

The tactic’s success was demonstrated by China during the 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Crisis, when a Chinese general’s loose talk about attacking Los Angeles helped deter a second transit of the Strait by a U.S. carrier battle group.  

Last year, President Biden defensively invoked the dreaded prospect of nuclear armageddon when, even before Russia’s invasion started, he precluded U.S. participation in a no-fly zone over Ukraine because “that’s World War III.” Vladimir Putin periodically mentions nuclear weapons to keep the fear alive. China may well find it useful to play the nuclear card again as it increases its threats against Taiwan.

The inhibition against “provoking” Moscow or Beijing is at work even when events are moving in the West’s favor. During his recent visit to Kyiv, Biden emphatically defined NATO’s strategic objective not as victory for Ukraine but as “no victory” for Russia. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, on the anniversary of Putin’s invasion, put the goal of his country’s sacrifice somewhat differently: “Russia must lose.”    

Between the two expressions — Russia simply not winning and Russia actually losing the war — is the vast space of strategic stalemate that increasingly appears to be the objective of Washington and its major NATO allies.  

According to press reports, both U.S. and NATO officials have been issuing veiled warnings to Ukraine’s leaders not to be overly ambitious in their war aims. Western powers are prepared to help push Russia out of Ukrainian territory invaded since Feb. 24, 2022, but not that seized in eastern Ukraine and Crimea in 2014. In other words, the new, revitalized NATO will help reverse Putin’s latest aggression while effectively ratifying the aggression tolerated by the old, flaccid NATO. Zelensky seems alone in challenging the moral and strategic illogic of that approach.

China, meanwhile, is making its own calculations on what it can get away with on Taiwan given the West’s inconsistent responses to Russia’s military adventures in Ukraine.

Presumably, the Biden administration or a successor will not repeat the Ukraine experience by simply reporting the intelligence warning of an imminent attack on Taiwan and belatedly increasing the flow of quality U.S. weapons, as required by the Taiwan Relations Act.  Hopefully, long before that point is reached, Washington will have released all the arms that are being held back for various bureaucratic and policy reasons. The unwisdom of delaying delivery of needed longer-range munitions, tanks and aircraft to Ukraine has been demonstrated by the unnecessary loss of Ukrainian lives, infrastructure and territory.

China’s war against Taiwan will be a naval-, air- and missile-dominated conflict rather than a grinding ground struggle. Given China’s massive military advantage, merely “provid[ing] Taiwan with arms of a defensive character,” as the Taiwan Relations Act requires, will not be sufficient to deter an attack. Russia has proved in Ukraine that when an ostensibly great military power threatens a lesser one, more is needed — not just to help the intended victim to survive but to prevent the war in the first place. For that, the presence of a stronger power demonstrating clarity of intention and strength of will must be imposed on the aggressor’s calculations.

The longstanding, and current, policy of strategic ambiguity on America’s commitment to defend Taiwan does not serve the need for deterrence. Washington instead must draw some credible “red lines” to inform China’s strategic thinking: In the event of a Chinese attack on Taiwan, the United States will immediately recognize Taiwan’s independence and sovereignty. And it will join Taiwan in resisting — i.e., destroying — the attacking elements of the People’s Liberation Army and the bases from which the attacks originated.

If China responds to America’s collective defense actions by attacking U.S. forces, territory or assets, or those of its allies, Washington will consider them as constituting acts of war against not just Taiwan but the United States itself and will act accordingly.

China, not just the West, should be worried about escalation.

Joseph Bosco served as China country director for the secretary of Defense from 2005 to 2006 and as Asia-Pacific director of humanitarian assistance and disaster relief from 2009 to 2010. He served in the Pentagon when Vladimir Putin invaded Georgia and was involved in Department of Defense discussions about the U.S. response. Follow him on Twitter @BoscoJosephA.