The Wall Street Journal’s report that the U.S. was increasing its overtly deployed troop presence on Taiwan to between 100 and 200 soldiers, from around 30 a year ago, is welcome news for the island’s defense. In addition to U.S. forces on Taiwan, the Michigan Army National Guard is hosting the training of a contingent from the Taiwanese military. Closer cooperation in the future, including additional training that will occur on specific U.S. weapons systems and in exercises, is heartening. But much more needs to be accomplished to provide Taiwan with the deterrent that it needs against China.
Taiwan’s security depends upon its own efforts but ultimately, it will depend upon the security umbrella provided by the United States. The U.S. must aid Taiwan to train, equip, supply and maintain its forces, which may be difficult to do while the U.S. aids Ukraine in its war with Russia. In 2021, Russia had about a $1.7 trillion gross domestic product; China’s that year was approximately $18 trillion. While no single measure is perfect, GDP is a good indicator of military power. U.S. aid to Ukraine has been substantial and is likely to continue to increase through this fiscal year. Despite its formidable nuclear capabilities, Russia is only a fraction of the conventional military threat that China could pose to Taiwan and U.S. interests in the Indo-Pacific.
China has the manpower, air and naval power, stockpiles of ballistic and cruise missiles, and the industrial base to fight a long war of attrition against Taiwan that Taipei alone cannot match. Indeed, the U.S. military would be hard pressed to do so. Given China’s power, Taiwan’s military needs far exceed Ukraine’s as the U.S. and Taiwan seek to deter a limited or major attack against the island.
Moreover, Taiwan is a vibrant and wealthy economy — and a superpower in computer chip production. Any damage to its factories will reverberate throughout the U.S. and global economies. It occupies key geopolitical real estate, as Beijing and Washington recognize. For China, it is a cork in the bottle of the first island chain, and so prevents the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) from easily accessing the Pacific, from defending China’s ports from mining, and sustaining the Sea Line of Communication from the East and South China Seas. For the U.S. and its allies, it is valuable for intelligence collection against China and for military bases to threaten China’s forces.
In the realm of political warfare, Taiwan is a democracy. It demonstrates what China might have been had the communists not come to power. Taiwan’s existence is a daily reminder of this — and thus, why the Chinese Communist Party is illegitimate. Taiwan has tremendous value to the U.S. in the cold war with China. A robust U.S. military presence on Taiwan could deter China’s aggression against the island and other U.S. interests and help to keep the cold war cold.
As a rule of thumb, the U.S. should be providing 20 times the amount of aid to Taiwan as it does to Ukraine. Regrettably, it does not. The U.S. should provide orders of magnitude more aid to Taiwan than it does, and certainly more than it does to Ukraine because Taiwan is a key strategic partner — one day, it might once again be an ally of the U.S. — and time is limited to deter a Chinese attack.
The U.S. is producing only so much critical military equipment. What is produced is divided among U.S. needs, those of allies, Ukraine, and others such as Taiwan. The aperture is too narrow and must be expanded immediately, although it will take years for expansion of production to bear fruit. And the clock is ticking. Senior officers have stated that an attack against Taiwan should be expected in the near term. In March 2021, Adm. Philip Davidson, then commander of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, said China likely will attack Taiwan before 2027. In October 2022, Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Michael Gilday warned that the window might be closing, to an attack by 2023. The former commander of U.S. Strategic Command, Adm. Charles Richard, has warned many times about the impending threat from China. Air Force Gen. Mike Minihan’s leaked memo underscores the urgency of these assessments.
There is tremendous value in the U.S. security umbrella but, despite its strength, there are tears in it. Senior civilian officials also have expressed their warnings in this regard. U.S. Secretary of the Navy Carlos Del Toro, in remarks to the National Press Club, said that the PLAN currently has 340 vessels and is on track to have 440 vessels by 2030. China operates 13 shipyards, one of which has greater capability than all U.S. shipyards combined. Accordingly, Del Toro argued, the U.S. operates fewer than 300 vessels and hopes to have 350 vessels by 2045. This imbalance of power is not good for sustaining America’s position in the world — and certainly is harmful for deterring a Chinese attack on Taiwan. More U.S. Navy ships are needed, as well as the shipyards to build, maintain and repair them.
Despite positive steps, including Gilday’s recent visit to Manila, where he worked on tightening relations to help deter a Chinese attack, the U.S. is not treating Taiwan with the urgency the cross-strait balance of power requires. The U.S. needs a 20:1 rule. A presidential visit to Kyiv should compel a score of visits from the president and other senior officials to Taipei. A dollar for Ukrainian security should be matched by 20 for Taiwan. More importantly, Taiwan should receive orders of magnitude more attention from the national security community, the Pentagon, and the intelligence community.
The aid Taiwan needs must be provided now, and bold measures are required from the Biden administration to deter China.
Bradley A. Thayer is director of China policy at the Center for Security Policy and the co-author of “Understanding the China Threat.”