With Nigeria’s presidential elections just weeks away, it looks increasingly likely that the elections will go to a second round, in what would be the first runoff election since the restoration of democracy in 1999. This should be embraced as an exciting new phase in Nigeria’s democratic development. However, in the shadow of pernicious election violence, the prospect of an extended electoral period raises concerns about prolonged instability.
Most of the presidential candidates signed a peace accord in September, yet election-related violence has escalated dramatically since that time, with more than 170 separate incidents reported across 34 states and in more than 100 local government areas (LGAs). January was the worst month for election violence so far, with at least 65 reported cases, including assaults on candidates, violent disruptions at campaign rallies, assassinations of party officials, attacks on Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) facilities, and daytime shootouts between rival political thugs.
There has been little accountability for these incidents and it is hard to escape the conclusion that election violence is fueled by a sense of impunity. Organizations such as Yiaga Africa and Kimpact Development Initiative are monitoring election violence risks and trends in sophisticated ways so that Nigeria’s civil society can prevent and mitigate election violence at the community level. Although these efforts are valuable, a significant reduction in election violence will require changing the incentives contributing to it.
To begin with, security forces must fully investigate incidents of election violence and arrest party officials, operatives and supporters who are involved in organizing and funding election violence at the local level. High-level statements by security force chiefs are helpful but do not go far enough.
Particular attention should be paid to local leaders of major parties in LGAs that experience election violence repeatedly. For example, there are LGAs in Abia, Anambra, Benue, Ebonyi, Edo, Gombe, Imo, Kaduna, Kano, Katsina, Kogi, Lagos, Nasarawa, Ogun, Osun, Rivers and Zamfara states where major parties have conducted multiple attacks since Sept. 29, 2022. In some LGAs, partisan attacks happen week after week, yet the LGA party leaders in these areas are rarely questioned — and almost never publicly named in association with the violence carried out under their party’s banner.
Historic levels of insecurity in Nigeria mean that security forces are stretched thin, but election violence should be a top priority because it has an outsized effect on the legitimacy of the electoral process and can undermine popular acceptance of election results. Election violence also risks forcing election delays, as INEC recently warned.
As the most populous and one of the most economically and strategically important countries in Africa, Nigeria’s democracy and stability should be a matter of grave concern to the U.S. and its democratic partners. To this end, the international community should take action to sanction those who are involved in election violence, including visa bans and asset freezes, as domestic and international nongovernmental organizations have called for repeatedly.
The Jan. 25 announcement that the United States would impose visa restrictions on those found to be undermining democracy in Nigeria is a welcome development, and followed a similar announcement by the British High Commission on Jan. 12. However, these announcements fall short of the type of action necessary to deter election violence. The U.S. visa bans will be issued under section 212(a)(3)C) of the Immigration and Nationality Act, which means the only way for an offender to know if they have been sanctioned is if they apply for a U.S. visa. The United Kingdom has similarly indicated they will not release names of sanctioned individuals because of data privacy concerns.
A more transparent approach — for example, issuing sanctions under authorities where names could be made public — would be a much more effective way of deterring election violence and communicating to Nigerians that there will be international accountability for election violence and malfeasance. At a minimum, the U.S. and U.K. should publicize the number of visa bans issued, so that Nigerians understand if this is a serious effort or a token gesture.
Ultimately, token gestures such as signing peace accords or secret visa bans are unlikely to bend the trajectory of election violence in Nigeria. If election violence is not reduced, it will be difficult to hold credible elections, which could result in the widespread rejection of results and even worse, post-election violence than what Nigeria experienced in 2011. Preventing this outcome will require concerted efforts, both domestically and internationally, to disrupt the incentives for violence by ending the de facto impunity with which it has been treated. Nigeria’s future may well depend on it.
Santiago Stocker is the resident program director for Nigeria at the International Republican Institute (IRI).