Helping Ukraine win quickly benefits everyone

After months of insisting that they could not send western tanks to Ukraine, the U.S. and many of its allies agreed last month to do so. The same pattern of postpone-then-commit had previously delayed the provision of advanced air defense systems, medium-range artillery, and other vital weapons systems. It has begun anew with respect to the Ukrainians’ request for western fighter jets and longer-range missiles that could destroy ammunition depots deeper in occupied Ukraine.

This makes no sense.

We need to declare firmly that our goal is for the Ukrainians to take back their country as quickly as possible. And then we should immediately take all steps necessary to bring about that result.

At this point, it is clear the Ukrainians will win the war. But it is up to us how long the war will linger, how badly the country will be devastated, and how many people will die on both sides. If we give the Ukrainians what they need to block the coming Russian offensive and to sever Russian supply lines to southern Ukraine and Crimea, this war can end relatively soon, without forcing the Ukrainians to storm every Russian defense line on their territory.

Some have been slow to recognize that Russia’s military is a far cry from the powerful Soviet armies that crushed Nazi Germany almost 80 years ago. Massive corruption has long hollowed it out. Never was that more obvious than when the Ukrainians managed to sink the flagship of Russia’s Black Sea Fleet with two relatively unsophisticated home-grown missiles: apparently several of the ship’s self-defense systems were not working.

Despite huge losses in Ukraine, Russia has yet to deploy its supposedly most modern, powerful tank, the Armata. Apparently the Armata only works when nobody is shooting at it. It is pretty good in military parades — except for the time it had to be towed out of Red Square.

Russia is sending its soldiers into battle with rusted-out rifles, flimsy helmets, and field communications based on cheap cellphones that allow the Ukrainians to listen in.

This corruption has forced Russia to rely overwhelmingly on just two major strengths: an enormous volume of artillery and an utter indifference to human lives, very much including those of its own soldiers.

Russia’s massed artillery allowed it to flatten numerous Ukrainian cities and towns. Doing so deprived defenders of cover but also made a mockery of Russian claims to be “liberating” Ukraine. This allowed it to push forward for a time. More recently, however, it has been running short of ammunition, in part because western rockets have allowed Ukrainians to target Russian ammunition depots.

No longer able to blanket areas with shells, Russia has resorted to human wave attacks. These often involve untrained draftees from Russia’s ethnic minorities and convicts paroled to fight. Its professional soldiers assess which Ukrainian defensive positions are least effective at mowing down the massed attackers and target follow-on offensives accordingly. Wounded soldiers are left to die.

Russia’s nine-month-long obsession with the wrecked and strategically insignificant town of Bakhmut has cost it many thousands of lives, with still no result. Because the Ukrainians value their soldiers far more, they may eventually leave the town if the risks become too great, but for now they are content to let Russia weaken itself pointlessly.

More recently, Russia has added a third advantage: It has friends in low places. The terror drones it has bought from Iran, in exchange for helping Iranian weapons programs, have killed many civilians and done serious damage to the Ukrainian power grid. They have not, however, had any impact on the course of the war. The artillery shells North Korea has provided accomplished more but can still be destroyed in ammunition depots if the Ukrainians have enough shells of their own.

Ukraine has consistently held the initiative since late summer. Russia’s imminent offensive likely will not change that in the long run. But even when they are badly armed, badly trained, badly motivated, and badly led, and even when their tactics deliberately sacrifice many lives for scant territory, 500,000 mobilized soldiers can cost a significant number of Ukrainian lives. And the Ukrainians likely will temporarily cede some territory to save lives and combat effectiveness.

Had the west provided tanks sooner, the Ukrainians could have cleared the jumping off points for this offensive.

Some have questioned whether the Ukrainians can retake Crimea by force. Of course, many experts with outdated understandings of Russia’s military predicted that it would conquer Ukraine within a few days — and then insisted that all land the Russians took was gone forever … only to have the Ukrainians reclaim half of the lost territory already.

In fact, the Ukrainians may not need to storm Crimea. So far, they have retaken three large areas from Russia: northern Ukraine around Kyiv, Chernihiv, and Sumy; eastern Ukraine around Kharkiv; and southern Ukraine, including Kherson. In only one of the three — Kharkiv — did the Ukrainians have to storm Russian positions directly. In the north and around Kherson, the Ukrainians severed tenuous Russian supply lines, forcing Russia to withdraw on its own.

The Crimean Peninsula is far more isolated and difficult to supply than either northern Ukraine or Kherson. Russia’s garrison there is almost entirely dependent on a few highways across still-occupied parts of southern Ukraine and the bridge Russia built across the Kerch Straits that separate it from Russia.

Once western tanks arrive, the Ukrainians will be well-positioned to sever the overland supply route at Melitopol, where local civilians are already engaged in extensive sabotage against Russian occupiers. And at that point, medium-range missiles could reach the Kerch Bridge. The Ukrainians have every right to bring it down, as most of it lies on Ukraine’s side of the international border.

The only question is how much we let the Ukrainians accomplish in their summer offensive.

If we commit now to giving the Ukrainians enough tanks to act simultaneously in the South and the East, enough long-range missiles to keep the Russians from bringing their North Korean ammunition to the front and enough fighter jets to protect their tanks and shoot down Iranian drones, the Ukrainians can reclaim so much of their country that further occupation ceases to serve any purpose for Russia and the war ends later this year.

If we continue to prevaricate about giving the Ukrainians what they need, they will still withstand Russia’s offensive, still continue to wear down Russia’s already weakened military, and still reclaim their territory. But the war then could drag on another year at a huge cost to us, to Ukraine, to the many poorer countries whose economies have crumbled since the war disrupted food exports, and to the Russian people.

The choice should be clear.

David A. Super is the Carmack Waterhouse Professor of Law and Economics at Georgetown University Law Center. He also served for several years as the general counsel for the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities. Follow him on Twitter @DavidASuper1