Fairly accounting for weapons in Ukraine

Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates is alleged to have said that when spies smell roses, they look for the funeral. And so, as an old spy, I smelled roses when Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky came to town just before Christmas.

Zelensky was loved. He again showed his country’s bravery against Putin’s brutal war and in doing so gave a bravura performance speaking to Congress and the American public of his worthy cause ­— a cause for which the United States has given nearly $50 billion in a year’s time, with more already pledged. Expensive roses for a worthy cause. Still, a lot of roses given very quickly. And more asked for. Serious questions are about to be asked — and they should be.

Politics and the oversight required

As we move into a new Congressional session, that $50 billion will be under politically motivated investigation by a Republican House with a strong bent toward isolationism. The investigation will be a mixed brew of belief the effort in Ukraine is overblown and a desire in general to attack the Biden administration. No doubt, there will be equally strong push back from a Democratic Senate and the administration. Welcome to oversight as political food fight.

Still, understanding all the political machinations — based on my four decades of experience at CIA, State, and on Capitol Hill dealing with this type of program — it is still a reasonable expectation for Congress to investigate any war spending. And doubtless, as all executive branches do, the Biden administration will hate it. 

But it is what Congress should and must do under our Constitution — protect and oversee the people’s money. Not necessarily to stop spending. Not to play “gotcha.” But to make sense of what has been done, account for the money, and perhaps, obtain lessons learned for the future.

It’s been done before

In the 1940s, as U.S. defense expenditures were ramping up sharply in advance of America’s entry into World War II, a number of Senators — including future President Harry S. Truman — expressed increasing concern over how the money was being spent. Some were vehement isolationists with a soupcon of pro-German attitude. Some were just anti-Roosevelt. Some were seriously concerned over large-scale, rapid spending.

In March 1941, the Senate created a Special Committee to Investigate the National Defense Program “of supplies, materials, munitions, vehicles, aircraft, vessels, plants, camps, and other articles and facilities in connection with the national defense.”

Nicknamed “The Truman Committee” for its chair, the Roosevelt administration — as you would expect — hated it.

But with Truman in the lead, the fairer members of the committee stuck to their guns, and over a four-year period were able to produce tangible results in billions of dollars in savings, uncovering corrupt contracts, and helping to streamline contract procedures.

A few oversight lessons learned

Part of my four decades of “Deep Swamp” experiences have been viewing, reviewing, and judging the efficacy of U.S. aid programs overseas. I would like to provide first three “macro” thoughts: One, it is not an easy job to execute these programs.  Two, the critic always has the advantage of not getting their hands dirty in the day-to-day of trying to manage. And three, not one of those programs did not have some problems to be reconciled.

So, to the Congressional overseers, I would like to provide some specific lessons based on my experiences and hope these observations help them make sober judgment about what is happening. To be productive — not just critical.

The very first lesson: Be aware that no matter how clear the mission, there is always judgment cluttered by the Fog of War. It means nothing is going to be 100 percent clear in terms of who is doing what to whom. And things move quickly in wars. What seemed a logical judgement one minute, may not seem so immediately afterward. Giving stinger missiles to the Mujahadeen in Afghanistan was a great idea at the time; afterward, it became a scary game of “who moved my missile where.”

Which leads to the second lesson: The United States may have a great, pinpoint accounting system for our weapons purchases and sales, but it is doubtful the users of the weapons do. So, anticipate that you aren’t exactly going to have an Amazon supply chain verification. And don’t expect a lot of receipts. 

And this leads to another lesson: It will be nearly impossible to determine who used what and where. The supplies that are given are no doubt spread all over a war zone. The logistics are going to be haphazard at best. How were these weapons were distributed? To whom were they distributed? And for what purpose where they used? Shooting a tank with a TOW missile is a fine use. Shooting a Russian HUMVEE, maybe not so much.

Entrepreneurs in the war zone

Another harsh reality in every war is someone illegally profits. Don’t be surprised if some enterprising locals — in and out of the Ukrainian military — made money selling our weapons to others beside Ukrainians. These guys also don’t give each other receipts. And tracking them down is damn difficult, if not impossible.

Another sad lesson: Don’t be surprised by who buys them, from independent arms sellers to terrorist groups, or others who wish to reverse-engineer our technology – think China, Russia, Iran, etc.

And a lesson hard learned: Our enemies are not stupid, and they are reverse-engineering our tactics and strategies. For example, don’t think for one moment that the Chinese and Russian militaries aren’t watching everything we are doing in Ukraine — from supplies, to supply chain — and adjusting their own military training.

Who moved my missile?

A final lesson: America produces a lot of weapons. We send a lot of weapons to war zones. We don’t always think about how we get those excess weapons back. This is a problem as recent as the Afghan withdrawal in 2021. We comfort ourselves saying the new owners won’t know how to maintain the equipment. We might even have disabled some of it. That is whistling through the graveyard: They’ll figure it out, and they will use it for their own purposes. Congress needs to think — and know — about how we can prevent that.

Striking the balance

While Congress may disagree on the efficacy and purpose of the Biden administration’s Ukraine efforts, it does owe a constitutional duty to oversee the spending of the people’s money on this effort. History tells us the Biden administration will not like it. But such is the nature of the balance of powers and duties of the Congress. Remember: In the past, they managed to do a successful review during one of the worst worldwide conflagrations in the 20^th century.

With the right level of diligence — and a minimum of gotcha partisanship — Congress can do it with the same kind of successful results. The American people, whose hard-earned money is being spent, deserve it.

Ronald A. Marks is a former CIA officer who served as Senate liaison for five CIA Directors and intelligence counsel to two Senate Majority Leaders. He currently is a non-resident senior fellow at the Scowcroft Center at The Atlantic Council and visiting professor at the Schar School of Policy and Government at George Mason University.